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Why is it that highly trained and seasoned executives fail? On the surface, this doesn’t make sense because they are very successful; yet research in the organization sciences provides no shortage of evidence to prove just that. From the classic Mann Gulch fire disaster of Weick’s famous collapse of sensemaking study, to studies of myopia of learning, escalation of commitment, threat-rigidity, dominant logic, the architecture of simplicity, the Icarus Paradox, to core competencies turning into core rigidities, and navigating new competitive markets using “old” cognitive maps, and many more such examples point to a ubiquitous phenomenon where highly trained and experienced professionals find themselves “stuck” in the heat of battle, unable to move and progress. On the one hand, for some, there is a desperate need for change, but are unable to do so, due to their trained incapacities. On the other hand, some simply cannot see the need for change, and continue with their “business as usual” mentality. For both, their visions of the world shrink, they have a tendency to cling onto their past habitual practices and oversimplify the complexity of the situation. In moments like these: DROP YOUR TOOLS and UNLEARN! This book chapter introduces a framework (grounded in clinical psychology) that has had consistent success in helping seasoned executives and key decision-makers open up the alternatives whenever they find themselves stuck with complexity.

Research for the case study was conducted using a combination of semi-structured interviews and secondary data sources.

This case traces the international expansion of Sadowsky Guitars’ bass guitar product line. Roger Sadowsky is one of the most respected instrument makers in the world and gained early acclaim for his outstanding repair and restoration work on guitars and basses. Some of his early clients included Prince, Will Lee (The Tonight Show), Tom Hamilton of Aerosmith, Jason Newsted of Metallica, Eddie Van Halen and Marcus Miller. Roger’s reputation and the demand for his instruments led to some customers having to wait for more than a year to obtain the chance to purchase a Sadowsky instrument, while others were unable to do so due to financial constraints. In 2003, Roger made the decision to form Sadowsky Japan to begin the contract manufacturing of more affordable Sadowsky instruments in Tokyo, Japan. As the company grew in size, Roger realized he was becoming more focused on running a business than building instruments. Furthermore, his Japanese partners were only interested in serving the Japanese market. This required him to handle the sales and distribution in the remaining parts of the world. In December of 2019, he announced a new, exclusive licensing agreement and distribution partnership between Sadowsky Guitars and Warwick GmbH & Co Music Equipment KG. The new agreement allowed Roger to continue running the Sadowsky NYC Custom Shop while Warwick would take over building and distributing the Metro instruments and a less-expensive, Chinese-built version of the MetroExpress instruments.

This case is appropriate for undergraduate and graduate-level courses related to marketing and consumer behavior. The case walks students through a real-life scenario when the founder of a well-known musical brand sought to expand internationally as a way to meet growing market demand. Students are asked to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the five key international market entry strategies: exporting, licensing, contract manufacturing, joint ventures and investment (equity/acquisition).

The case works well in the classroom, even if people are unfamiliar with the musical instrument retail industry. Participants are most likely aware of some of the artists and musicians mentioned in the case. Some may also be or know musicians. The instructor should be able to quickly engage participants in a lively discussion about Roger Sadowsky’s vision for his instruments and the opportunities and challenges of expanding product offerings and increasing market share.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

This chapter analyzes the campaign against race norming in the 2013 National Football League (NFL) concussion settlement that caregivers of retired players designed, and it considers how their collective action throws new light on activism in sport. While there is a substantial literature on how individual athletes engage in protest, less work has focused on how families – partners, children, siblings, and parents – of athletes organize as a group to answer back to anti-Black racism in professional sport. I argue that a group of spouses used their position as caregivers to shame the NFL, the presiding judge of the settlement, Class Counsel, and even the Department of Justice into acknowledging not only individual suffering from traumatic brain injury but also of the distribution of that suffering across households. Specifically, the wives group expanded definitions of risk and damage to include not only individual illness but also family and group suffering and demanded inclusion of gendered and racialized aspects of social care. Through their campaign, the group recast what is considered protest in the world of sport and who has the ability to access an activist subjectivity.

Existing research suggests that organizational learning, jointly implemented by principals and teachers may reduce agency risks and improve school management effectiveness. However, research investigating how this process occurs is lacking. The relationship between school leaders promoting the involvement of teachers in school-wide processes focused on instructional improvement and the coherence characterizing a school's instructional program remains unclear.

The authors identified shared instructional leadership and instructional coherence, as two key variables describing the process of organizational learning and the outcome of agency risk reduction. The authors employed hierarchical linear modeling to test the hypothesis that shared leaderships positively predicts differences among schools in instructional coherence.

Based on a sample of 113 public high schools selected from a U.S. Midwestern state, the results confirm the hypothesis.

This study uses the existing theoretical and empirical findings to interpret the potential relationship between shared leadership and instructional coherence, and validates it through empirical data analysis. The findings expand the understanding of the shared leadership theory. Although the design of this study is strictly based on theoretical and empirical findings, and part of the purpose of the research is to find the reasons why shared leadership seems to be insignificant in some countries and regions, readers should still note that the sample source is American schools. The findings of this study are worth examining with different samples in future studies.

Since the direct relationship between shared leadership and student standardized test scores has been difficult to measure, and in some countries even negative, there is debate about the need for shared leadership. The difficulty of measurement is caused by the diversity of leadership subjects and the complexity of leadership tasks. This study finds out the direct object of shared leadership and the process of exerting its effects, which will expand the understanding of the positive meaning of shared leadership. This will help different countries and regions better identify and play the role of shared leadership.

Based on the combination of organizational learning theory, agency theory and shared leadership theory, the study modeled the process of collaborative organizational learning among principals and teachers. The study employed instructional coherence as a form of structured organizational learning that is a prerequisite for improvement in common measures of student learning such as standardized test scores. Do so provide practical guidance for educators seeking improvement through organizational learning.

Warren Nutter and James M. Buchanan did not revise “Universal Education” to turn against providing tuition grants to segregated schools in 1965. Their revised text contains no call to expel segregation academies from the tuition grant program and does not even express disapproval of the goals or the work of segregation academies. Recent claims to that effect by Fleury (2023) and Levy and Peart (2023) cannot be sustained by either textual or contextual evidence.