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The purpose of this paper is to examine the dramatically changed role of Russia in the global economy since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the Soviet institutions collapsed and were either reformed or replaced in a new Russian institutional landscape. The paper presents a fact-based and balanced view of Russia’s evolving role in the global economy, as distinguished from the sometimes one-sided view presented by some Western commentators. The authors establish that the two countervailing views are fundamentally based on different cultural perspectives about institutions, primarily the roles of business and government.

This paper is developed as a perspectives article drawing upon the decades of academic and business experience of all three authors with Russian business, management and the economy. The paper focuses on the structure of Russian institutional change and places it within the historical context of the challenges of various periods of time from the late 1980s to the present. The authors posit that cultural foundations complicate that institutional evolution.

Russia will remain a major player in world markets for energy, raw materials and armaments for the near future at least. Principal institutional questions facing Russia have to do with how to reduce the country’s overall dependence on raw material exports, with its vulnerability to world market fluctuations, and how to modernize Russian economic and political institutions. The degree of success in addressing these questions will depend largely upon the ability of the new and reformed economic institutions to show the flexibility to respond to changes in the global order, on whether political considerations will continue to supersede economic issues, and how markedly cultural traditions will continue to impede positive changes.

The entire system of international trade is under question, disrupted by the growing nationalism that is threatening the globalization that became institutionalized over decades in the wake of the Second World War. Russia’s future role is partially dependent upon how new patterns of international trade develop in response to the current disruption of established trade regimes, and by how political conflicts are expressed economically. The authors observe that Russia’s historical and cultural traditions, especially acquiescence to a highly centralized government with a strong autocratic leader, limit the country’s options. The authors explore how Russia’s reactions to Western sanctions have led to a new strategic approach, moving away from full engagement in the global economy to selective economic, and sometimes political, alliances with primarily non-Western countries, most notably China. The authors contrast Russia’s situation with that of China, which has been able to make substantial economic progress while still embracing a strong, centralized political institutional structure.

Many Western analysts have viewed Russian institutional evolution very critically through the lens of Western politics and sanctions, while Russia has continued along its own path of economic and institutional development. Each view, the authors argue, is based upon differing cultural perspectives of the roles of business and government. As a result, a distinct difference exists between the Western and Russian perspectives on Russia’s role in the world. This paper presents both points of view and explores the future of Russia’s position in the world economy based upon its evolving strategy for national economic policy. The authors contrast the situations of Russia and China, highlighting how Western-centric cultural views have affected perceptions of each country, sometimes similarly and at times with decided differences.

This study aims to attempt to investigate the time-varying causality and price spillover effects between crude oil and exchange rate markets in G7 economies during the COVID-19 and Russia–Ukraine crises.

This study uses time-varying Granger causality test and spillover index.

This study finds a time-varying causality between exchange rate returns and oil prices, implying that crude oil prices have the predictive power of the foreign exchange rate markets in G7 economies in their domain. Furthermore, the total spillover index is estimated to fall significantly around COVID-19 and war events. However, this index is relatively high – more than 57% during the first wave of COVID-19 and decreasing slightly during the Russia–Ukraine conflict.

This outcome supports the hypothesis that the majority of the time-varying interaction between exchange rates and oil prices takes place in the short term. As a result, the time-varying characteristics provide straightforward insight for investors and policymakers to fully understand the intercorrelation between oil prices and the G7 exchange rate markets.

First, this study has reexamined the oil–exchange rate nexus to highlight new evidence using novel time-varying Granger causality model recently proposed by Shi et al. (2018) and the spillover index proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). These approaches allow the author to improve understanding of time-varying causal associations and return transmission between exchange rates and oil prices. Second, compared to past papers, this paper has used data from December 31, 2019, to October 31, 2022, to offer a fresh and accurate structure between the markets, which indicates the unique experience of the COVID-19 outbreak and Russia–Ukraine war episodes. Third, this study analyzes a data set of seven advanced economies (G7) exhibiting significant variations in their economic situations and responding to global stress times.

The study's objective is to measure the response of the food prices to the aggregate and disaggregate geopolitical risk events, Russia's geopolitical risks and global energy prices in the context of two European regions, i.e. Eastern and Western Europe covering the monthly data from January 2001 to March 2022.

The authors apply a novel and sophisticated econometric method, the cross-quantilogram (CQ) approach, to analyse the authors’ monthly data properties. This method detects the causal relationship between the variables under the bi-variate modelling approach. More importantly, the CQ procedure divulges the bearish and bullish states of the causal association between the variables under short, medium and long memories.

The authors find that aggregate measures of geopolitical risk reduce food prices in the short term in the Eastern Europe but increases food prices in the Western Europe. Besides, the decomposed measures of geopolitical risk “threats” and “acts” have heterogeneous effects on the food prices. More importantly, Russia's geopolitical risk events and global energy prices enhance the food inflation under long memory.

The authors provide diverse policy implications for Eastern and Western Europe based on the authors’ findings. First, the European policymakers should take concrete and joint policy measures to tackle the detrimental effects of geopolitical risks to bring stability to the food markets. Second, this region should emphasize utilizing their unused agricultural lands to grow more crops to avoid external dependence on food. Third, the European Union and its partners should begin global initiatives to help smallholder farmers because of their contribution to the resilience of disadvantaged, predominantly rural communities. Fourth, geopolitically affected European countries like Ukraine should deal with a crippled supply chain to safeguard their production infrastructure. Fifth, fuel (oil) scarcity in the European region due to the Russia-Ukraine war should be mitigated by searching for alternative sources (countries) for smooth food transportation for trade. Finally, as Europe and its Allies impose new sanctions in response to the Russia-Ukraine war, it can have immediate and long-run disastrous consequences on the European and the global total food systems. In this case, all European blocks mandate cultivating stratagems to safeguard food security and evade a long-run cataclysm with multitudinous geopolitical magnitudes for European countries and the rest of the world.

This is the maiden study that considers the aggregated and disaggregated measures of the geopolitical risk events, Russia's geopolitical risks and global energy prices and delves into these dynamics' effects on food prices. Notably, linking the context of the Russia-Ukraine war is a significant value addition to the existing piece of food literature.

The article compares the effect of European Union (EU)-Russian sanctions imposed in 2014 with the influence of fluctuating oil prices on Danish trade.

In this paper annual import and export trade data between Denmark and 152 countries from the period 2002–18 were computed in STATA/SE 16.1 using the Gravity model to evaluate the effect of economic sanctions and the price of oil.

Results showed that the impact from the fall of oil price exceeded the negative effect from sanctions on Danish export. Additionally, the analyses suggest that the fall in oil price had a negative effect on Danish import. Even so, Danish import significantly increased due to growth in supplies of energy resources from Russia.

This study explains the overlapping effects of EU-Russian sanctions and fluctuating oil prices on Danish trade. This methodology can be expanded to encompass multiple countries using the two-sided Gravity model.

This paper aims to study the ongoing and emerging technological changes in the global energy sector from the frequently neglected perspective of their potential destructive impact on the Russian economy.

Having reviewed existing global energy forecasts made by reputable multilateral and national government agencies, major energy corporations and specialised consulting firms, the authors noticed that most of them are by and large based on the extrapolation of conventional long-term trends depicting gradual growth of fossil fuels’ demand and catching-up supply. Unlike this approach, the paper focuses on the possible cases when conventional trends are broken, supply–demand imbalances become huge and the situation in the global energy markets is rapidly and dramatically changing with severe consequences for the Russian economy, seriously dependent on fossil fuels exports. Revealing these stress scenarios and major drivers leading to their realisation are in the focus of the research. Based on the Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political, Values (analytical framework) (STEEPV) approach, the authors start from analysing various combinations of factors capable to launch stress scenarios for the Russian economy. Formulating concrete stress scenarios and assessing their negative impact on the Russian economy constitute the next step of the analysis. In conclusion, the paper underlines the urgency to integrate stress analysis related to global energy trends into the Russian national systems of technology foresight and strategic planning, which are now in the early stages of development.

The analysis of global energy market trends and various combinations of related economic, political, technological and ecological factors allowed to formulate four stress scenarios particularly painful for the Russian economy. They include the currently developing scenario “Collapse of oil prices”, and three potential ones: “Gas abundance”, “Radical de-carbonisation” and “Hydrogen economy”. One of the most important conclusions of the paper is that technology-related drivers are playing the leading role in stress scenario realisation, but it is usually a specific combination of other drivers (interlacing with technology-related factors) that could trigger the launch a particular scenario.

This study’s approach is based on the assumption that Russia’s dependence on hydrocarbons exports as one of the main structural characteristics of the Russian economy will remain intact. However, for the long-term perspective, this assumption might not hold true. So, new research will be needed to review the stress scenarios within the context of radical diversification of the Russian economy.

This paper suggests a number of practical steps aimed at introducing stress analysis as one of the key functions within the energy-related sectoral components of the Russian national systems of technology forecasting and strategic planning.

The novelty of this paper is determined both by the subject of the analysis and approach taken to reveal it. In contrast to most of research in this area, the main focus has been moved from the opportunities and potential benefits of contemporary technology-related global energy shifts to their possible negative impact on the national economy. Another important original feature of the approach is that existing global energy forecasts are used only as a background for core analysis centred around the cases when conventional energy trends are broken.

The so-called “oil price war” of 2014-2016 took place between several main global oil producers; OPEC (led by Saudi Arabia), Russia and the newcomer; American tight oil or fracking oil. These oil producers were competing against each other over market shares in the global oil market, by maintaining their high oil production rates, even if this led to a decline in oil prices and a reduction in revenues from oil sales. As energy politics need more coverage in International Political Economy (IPE) theory, this paper aims to argue that Saudi Arabia's policies during the oil price war of 2014-2016 reflected a policy of neomercantilism, which is the IPE equivalent of the school of realism in International Relations (IR).

This paper tests for neomercantilism by testing three of its main definitional components. The first definitional component is that the state, as the political authority, intervenes in the economic decisions. The second component is the primacy of the state interests over business corporate profits, or the primacy of political and security considerations over short-term economic and corporate profit considerations. The third is the zero-sum or relative gains nature of dealings between states. Afterwards, this paper tests for neomercantilism in the Saudi policy by examining how each of these definitional components is reflected in the Saudi policy during the oil price war.

As energy politics need more coverage in International Political Economy (IPE) theory, this paper argues that Saudi Arabia's policies during the oil price war of 2014-2016 reflected a policy of neomercantilism, which is the IPE equivalent of the school of realism in International Relations (IR).

As energy politics need more coverage in International Political Economy (IPE) theory, this paper argues that Saudi Arabia's policies during the oil price war of 2014-2016 reflected a policy of neomercantilism, which is the IPE equivalent of the school of realism in International Relations (IR).

In this study, the authors analyze the impact of geopolitics risk on Sukuk, Islamic and composite stocks, oil and gold markets and portfolio diversification implications during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict period.

The study used a mix of wavelet-based approaches, including continuous wavelet transformation and discrete wavelet transformation. The analysis used data from the Geopolitical Risk index (GP{R), Dow Jones Sukuk index (SUKUK), Dow Jones Islamic index (DJII), Dow Jones composite index (DJCI), one of the top crude oil benchmarks which is based on the Europe (BRENT) (oil fields in the North Sea between the Shetland Island and Norway), and Global Gold Price Index (gold) from May 31, 2012, to June 13, 2022.

The results of the study indicate that during the COVID-19 and Russia–Ukraine conflict period geopolitical risk (GPR) was in the leading position, where BRENT confirmed the lagging relationship. On the other hand, during the COVID-19 pandemic period, SUKUK, DJII and DJCI are in the leading position, where GPR confirms the lagging position.

The present study is unique in three respects. First, the authors revisit the influence of GPR on global asset markets such as Islamic stocks, Islamic bonds, conventional stocks, oil and gold. Second, the authors use the wavelet power spectrum and coherence analysis to determine the level of reliance based on time and frequency features. Third, the authors conduct an empirical study that includes recent endogenous shocks generated by health crises such as the COVID-19 epidemic, as well as shocks caused by the geopolitical danger of a war between Russia and Ukraine.

1. We analyze the impact of geopolitics risk on Sukuk, Islamic and composite stocks, oil and gold markets and portfolio diversification implications during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict period.

2. The results of the wavelet-based approach show that Dow Jones composite and Islamic indexes have observed the highest mean return during the study period.

3. GPR and BRENT are estimated to have the highest amount of risk throughout the observation period.

4. Dow Jones Sukuk, Islamic and composite stock show similar trend of volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic period and comparatively gold observes lower variance during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict.

We analyze the impact of geopolitics risk on Sukuk, Islamic and composite stocks, oil and gold markets and portfolio diversification implications during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict period.

The results of the wavelet-based approach show that Dow Jones composite and Islamic indexes have observed the highest mean return during the study period.

GPR and BRENT are estimated to have the highest amount of risk throughout the observation period.

Dow Jones Sukuk, Islamic and composite stock show similar trend of volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic period and comparatively gold observes lower variance during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict.

This paper aims to accommodate the influence of both economic policy uncertainty and geopolitical risks in the relationship between oil price and exchange-rate returns in the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) countries through an interaction term (EPGR).

The authors use continuous wavelet transform (CWT), wavelet coherence (WC) and partial wavelet coherence (PWC). First, the authors apply the CWT to examine the evolution of oil prices, EPGR and exchange rate returns. Second, the authors use WC to investigate the relationship between oil price and exchange rate returns (excluding EPGR). Third, the authors use PWC to account for EPGR’s impact on the oil exchange rate returns dynamics and explore partial correlations in the oil and exchange rate returns dynamics.

The empirical results generally show that EPGR is a key driver in the oil and exchange rate returns nexus.

The relevance of EPGR in influencing exchange rate volatility is confirmed by the findings. As a result, it is critical for government officials and foreign exchange investors to use EPGR as a leading indicator when establishing foreign exchange trading strategies and economic forecasts.

This study is the first, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to apply a wavelet-based technique to account for EPGR in the relationship between oil and exchange rate returns in the BRICS countries.

The authors empirically aim to study the implications of uncertainty generated by oil price volatility on some key macroeconomic variables, including production, exchange rates and interest rates, of both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Using a block exogeneity structural Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model that mutes the effects of domestic variables on global factors and that is suitable for small open economies because of significant differences in the responses of domestic production in oil-importing countries will most likely decrease through reducing planning horizons, postponing investment projects and relocating resources more inefficiently.

The authors integrated into the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model the block exogeneity feature since all the countries in this study are small open economies that cannot influence the global economic variables. The block exogeneity feature imposes the restriction that the domestic variables have neither a contemporaneous nor a lagged impact on the global variables. This model has eight variables: oil price volatility, world demand and federal funds rate as the global variables; and domestic production, monetary aggregate, inflation rate, exchange rate and interest rate as domestic variables. The authors assemble the data for 12 developing countries for which the necessary data for the analysis are available: six oil exporting countries (Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico and Colombia) and six oil importing countries (Turkey, India, Philippines, Poland, South Africa and Indonesia).

The results point out significant differences in the responses of macroeconomic variables to oil price volatility shocks between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Furthermore, the local currencies of these countries depreciate due to concerns about possible current account worsening. In response to the shock, domestic interest rates are reduced so as to alleviate the negative exposure of the shock on domestic economic activity. While domestic production in some oil-exporting countries (i.e. Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran) increases during oil price uncertainty; in some other countries (i.e. Mexico, Kazakhstan and Colombia), domestic production decreases.

Several components of the study contribute to its novelty. One of them is the period under consideration. The time frame that encompasses the most significant geopolitical and financial events, such as the Middle East Spring and the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. The research was conducted using the block-exogeneity SVAR model, which includes 12 oil exporting and importing developing countries. With this model, the global dynamics, particularly the energy market, that these nations may influence and are influenced by, i.e. global and nonglobal factors can be constrained. This makes it easy to determine the various effects prices have on macroeconomic variables.

1. Oil prices and volatility still matter to the global economy

2. Monetary and fiscal policy interventions in response to oil price volatility create uncertainty and impede investment activity

3. The response of macroeconomic variables to volatility shocks in oil prices varies across oil importers and exporters

4. Interest rates help stabilize production in oil-importing economies that have well-functioning financial markets

Oil prices and volatility still matter to the global economy

Monetary and fiscal policy interventions in response to oil price volatility create uncertainty and impede investment activity

The response of macroeconomic variables to volatility shocks in oil prices varies across oil importers and exporters

Interest rates help stabilize production in oil-importing economies that have well-functioning financial markets

The Russian invasion of Ukraine generated unprecedented panic in the European financial system. As expected, the European Union (EU) felt most of the negative effects of the war due to geographical proximity to Ukraine and energy dependence on Russia. This study aims to investigate the influence of Brent crude oil (BCO), Dutch Title Transfer Facility Natural Gas, and CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) on Deutscher Aktien Index (DAX), Austrian Traded Index (ATX) and Milano Indice di Borsa (FTSEMIB). The German, Austrian and Italian equity indexes were chosen due to the heavy dependence of these countries on Russian gas and oil.

The data cover the period from November 24, 2021, to June 24, 2022, including five months of the Russia–Ukraine war. To generate the intended results, vector autoregressive, structural vector autoregressive, vector error correction model, Johansen test and Granger causality test were used.

The results highlight that natural gas and the VIX carried negative effects on DAX, ATX and FTSEMIB. The BCO was expected to have influenced three selected equity indexes, while the results suggest that it was priced only in ATX.

This research provides modest evidence for the policymakers on the systemic risk that Russian gas has for the EU equity markets. From a managerial perspective, changes in oil and gas prices are a permanently integral part of portfolio risk analysis.