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This chapter’s goal is to define the kind of seeds to be planted for moving forward in the safe and stable drive toward a leading central banking role directed at achieving a sustained Islamic banking and finance development within the global financial system. The system witnessed the input of Islamic banking with its fruitful contribution as a feasible banking structure in both implementing agreed reforms and shaping the next steps directed toward crisis prevention and crisis resolution.

The adopted approach is based upon scientific conceptual basis as well as the practical experience related to the central banking role and Islamic banking evolution. This chapter will define the strategic role of Central Banks and highlight the conceptual basis governing the leading role of central banks as well as the practical basis derived from our central banking and Islamic banking experience.

In light of the conceptual and practical basis for enabling an efficient and effective role of Central Banks as a regulatory body in shaping the future of the Islamic Financial System. Legal, institutional and managerial strategic determinants for this role have been defined.

The analytical work of this chapter crystallises in a pioneering initiative the main determining factors governing the role of central banks as the main regulatory body for Islamic banking, and how this role could be effective in affecting the future role to be played by the Islamic banks in the global financial system. Also, to this end, the integrated required role by central banks, public policies, multilateral institutions and Islamic banks are illustrated.

Energy and cooperative hard work and commitment from all players, including the regulators of Islamic banks supported by public policies, international and multilateral institutions and members of the Islamic banking family is thought to be the main determining factor for transforming the Islamic banking family into one that will make the Islamic people and all humanity – through the global financial system – live with more stability, welfare and happiness.

Purpose: This chapter discusses the need for climate change risk mitigation and why it is not the responsibility of Central Banks to mitigate climate change risk.

Methodology: This chapter uses critical discourse analysis to explain why central banks should not have the responsibility for climate change risk mitigation.

Findings: This chapter argues that the responsibility for managing climate change risk should lie with elected officials, other groups and institutions but not Central Banks. Elected officials, or politicians, should be held responsible to deal with the consequence of climate change events. Also, international organizations and everybody can take responsibility for climate change while the Central Bank can provide assistance – but Central Banks should not lead the climate policy making or mitigation agenda.

Implication: The policy implication is that the responsibility for climate change risk mitigation should be shifted to politicians who are elected officials of the people. Also, international climate change organizations or groups can take responsibility for mitigating the climate change risk of member countries. Finally, citizens in a country or region should have equal responsibility for climate change. Climate information should be provided to every citizen to help them prepare for future climatic conditions.

Originality: This chapter propagates the idea that Central Banks should take a lead role in dealing with the problems of climate change. This chapter is the first chapter to contest a Central Bank-led climate change risk mitigation agenda.

Quality Assurance and Improvement Program (QAIP) is defined as “an ongoing and periodic assessment of the entire spectrum of audit and consulting work performed by the internal audit (IA) activity”. QAIP is an important component of internal auditors’ commitment to improve internal audit (IA) quality. The pressure towards improvement is urgent for central banks, in light of the vulnerabilities of their IA functions identified by the International Monetary Fund. The authors analyse the professional standards and the literature on IA and QAIP, aiming to propose general considerations to enhance IA quality and to develop and maintain a QAIP, with reference to central banks, also shedding light on the synergies among IA, QAIP and total quality management (TQM).

This paper reviews the most relevant professional standards in light of the professional and academic literature regarding IA quality, QAIP and their relationship with TQM. The analysis of these sources represents an important step to identify general measures to improve IA quality and develop effective QAIP in central banks.

This analysis shows that it is important to understand the rationale behind the development of an IA function and its theoretical and practical foundation, especially for complex organisations such as central banks. In addition, the authors show that QAIP represents an important tool to exploit the synergies between TQM and IA. These synergies could result in higher levels of quality for the IA function and more effective implementation of TQM within the whole organisation. Lastly, the authors provide practical suggestions to support the implementation of an effective QAIP in central banks and to spread TQM philosophy within the organisation.

The authors contribute to the scant literature on IA quality and QAIP by focusing on central banks and shedding light on the relationship with TQM. Regardless of their importance, these topics have been largely neglected by the extant literature.

The paper explores the precarious balance between modernizing monetary systems by means of digital currencies (either issued by the central bank itself or independently) and safeguarding financial stability as also ensured by tangible payment (and saving) instruments like paper money.

Which aspects of modern payment systems could contribute to improve the way of functioning of today's globalized economy? And, which might even threaten the above-mentioned instable equilibrium? This survey paper aims, precisely, at giving some preliminary answers to a complex – therefore, ongoing – debate at scientific as well as banking and political levels.

The coexistence of State's money (i.e. “legal tender”) and cryptocurrencies can have a disciplining effect on central banks. Nevertheless, there are still high risks connected to the introduction of central bank digital currency, which should be by far not considered to be a perfect substitute of current cash. At the same time, cryptocurrencies issued by central banks might be exposed to the drawbacks of cryptocurrencies without benefiting from correspondingly strong advantages. A well-governed two-tier system to be achieved through innovation in payment infrastructures might be, in turn, more preferable. Regulated competition by new players combined with “traditional” deposits and central bank elements remains essential, although central banks should embrace the technologies underlying cryptocurrencies, because risk payment service providers could move to other currency areas considered to be more appealing for buyers and sellers.

We do not see specific limitations besides the fact that the following is for sure a broad field of scientific research to be covered, which is at the same time at the origin of ongoing developments and findings. Originality and implications of the paper are, instead, not only represented by its conclusions (which highlight the role of traditional payment instruments and stress why the concept of “money” still has to have specific features) but also by its approach of recent literature's review combined with equally strong logical-analytical insights.

In the light of these considerations, even the role of traditional payment systems like paper money is by far not outdated or cannot be – at this point, at least – replaced by central bank digital currencies (whose features based on dematerialization despite being issued and guaranteed by a public authority are very different).

No matter which form it might assume is what differentiates economic from barter transactions. This conclusion is by far not tautological or self-evident since the notion of money has historically been a great object of scientific discussion. In the light of increasingly modern payment instruments, there is no question that money and the effectiveness of related monetary policies have to be also explored from a social perspective according to different monetary scenarios, ranging from central bank digital currencies to private currencies and cash restrictions/abolition.

The originality/value of the following article is represented by the fact that it (1) refers to some of the most relevant and recent contributions to this research field, (2) moves from payment systems in general to their newest trends like cryptocurrencies, cash restrictions (or, even, abolition proposals) and monetary policy while (3) combining all elements to reach a common picture. The paper aims at being a comprehensive contribution dealing with "money" in its broadest but also newest sense.

The authors aim to look at the conditions under which central bank easing – and specifically the purchase of private sector securities – can/should contribute to growth, rather than fiscal policy and also ask when can the central bank’s purchase of private sector securities help supplant traditional monetary policy.

After surveying the existing literature, the authors use simple correlation of central bank private asset (stocks, bonds, etc.), interest rates, gross domestic product (GDP) growth, inflation and the extent of the functioning of domestic banking sectors (among others) to classify countries in which these purchases promote pro-growth investment.

Under the typical conditions for unconventional monetary policy, central bank purchases of private companies’ securities can promote growth in some places (like Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Georgia and Greece at the time of our writing) while hurting it in others (like in parts of Latin America and Africa in the mid-2010s). The authors find how such purchases effectively “bypass” dysfunctional banking systems and central/government local bodies fiscal spending, making the central bank the “funder of last resort” in many middle and lower income countries.

This paper tells specific central banks to ramp up – or reduce – their purchases of private sector securities. The authors identify exact jurisdictions where such “helicopter money” has led to investment in the past economic growth.

All previous work on conventional and unconventional monetary policy has looked at the way monetary policy affects investment and growth through the banking system and holding companies’ reactions constant. The authors do the opposite – looking at how companies respond, holding banking system responses constant. No one has ever looked at these private purchases (taken from a special IMF database), much less tried to argue that central banks can sometimes target investment growth much better than fiscal policy. No one has ever considered them as a funder (rather than lender) of last resort.

The purpose of this paper is to offer an initial assessment of the Northern Rock (NR) crisis.

The paper describes the context of financial market turmoil and the multi‐dimensional aspects of the crisis.

The central finding of this paper is that the NR episode is a multi‐dimensional problem and reflects a complex set of inter‐related problems.

The paper brings together some of the strands of the analysis and addresses several lessons that can be learned.

This paper aims to analyse the role of central bank digital currency (CBDC) in bank earnings management and focus on how CBDC activity might influence banks to engage in accrual earnings management using loan loss provisions (LLPs) and the implications for earnings quality.

The paper used conceptual discourse analysis to explain the role of CBDC in bank earnings management.

Banks will use accruals, such as LLPs, to manage earnings when CBDC-induced bank disintermediation leads to a reduction in bank deposits, a reduction in bank lending and a likely reduction in reported earnings. Bank managers will mitigate the reduction in reported earnings by lowering discretionary LLPs to increase reported earnings.

The recent emergence of CBDC in the digital currency universe has led to increased research interest on the role of CBDC in corporations and society. This study contributes to the literature by focusing on banks, and examining the effect of CBDC on bank earnings management.

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.

This paper seeks to provide an insight into financial crime in Italy and the highlighting of the anomalous role and position of the governor of the Italian National Bank and the need for reform.

Research from contemporaneous open and other sources during a comparatively intense period mid to late 2005 regarding Italian financial institutions and international banking operations.

The ground‐breaking co‐ordinated conventions and regulatory framework of international banking operations on an EU‐wide basis was frustrated in Italy by the questionable conduct of the governor of the Italian National Bank. In this he was aided and abetted by the arguably excessive powers of that office. This conduct was interacting with and linked to, several cross‐currents of ongoing alleged financial crime in Italy.

This gives an insight into financial crime in Italy and the highlighting of the anomalous role and position of the governor of the Italian National Bank and the necessity for reform.