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The purpose of this paper is to emphasize that East Asia and South East Asia, despite enormous economic advances, have a deficit on rule of law, analysed as either judicial autonomy and legal integrity (rule of law I) or as voice and accountability (rule of law II).

First, a distinction is made between two key aspects of rule of law; second, these two aspects are measured by data from the World Bank Governance project, relating them to various measures on socio‐economic development and economic growth.

It is not generally true that development leads to or entails freedom, as several countries in the ASEAN +3 region display low scores on either one of the dimensions of rule of law or both.

In both research and in practice, one needs to devote more effort into understanding how rapid economic development may be possible without strong rule of law, either as legal integrity and judicial autonomy, or as voice and political accountability. In the process of globalisation, demands for more of rule of law in this region appear justifiable.

This paper provides useful information on economic development and political development, which is highly relevant for understanding the implication of economic growth in the countries in ASEAN +3.

Despite a global consensus that rule of law is desirable, there are important debates about what this entails and how it can be achieved or supported in developing and transitional countries of the Global South. Accordingly, this chapter considers the importance and contextual suitability of rule of law as a building block for ‘peaceful and inclusive societies’ in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). We begin by examining key definitional debates and consider the challenges inherent to monitoring progress towards SDG target 16.3 which seeks to ‘promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all’. We proceed to illustrate some of these definitional and methodological limitations by considering how favourable rankings of model Western democracies mask rule of law deficits that relate to access to justice and the protection of human rights for marginalised populations. This critique highlights an important point that is repeatedly emphasised throughout the rule of law literature: rule of law is not an end state but rather an ideal that all countries must continuously work to realise and sustain. The remainder of the chapter considers the challenges of promoting a Western rule of law agenda in a failed and titular democracy (the Solomon Islands) and a peaceful and prosperous country (Singapore) which adheres to a ‘thin’ definition of the rule of law that does not conform with liberal ideals.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the congruence between Nigeria’s unremitting rule of law deficit, corruption pandemic and its crisis of developmentalism. The paper proves that market failures and state failures are mutually reinforcing and are functions of systemic official corruption in the private and public sectors of the Nigerian economy.

This study is library-based. It relies on secondary data generated by the variegated multilateral agencies, law reports of international and municipal tribunals, relevant books, journals, monographs policy papers and so forth as the basis of analysis.

Findings suggest that Nigeria’s corruption pandemic is a derivative of its unremitting rule of law deficit and that its crisis of developmentalism is a logical function of the pervasive normlessness, very wide latitude for discretion, arbitrariness, weak institutions and lack of centrality of law and its institutions, which characterise its body politik.

Systemic corruption in Nigeria affects the citizens’ perception of social justice and equity and undermines economic efficiency. It has also distorted the work reward causality, which has engendered a rentier social-economic order.

By first demonstrating the congruence between Nigeria’s rule of law deficit, corruption and economic and governance failure; the paper focusses on the total breakdown of norms in the Nigerian private and public sectors and resultant stultification of economic growth, sustainable human development and pervasive impoverishment of the citizenry.

Since the late 1990s, developing countries have been encouraged by international financial organisations to adopt a shareholder primacy corporate governance model. It was anticipated that in an increasingly globalised financial market, countries which introduced corporate governance practices that favour investors would gain a comparative advantage and attract more capital leading to financial market growth. This paper aims to empirically test this hypothesis.

The present research paper quantitatively investigates whether adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance norms has had any impact on the growth of the financial market, focusing on nineteen developing countries between 1995 and 2014. Time series indices are prepared for corporate governance regulations, financial market development along with three control indices. Then a lagged multilevel regression between these indices is used to investigate the strength of causality between the adoption of pro-shareholder corporate governance and the growth of the financial market.

The research paper finds that shifting towards a shareholder primacy model in corporate governance has a very small effect on growth of financial market in developing countries. Overall the financial, economic and technological controls have much more impact on the growth of financial markets.

This paper conclusively ends the discussion as to whether change in corporate governance has any impact on financial market growth of a country. The papers uses Bayesian econometric model. The paper thus signals the end of LLSV led question as to whether law can affect finance.

The past few decades have seen a gradual convergence in corporate governance norms the world over, entailing a discernible shift towards shareholder primacy models. It holds particularly true of developing countries, many of which have steadily amended corporate governance norms to enhance the scope of shareholder rights. This is usually justified through the rationale that increasing protection for foreign investors and shareholders would mean greater investment in capital market and overall financial market development. In India, the shift coincides with a series of fundamental economic and financial policy reforms initiated in the 1990s: collectively and loosely referred to as “liberalisation”, this process marks a paradigm-shift from a tightly controlled welfare economy to one considerably more laissez-faire in its orientation. A fallout of which was that the need to attract and sustain foreign investments acquired an unprecedented significance. The purpose of this paper is to help the readers understand in this larger context the corporate law reform initiatives in India, particularly those pertaining to shareholder rights and allied issues.

This paper empirically tests the hypothesis that enhanced shareholder protection leads to greater levels of investments, and financial developments generally. It then uses regression analysis to detect if the change in corporate governance, making it more shareholder-friendly, has had any effect on growth in financial market. It is divided into two broad parts. The first tracks the evolution of corporate governance norms in India. A robust qualitative and quantitative analysis is used to determine the tilt towards a shareholder primacy regime that Indian corporate governance regime now displays. The second chapter deals with the regression analysis where the outcome variable is financial market growth, and explanatory variable is the change in the governance regime with relevant control variables.

The authors find that change in shareholder primacy corporate governance has little effect on financial market growth in India. The authors would suggest that instead of changing the law in books, more emphasis should be given to implement those regulations and increase the overall rule of law.

This is the first time that such a wide-scale study has been conducted in India, using Bayesian methods. It ought to be of immense value to professionals and academics both.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

Financial sustainability requires governments to run sufficiently large primary surpluses going forward to cover the cost of servicing its debt budgets to balance in the long run. In democracies, politicians who strive for reelection often tend to systematically violate this tenet. This paper discusses two types of “anchors” that may be used to cope with this problem by limiting the room for new and excessive public debt. First, we analyze national constitutional safeguards on the basis of the “debt brake” in Switzerland and Germany. Second, we discuss international institutions to maintain financial discipline, referring to the Maastricht-criteria. These anchors are designed to allow policymakers to commit to policies that provide long term financial stability and sustainability of public finances. However, as the recent crises have shown, the problem of time inconsistency in policy making remains, especially when anchors are weak. Therefore, the paper discusses the circumstances under which institutional anchors may help to restrict politician behavior to promote sustainability of public finances. We conclude by indentifying three conditions required for the proper functioning of collective anchors in the context of public finances.

I begin with a dispute over a fox hunt, by which to understand the law of tangible property, then develop that metaphor for the major types of intellectual property. I start with domestic U.S. patent law for the sake of concreteness, and generalize to other jurisdictions and types of intellectual property. In the latter parts of the paper I discuss the international implications of intellectual property, including especially the effects of information spillovers. The last part of the paper describes the hazards in analogizing “trade” in intellectual property rights to trade in goods, and particularly in interpreting international patent data. These hazards motivate the search for a structural model specially adapted to the purpose of valuing international intellectual property rights and rules. The goal is to give economists a simple and integrated framework for analyzing intellectual property across time, jurisdiction and regime type, with an eye towards eventually developing other incentive systems that have the advantages of property (such as decentralized decision-making), but fewer of the disadvantages.

This study investigates the relationship between different levels of state balanced budget laws and state borrowing costs. Using federal guidelines for state balanced budget law classifications, this author inserted dichotomous variables in an empirical model of state borrowing costs. Ordinary Least Squares Regression is utilized to determine which balanced budget laws are recognized in state interest costs. The results indicate a significant relationship between the most restrictive levels of balanced budget laws and state borrowing costs. The strongest balanced budget laws are associated with lower interest costs while the weakest budget laws are associated with higher costs. It appears that taxpayers in states with weaker balanced budget amendments may not be as protected against excessive government growth as those in states with the most stringent balancing requirements.

The federal budget process is a compilation of many rules and procedures, enacted primarily over the past century. Initially neutral as to budget outcome, that process, by the mid-1980s, had evolved to emphasize reducing the deficit. And the budget enforcement procedures put in place to control deficits, combined with robust economic growth, helped to produce historic budget surpluses by the end of 1990s. But in 2001, the economy slowed significantly. The budgetary effects of that slowdown, of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and other factors, brought a return of the deficit in 2002--- ironically, just as the budget enforcement framework put in place to control deficits expired. Now, lawmakers face the question of what new framework should take its place. This article discusses the evolution of federal budgeting, emphasizing the major characteristics of each period and what factors drove reform efforts at each stage.