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The purpose of this paper is to examine the dramatically changed role of Russia in the global economy since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the Soviet institutions collapsed and were either reformed or replaced in a new Russian institutional landscape. The paper presents a fact-based and balanced view of Russia’s evolving role in the global economy, as distinguished from the sometimes one-sided view presented by some Western commentators. The authors establish that the two countervailing views are fundamentally based on different cultural perspectives about institutions, primarily the roles of business and government.

This paper is developed as a perspectives article drawing upon the decades of academic and business experience of all three authors with Russian business, management and the economy. The paper focuses on the structure of Russian institutional change and places it within the historical context of the challenges of various periods of time from the late 1980s to the present. The authors posit that cultural foundations complicate that institutional evolution.

Russia will remain a major player in world markets for energy, raw materials and armaments for the near future at least. Principal institutional questions facing Russia have to do with how to reduce the country’s overall dependence on raw material exports, with its vulnerability to world market fluctuations, and how to modernize Russian economic and political institutions. The degree of success in addressing these questions will depend largely upon the ability of the new and reformed economic institutions to show the flexibility to respond to changes in the global order, on whether political considerations will continue to supersede economic issues, and how markedly cultural traditions will continue to impede positive changes.

The entire system of international trade is under question, disrupted by the growing nationalism that is threatening the globalization that became institutionalized over decades in the wake of the Second World War. Russia’s future role is partially dependent upon how new patterns of international trade develop in response to the current disruption of established trade regimes, and by how political conflicts are expressed economically. The authors observe that Russia’s historical and cultural traditions, especially acquiescence to a highly centralized government with a strong autocratic leader, limit the country’s options. The authors explore how Russia’s reactions to Western sanctions have led to a new strategic approach, moving away from full engagement in the global economy to selective economic, and sometimes political, alliances with primarily non-Western countries, most notably China. The authors contrast Russia’s situation with that of China, which has been able to make substantial economic progress while still embracing a strong, centralized political institutional structure.

Many Western analysts have viewed Russian institutional evolution very critically through the lens of Western politics and sanctions, while Russia has continued along its own path of economic and institutional development. Each view, the authors argue, is based upon differing cultural perspectives of the roles of business and government. As a result, a distinct difference exists between the Western and Russian perspectives on Russia’s role in the world. This paper presents both points of view and explores the future of Russia’s position in the world economy based upon its evolving strategy for national economic policy. The authors contrast the situations of Russia and China, highlighting how Western-centric cultural views have affected perceptions of each country, sometimes similarly and at times with decided differences.

This study aims to attempt to investigate the time-varying causality and price spillover effects between crude oil and exchange rate markets in G7 economies during the COVID-19 and Russia–Ukraine crises.

This study uses time-varying Granger causality test and spillover index.

This study finds a time-varying causality between exchange rate returns and oil prices, implying that crude oil prices have the predictive power of the foreign exchange rate markets in G7 economies in their domain. Furthermore, the total spillover index is estimated to fall significantly around COVID-19 and war events. However, this index is relatively high – more than 57% during the first wave of COVID-19 and decreasing slightly during the Russia–Ukraine conflict.

This outcome supports the hypothesis that the majority of the time-varying interaction between exchange rates and oil prices takes place in the short term. As a result, the time-varying characteristics provide straightforward insight for investors and policymakers to fully understand the intercorrelation between oil prices and the G7 exchange rate markets.

First, this study has reexamined the oil–exchange rate nexus to highlight new evidence using novel time-varying Granger causality model recently proposed by Shi et al. (2018) and the spillover index proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). These approaches allow the author to improve understanding of time-varying causal associations and return transmission between exchange rates and oil prices. Second, compared to past papers, this paper has used data from December 31, 2019, to October 31, 2022, to offer a fresh and accurate structure between the markets, which indicates the unique experience of the COVID-19 outbreak and Russia–Ukraine war episodes. Third, this study analyzes a data set of seven advanced economies (G7) exhibiting significant variations in their economic situations and responding to global stress times.

The study's objective is to measure the response of the food prices to the aggregate and disaggregate geopolitical risk events, Russia's geopolitical risks and global energy prices in the context of two European regions, i.e. Eastern and Western Europe covering the monthly data from January 2001 to March 2022.

The authors apply a novel and sophisticated econometric method, the cross-quantilogram (CQ) approach, to analyse the authors’ monthly data properties. This method detects the causal relationship between the variables under the bi-variate modelling approach. More importantly, the CQ procedure divulges the bearish and bullish states of the causal association between the variables under short, medium and long memories.

The authors find that aggregate measures of geopolitical risk reduce food prices in the short term in the Eastern Europe but increases food prices in the Western Europe. Besides, the decomposed measures of geopolitical risk “threats” and “acts” have heterogeneous effects on the food prices. More importantly, Russia's geopolitical risk events and global energy prices enhance the food inflation under long memory.

The authors provide diverse policy implications for Eastern and Western Europe based on the authors’ findings. First, the European policymakers should take concrete and joint policy measures to tackle the detrimental effects of geopolitical risks to bring stability to the food markets. Second, this region should emphasize utilizing their unused agricultural lands to grow more crops to avoid external dependence on food. Third, the European Union and its partners should begin global initiatives to help smallholder farmers because of their contribution to the resilience of disadvantaged, predominantly rural communities. Fourth, geopolitically affected European countries like Ukraine should deal with a crippled supply chain to safeguard their production infrastructure. Fifth, fuel (oil) scarcity in the European region due to the Russia-Ukraine war should be mitigated by searching for alternative sources (countries) for smooth food transportation for trade. Finally, as Europe and its Allies impose new sanctions in response to the Russia-Ukraine war, it can have immediate and long-run disastrous consequences on the European and the global total food systems. In this case, all European blocks mandate cultivating stratagems to safeguard food security and evade a long-run cataclysm with multitudinous geopolitical magnitudes for European countries and the rest of the world.

This is the maiden study that considers the aggregated and disaggregated measures of the geopolitical risk events, Russia's geopolitical risks and global energy prices and delves into these dynamics' effects on food prices. Notably, linking the context of the Russia-Ukraine war is a significant value addition to the existing piece of food literature.

This study investigates the impacts of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on the cross-correlation between agricultural commodity prices and crude oil prices.

The authors used MultiFractal Detrended Fluctuation Cross-Correlation Analysis (MF-X-DFA) to explore the correlation behavior before and during conflict. The authors analyzed the price connections between future prices for crude oil and agricultural commodities. Data consists of daily futures price returns for agricultural commodities (Corn, Soybean and Wheat) and Crude Oil (Brent) traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange from Aug 3, 2020, to July 29, 2022.

The results suggest that cross-correlation behavior changed after the conflict. The multifractal behavior was observed in the cross correlations. The Russia–Ukraine conflict caused an increase in the series' fractal strength. The study findings showed that the correlations involving the wheat market were higher and anti-persistent behavior was observed.

The study was limited by the number of observations after the Russia–Ukraine conflict.

This study contributes to the literature that investigates the impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on the financial market. As this is a recent event, as far as we know, we did not find another study that investigated cross-correlation in agricultural commodities using multifractal analysis.

The article compares the effect of European Union (EU)-Russian sanctions imposed in 2014 with the influence of fluctuating oil prices on Danish trade.

In this paper annual import and export trade data between Denmark and 152 countries from the period 2002–18 were computed in STATA/SE 16.1 using the Gravity model to evaluate the effect of economic sanctions and the price of oil.

Results showed that the impact from the fall of oil price exceeded the negative effect from sanctions on Danish export. Additionally, the analyses suggest that the fall in oil price had a negative effect on Danish import. Even so, Danish import significantly increased due to growth in supplies of energy resources from Russia.

This study explains the overlapping effects of EU-Russian sanctions and fluctuating oil prices on Danish trade. This methodology can be expanded to encompass multiple countries using the two-sided Gravity model.