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Over the years we have reported prosecutions where the defence has alleged, and with circumstantial support that the presence of a harmful foreign body in food was deliberate through the action of a single disgruntled employee or where the labour relations climate generally has been bad. It makes no difference to the manufacturer's responsibility—the offence is an absolute one—but occasionally courts have allowed it in mitigation. Sometimes, it has been the nature of the extraneous material, e.g. fragments of glass or metal, the like of which did not exist in the factory premises or plant. This may be taken as a symptom of the vandalism of the age, but more recently, two incidents have drawn attention to its dangers and provided a glimpse of the criminal mind which can inflict such injury on employers, and expose innocent consumers, of all ages, to possible harm.

Smedleys Ltd v. Breed effectively disposes of Section 3 (3), Food and Drugs Act, 1955 as a defence in law in what nowadays constitutes the commonest source of all food prosecutions, viz., foreign matter in food. Their Lord‐ships' judgment is indeed a brilliant exposition of the law on the subject, but the result of their dismissal of the appeal can only be seen, as one of their number stated, that local authorities and magistrates for all practical purposes can ignore the subsection, and from the numerous reports of legal proceedings, this is what they have been doing for many years. It was resurrected in a case, similar in circumstance to that in Smedleys, a couple of years ago, in respect of a snail in black currant jam, in which the snail and black currants were identical in size and appearance.

Entrepreneurship is a key factor in the growth of regions, given its impact on innovation and job creation. The relationship between start-up companies and their environment is closely linked to negotiation mechanisms since the formation of trust, the governance structure, and how entrepreneurs protect themselves from adverse situations depend on them. However, no single framework can bring together the bargaining, entrepreneurship, and institutional factors that determine the success or failure of start-ups. The objective of this chapter is to jointly analyze bargaining and entrepreneurship through the theory of economic institutionalism, Transaction Cost Theory, and Cognitive Organization Theory. To this end, an analytical scheme is proposed that brings together these precepts applied theoretically to the Latin American case. The scope is to provide a novel framework of analysis by incorporating essential institutional elements for negotiation, such as contracting, governance, organizational structure, trust, relational risks, and hedging against opportunism.

This paper aims to explain the dynamics of entrepreneurial decisions and actions (D&As) in the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) growth process. The study focuses on the changing portfolio and relationship governance and captures these dynamics by using the concept of “enabling constraints” (ECs).

In-depth, long-term and multiple-case study method was adopted based on six high-growth SMEs. Pattern-matching and alternative template approach formed a basis for developing a research framework, further corroborated and advanced in the empirical study.

The research provides empirical evidence of ECs as entrepreneurial perceptions that both limit (constrain) the range of accessible options and facilitate (enable) new opportunities. This study’s results point to how owner-managers' judgments about growth motives and rationales constrain their choices and how they enable new directions, acknowledging the changing context.

This work contributes to the research on SME growth processes by specifying their dynamics in terms of a creative mutual causality. Here, D&As stem from entrepreneurs' perceptions that are affected by the context, with the latter also shaped by prior decisions and actions. This theoretical contribution has been synthesized in the form of a framework of ECs in the SME growth process with related propositions.

In an effort to restore investor confidence in the wake of recent financial reporting scandals, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 mandates that audit committees be fully independent and have at least one financial expert. The SEC adopted rules implementing these Sarbanes‐Oxley provisions. This paper contributes to the literature on the association between audit committee characteristics recommended by SOX and the likelihood of fraud in two ways. First, we focus on audit committee composition and the extent of the underlying nature of the firm (e.g., firm size, growth) and the contracting environment (e.g., managerial ownership, leverage) of the firm on the likelihood of fraud. In particular, we find that the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting is negatively related to audit committee independence, number of audit committee meetings and managerial ownership and positively related to firm size and firm growth opportunities. Second, we separately examine firms with totally independent audit committees and fraudulent financial reporting. This sample is interesting because these are firms that had good corporate governance and yet still had fraudulent financial reporting. By separately examining firms with totally independent audit committees, we find that the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting given a totally independent audit committee is inversely related to the level of managerial ownership and the number of audit committee meetings.

A survey of young microfirms was conducted to investigate their growth intentions. The findings confirm the distinct profiles of four types of firms categorized on the basis of current and future employment: Lifestyler, Entrepreneur, Manager, and Mover. They differ in terms of the owner's perceptions of the desirability and practicality of growing their firm, and with respect to the moderating variables of industry affiliation, business location, and investment level. Research issues and service implications for business support agencies are identified.

The purpose of this paper is to explain how the process that occurs before an entrepreneurial failure event provides a coached learning setting that creates entrepreneurial expertise.

This is a conceptual paper drawing on the literatures of expert information processing theory and deliberate-practice expertise development to suggest a model and propositions that flow from the analysis.

Adding to the expert performance literature – specifically the introduction of the notion of emergent practice – this paper proposes that the intensity of the fight to avoid entrepreneurial failure, the duration of the fight, the content required in that fight, and the clarity and rapidity of feedback received, are associated with the creation of entrepreneurial expertise.

This paper complements research on learning from failure by exploring how significant learning before entrepreneurial failure either occurs or is avoided, can lead to the creation of entrepreneurial expertise.

This research provides guidance for entrepreneurs engaged in the fight to avoid entrepreneurial failure, and suggests ways for prospective supporters to better assess entrepreneurs with failed ventures in their history.

The paper applies the deliberate-practice concept, common in sports, games, and the arts, to an “emergent practice” setting; that is, within a real-life (marketplace) setting within which the “fight” to avoid entrepreneurial failure functions as the “coach”; and it describes how the learning necessary for the creation of entrepreneurial expertise likely takes place.