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After the end of the Napoleonic War, few issues of public policy dominated discussions in England as fervently as the issue of currency and the national debt. A time of civil unrest and social radicalisation, the circulation of ideas and pamphlets was prolific. The difficulties of post-war reconstruction sparked a long debate on issues of monetary reform and repayment of the national debt. The growth of national debt increased the size of the financial market and had important consequences for a changing class dynamic in domestic political affairs. The distributional aspects of the conflict were present, as was the satirical mockery of mishandling of public affairs. In much of the subsequent scholarship the organisation of taxation and expenditure, and the financial system and the issue of currency have been analysed as separate. This chapter brings them together. In particular, it focuses on Ricardo’s monetary thought and his views on public finance and contextualises them in light of his contemporaries.

To discuss the concept of cybernetics, and to point out its complexities.

Cybernetics can be seen as a scientific concept of harnessing complexity as a feedback phenomenon and a project aimed at establishing a new control science and adaptive technology based on the formalization of complexity. Today, we still do not have adaptive or complex computers.

Cybernetics has failed both as a concept and a project, and is becoming a case for historians. But before it is classified as just a short scientific episode between the atomic bomb and cyberwar, a closer look will show that it was not only a military sponsored project driven by the cold war of the 1950s but also a rebellious movement inspired by the visions of the 1960s. Heinz von Foerster more than anyone else represented this human face of cybernetics.

Considers some of the thought‐provoking ideas of Heinz von Foerster in the history of cybernetics.

Proposes that halfway through the decade which has been termed that of the brain, our level of understanding is still primitive despite much excellent research. Discusses new findings, such as those presented in a recent lecture, which can still alter profoundly the perception of neural mechanisms, and shows that we may even be wrong in the customary assumption that the well‐known electro‐chemical neural transmission is the only important form of rapid internal communication in the brain.

The HILT Phase II project aimed to develop a pilot terminologies server with a view to improving cross‐sectoral information retrieval. In order to inform this process, it was first necessary to examine how a representative group of users approached a range of information‐related tasks. This paper focuses on exploratory interviews conducted to investigate the proposed ideal and actual strategies of a group of 30 users in relation to eight separate information tasks. In addition, users were asked to give examples of search terms they may employ and to describe how they would formulate search queries in each scenario. The interview process undertaken and the results compiled are outlined, and associated implications for the development of a pilot terminologies server are discussed.

This study evaluates cross-national differences in public beliefs about the causes of health and the role of these beliefs in shaping attitudes regarding health policy.

The study uses data from the 2011 International Social Survey Program, which includes questions on health and health care, asked in 29 countries. Respondents were asked about four specific causes of poor health (i.e., genes, behavior, the environment, and poverty). Respondents were also asked about their attitudes regarding three aspects of health policy: their support for government-provided care, the perceived fairness of income disparities in medical treatment, and their support for providing health care to noncitizens.

The study has three findings. First, the study reveals the global reach of a multicausal view. The four beliefs about the causes of poor health are positively correlated in all countries. However, there is considerable cross-national variation in the average support for specific causes. Although in some countries proximate causes, such as genes, are endorsed more frequently than distal causes, such as poverty, this is by no means a uniform pattern. Support for genetic causes is high, but genetic reductionism is rare. Second, the study reveals that health beliefs are fundamentally political beliefs. The single most important determinant of beliefs about the causes of health is the country in which the respondent resides, exceeding in influence religion, education, and even personal experiences with health and health care. Third, the study reveals that the political connotations of health beliefs vary between countries, especially beliefs regarding genes. In general, those who endorse behavioral arguments favor less government involvement in health care and are more accepting of income disparities in the quality of care. Those who endorse the environment and poverty, meanwhile, tend to support a stronger role of government. Yet, the magnitude of these associations varies and, in the case of genetic arguments, even the direction of the association varies. Genetic arguments are frequently associated with support for a stronger role of government, but genetic arguments also are occasionally associated with support for the exclusion of noncitizens from the health care system.

International survey research is valuable for exploring the scope of patterns revealed in a limited set of countries, but it is difficult to pinpoint the source of cross-national differences.

The study demonstrates the importance of national context in shaping health beliefs, as well as the role of beliefs regarding the causes of health in setting the stage for public receptivity to government-provided care. The study also illustrates the value of thinking about beliefs about genes as reflecting larger projects of biocitizenship, at least in some countries.

The aim of this chapter is to argue that charisma is a collective representation, and that charismatic authority is a social status that derives more from the “recognition” of the followers than from the “magnetism” of the leaders. I contend further that a close reading of Max Weber shows that he, too, saw charisma in this light.

I develop my argument by a close reading of many of the most relevant texts on the subject. This includes not only the renowned texts on this subject by Max Weber, but also many books and articles that interpret or criticize Weber’s views.

I pay exceptionally close attention to key arguments and texts, several of which have been overlooked in the past.

Writers for whom charisma is personal magnetism tend to assume that charismatic rule is natural and that the full realization of democratic norms is unlikely. Authority, in this view, emanates from rulers unbound by popular constraint. I argue that, in fact, authority draws both its mandate and its energy from the public, and that rulers depend on the loyalty of their subjects, which is never assured. So charismatic claimants are dependent on popular choice, not vice versa.

I advocate a “culturalist” interpretation of Weber, which runs counter to the dominant “personalist” account. Conventional interpreters, under the sway of theology or mass psychology, misread Weber as a romantic, for whom charisma is primal and undemocratic rule is destiny. This essay offers a counter-reading.

This study uses parametric hazard models to investigate duration dependence in US stock market cycles over the January 1929 through December 1992 period. Market cycles are determined using the Beveridge‐Nelson (1981) approach to the decomposition of economic time series. The results show that both real and nominal cycles exhibit positive duration dependence. The implication of this finding is that actual prices revert to their permanent or trend level in a non‐random manner as the cyclical component dissipates over time. This process is consistent with mean reversion in price and suggests that predictable periodicity in market cycles may exist. Only limited evidence is obtained that discrete shifts or trends in mean cycle duration exist. The length of market cycles appears not to have changed over the 1929–92 period.