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The Kennedy tapes of the meetings on the Cuban missile crisis are evidence of the strategy formulation process. Analysis of the interventions in these meetings reveals that President Kennedy had adopted a questioning, Socratic approach. Conclusions are drawn on President Kennedy's leadership style. The methods employed in 1962 are compared with ideas from strategic management: positioning; resource‐based view; top‐down or bottom‐up; deliberate or emergent; and rational or generative. The author deduces from this evidence: the collective strategy process cannot truly begin until a collective aim has been decided; the strategy process is best led by a facilitator, rather than an authoritarian; both positioning resources need to be considered; strategy formulation is an art, guided by whatever science can be brought to bear.

The purpose of this paper is to draw conclusions on strategy formulation from an analysis of the “Alanbrooke” diaries. The approach is comparative, and uses the information in the diary and the forms of business strategies devised by Mintzberg et al., and with ideas on business alliances. The paper finds that the logical, planned approach of Alanbrooke is contrasted with the more entrepreneurial attitude of Churchill, but the combination of these contrasting traits led to effective strategy formulation. The difference in character of them and the resulting controversies were essential to make the right choices, and Churchill deliberately chose someone who was likely to oppose him. The research is limited by the possibility of bias in the diary. A practical implication is that leaders can benefit from choosing a strong, talented colleague, even though the stormy interactions can be wearisome. The value in this analysis is in the light it sheds on the way strategy is developed in a real situation and is also an indication of the value of the comparative approach to the study of strategy process.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the strategy formulation process recorded as being used during the Battle of Britain with concepts from current management theory.

The approach to the topic is through the medium of a case study. An account is given of the events in the battle, based on a variety of sources, and various management theories are then used in comparison.

The paper concludes that it was the strategic thought, or lack of it, that was the root cause of the German failure. The theories of strategic thinking; strategy formation; strategic change; and business level strategy are considered in turn in the context of the German side of the battle. The dominance of Hitler in the strategy formulation process is considered a disadvantage. Although the Luftwaffe had superior resources, the manner of their use was at fault. The strategy emerged over the period of the battle, but the results lacked consistency, coherence and a clearly defined aim.

Comparison of military and business strategy formulation processes is a valuable means of considering the validity of strategic management theory. Caution has to be exercised, however, when considering events 65 years ago and in making military business comparisons, which though indicative are never completely exact.

It is hoped that this comparative case study will be of value both to practising managers and to those researchers who can see value in this methodology. Military strategists should find value in the use of strategic management theories in their field.

To provide a concise briefing on the most topical issues and relevant implications from the top 400 management publications in the world.

This briefing is prepared by an independent writer who adds their own impartial comments and places the argument in context.

Feldman's detailed study reviews the decision‐making processes – and the influences which were brought to bear on those processes – in the years before the space shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986. He demonstrates – with a carefully‐constructed view of the culture of objectivity, of how decisions are made and what knowledge is brought to bear on those decisions – how misunderstandings of flight risk resulted. Robert F. Gratton analyses President Kennedy's style of leadership and decision making during the crucial days of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. He reveals that Kennedy adopted a questioning, Socratic approach and concludes that the collective strategy process can not truly begin until a collective aim has been decided. In addition, the strategy process is best led by a facilitator than an authoritarian, and strategy formulation is an art, guided by whatever science can be brought to bear. Howard Hills demonstrates the benefits of collaborative decision making. He identifies symptoms of teams that fail to make collaborative decisions, and offers actions a team leader may take to enable effective collaborative decisions to be made. He asserts the value of mutual respect, learning from mistakes and welcoming feedback.

Provides implementable strategies and practical thinking that has influenced some of the world's leading organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to review the 11 lessons propounded by Robert McNamara in the film The Fog of War and to consider them in the context of theories of strategic management, particularly the formulation of strategy.

The film is taken as a case study and the evidence is considered against the background of Mr McNamara's career and contemporary events, triangulated wherever possible by additional accounts so that bias is avoided as much as possible.

The paper finds that, despite a lifelong rational, empirical approach, Mr McNamara has discovered that there are limits to these methods. The importance of values, morals and ethics emerges. The importance of these messages is that the business strategist should acknowledge the limits of rationality and the importance of intangible factors, not least the vagaries of human nature.

The paper is a part of a continuing study by the author of the parallels between military/grand strategy formulation and the similar activity in business.

Merchants and manufacturers have it in their power to minimise in some degree the extent to which we are becoming indebted to foreign countries in respect of the large excess of imports over exports, by obtaining, as far as possible, their imported supplies of food products and raw materials for industries from countries within the Empire. Take, for example, meat and cheese. The prevailing high prices are no doubt encouraging the home production of these commodities. Nevertheless a large quantity must necessarily be imported. In 1914 meat to the value of 62 million pounds was imported, and cheese to the value of 8 million pounds. Of the imports of meat 26 per cent. came from within the Empire, and of cheese 82 per cent. Clearly it is better under existing circumstances that we should buy meat from Australia and New Zealand than from Argentina, and cheese from Canada and New Zealand rather than from Holland and the United States. Many other examples may be mentioned of products which can equally as well be obtained within the Empire as from foreign countries, such as maize from South Africa, where a large increase of production is expected this year; oats from Canada rather than from Argentina and the United States; barley from Canada; peas from New Zealand; butter from Australia and New Zealand; canned salmon, of which 2½ million pounds' worth was imported in 1914, from Canada rather than from the United States; apples from Canada and Australia; wine from Australia; tea from India and Ceylon rather than from China and Java; cocoa from the Gold Coast and the West Indies; copra from Malaya, India and Australia; rubber from Malaya and Ceylon; fibres from New Zealand, Mauritius, Ceylon, etc.; wood pulp from Canada and Newfoundland; wool from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Falkland Islands rather than from Argentina, Chile and other foreign sources; tanning materials from India, Natal, Australia and British East Africa; dyewoods from the West Indies; timber from Canada; hardwoods from India, West Africa, the West Indies and Australia; copper and copper ore from Australia and South Africa; tin and tin ore from Malaya, Nigeria, South Africa and Australia; manganese from India; plumbago from Ceylon; hides from India, Africa and Australia, and so forth. It has been stated that the result of the war may ultimately depend largely on financial strength. In that case the country which is to the greatest extent self‐supporting as regards supplies of the necessaries of life and materials for the manufacture of munitions of war will be in a position to carry on the longest. Undoubtedly the British Empire contains within itself the power to produce all such materials, and the Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies are in fact already supplying a large proportion of the food products and raw materials for industries, which are imported into the United Kingdom. There are a few notable exceptions, e.g., for our supplies of cotton and sugar we have always been largely dependent on foreign countries, but Uganda and the Soudan are capable of producing in the future very large quantities of cotton of the quality required by Lancashire spinners, and sugar production in our Colonies could, with proper encouragement, be expanded so as to meet the whole of the requirements of the Mother Country. If the British capital and energy which have in the past gone every year to the development of enterprises in foreign countries had been devoted for a tew years exclusively to exploiting the resources of the Dominions and Colonies, the British Empire would, by this time, have become practically self‐supporting, and the bulk of our imported foodstuffs and raw products required for our manufacturing industries would now be obtained from within the Empire and paid for by increased quantities of our own manufactures. It may be hoped that one of the lessons which we shall learn from the war will be definitely to encourage the development of the vast resources of our overseas Empire. — The Chamber of Commerce Journal.

BOOKS and Libraries for the Blind form the subject of a paper by Dr. Robert C. Moon in the May Library Journal. The writer is the son of William Moon, the inventor of the system of embossed writing bearing his name. He describes the systems of writing for the blind in use, and the various agencies for circulating literature. After examining the existing departments for the blind in Public Libraries, he comes to the conclusion that “all the libraries need more books, and if they are to reach and teach the adult blind they must have a fair proportion of them in the Moon type. All Public Libraries should possess a few works printed in the various types, care being taken to have a good supply of those embossed in the special type which is taught in the schools for the blind of the immediate locality, in order that the pupils in vacation time, and the graduates of the schools may be provided with reading matter, but the infirm and aged blind will be found in almost all communities, and for them books printed in the Moon type are indispensable. Alice S. Tyler describes the League of Library Commissions. “The success of the experiment in co‐operation which was inaugurated in 1901 by the library commissions of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa, whereby printed matter of common interest and equal necessity and value to these commissions was issued jointly, led to the suggestion that a national organization might more economically carry forward these and other lines of co‐operative work, leaving to the overcrowded state commission workers more time and money for the peculiar problems of each state.” This suggestion was brought up at the St. Louis conference, and resulted in an organization being formed under the title of the League of Library Commissions, consisting of one representative from each of the commissions included. The particular directions in which the League will promote co‐operative work are: carefully prepared lists of books for first purchase for small libraries; lists of new books which, upon examination, had been found desirable ; handbook of suggestions and direction as to the organization and management of small libraries; printed statement regarding the aims and methods of state library commissions, with comparison of their laws; definite help and suggestions on the subject of library buildings, especially floor‐plans arranged for economic administration, growing out of the experience of the library commissions in connection with the erection of Carnegie and other library buildings within the last few years; united effort to bring to the attention of book publishers the urgent need of good, durable binding, adequate indexing, &c.

In 1899 the medical practitioners of Dublin were confronted with an outbreak of a peculiar and obscure illness, characterised by symptoms which were very unusual. For want of a better explanation, the disorder, which seemed to be epidemic, was explained by the simple expedient of finding a name for it. It was labelled as “beri‐beri,” a tropical disease with very much the same clinical and pathological features as those observed at Dublin. Papers were read before certain societies, and then as the cases gradually diminished in number, the subject lost interest and was dropped.

THE catalogue, as a library appliance of importance, has had more attention devoted to it than, perhaps, any other method or factor of librarianship. Its construction, materials, rules for compilation and other aspects have all been considered at great length, and in every conceivable manner, so that little remains for exposition save some points in the policy of the catalogue, and its effects on progress and methods. In the early days of the municipal library movement, when methods were somewhat crude, and hedged round with restrictions of many kinds, the catalogue, even in the primitive form it then assumed, was the only key to the book‐wealth of a library, and as such its value was duly recognized. As time went on, and the vogue of the printed catalogue was consolidated, its importance as an appliance became more and more established, and when the first Newcastle catalogue appeared and received such an unusual amount of journalistic notice, the idea of the printed catalogue as the indispensable library tool was enormously enhanced from that time till quite recently. One undoubted result of this devotion to the catalogue has been to stereotype methods to a great extent, leading in the end to stagnation, and there are places even now where every department of the library is made to revolve round the catalogue. Whether it is altogether wise to subordinate everything in library work to the cult of the catalogue has been questioned by several librarians during the past few years, and it is because there is so much to be said against this policy that the following reflections are submitted.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the topics published in the journal in the five-year period from 2005 to 2009.

A qualitative examination of content by year identifies prevalent themes.

The beginning and ending of the time period demonstrate continued interest in major figures of our field and the context of their thinking. Quality, excellence and continuous improvement were recurrent topics as were those of business in society, ethics and social responsibility. The value of historical analysis with suggested methodologies for further study was included.

The paper is limited to the topical papers within this five-year timeframe and a qualitative analysis of themes. Fewer than expected papers were published on leadership and international subjects given their important to the field.

Aspiring authors may find the historical background for the current topics of entrepreneurship, quality, ethics and social responsibility convenient. Helpful advice from experts about how to study management history is highlighted. Cross-cultural and international historical linkages on themes and concepts are identified as areas in need of additional research.

The social construction of studying and teaching history is discussed. The context in which major writers lived and events occurred is recognized as a major factor in interpreting situations.

The paper reviews over 100 articles to categorize the historical origins of current and recurring topics into major themes. Papers are organized by topic, person or event into a chart by year.