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Companies vary in their attitudes toward regulatory (ethics) risk. The purpose of this study is to assess how regulatory risk‐averse, risk neutral and risk seeking companies employ distinct managerial risk and slack accumulation strategies and differ in their auditor scores and bankruptcy risk.

The authors test their hypotheses using the GAO‐assembled database of financial restatements that allows contrasting voluntary restaters (firms that restated without being prompted either by external auditors or the SEC) and forced restaters (firms requested to restate by the SEC or external auditors). The paper uses logistic regression for comparing different groups of firms to test the hypotheses.

The results of the data analysis mostly supported the hypotheses. The findings suggest that a firm's attitude towards regulatory risk is associated with organizational slack (available and potential), risk (managerial and organizational), and auditor's rating.

Some limitations of the study are: use of cross sectional data does not allow testing causal effects, relying on GAO office for categorizing firms in different regulatory category introduces the possibility of bias in analysis, and use of only North American firms in the sample limits the generalizability of the findings.

Firms' attitudes toward regulatory risk and their respective risk and slack management strategies could be used to detect fraud early on before such firms transgress from the realm of legality to borderline legality and illegality.

Some contributions of the study are: it shows that a firm's fraud tendency or regulatory risk behavior is associated with the type of slack accumulated and available in the firm, regulatory risk‐averse companies take less managerial and bankruptcy risks, and earn higher evaluations from auditors, it demonstrates that regulatory risk‐averse companies differ from regulatory risk neutral companies.

The paper aims to explore how power and gender influence decision making in an operational and risky context.

The authors run a laboratory experiment. The experimental factors are power and operational profitability. Power is manipulated using an episodic priming task, while profitability, by changing a newsvendor-type product’s procurement cost. Participants’ risk attitude is captured using a risk lottery.

Participants deviate from the optimal order regardless of the power condition and their risk profile. Risk-seeking women order consistently more than risk-seeking men, which allow women to offer a higher service level. In the low-profit condition, men prefer to make more conservative decisions, which allow them to place orders that are closer to the economical benchmark, where both men’ induced power and the risk-seeking tendencies from both genders play a role. Behavioural models in the high-power condition explain the observed differences in ordering behaviours.

This paper provides behavioural research to explore how differences in power and gender, and their links with risky decision making, influence decision making in an uncertain operations management context, representing thus an important departure from mainstream studies.

The purpose of this paper is to study which factors affect consumer expenditure and how, when positional concerns matter. It also investigates how consumers finance and reallocate their expenditure, and modify their consumer baskets when members of their reference groups spend more on positional goods, and they do not want to lag behind.

A literature review is presented, and then a new model is developed from a behavioural economic perspective. It describes how consumers with various risk attitudes reallocate their consumer expenditure and modify their consumer baskets when consumption externalities influence their relative consumption due to a positional game, but they want to “keep up with the Joneses”.

Consumers with different risk attitudes finance and reallocate their consumption expenditures variously to sustain their relative positions. Risk-neutral, slightly and intermediately risk-seeking consumers achieve a lower utility level than others. They do not realise a utility-maximising consumer basket, as it includes a relatively low number of nonpositional goods, but this choice can be considered the best response in a positional game in order to sustain their relative position.

The relationship between positional and nonpositional goods is explicitly described. The model assumes that consumers can be classified based on their risk attitudes when positional concerns matter. It also describes how consumers with various risk attitudes reallocate their consumer expenditure when they want to sustain or improve their relative consumption in a positional game.

Capital project delivery, such as the delivery of transportation networks and industrial facilities, often suffers losses due to overly aggressive planning. Planners often are overly optimistic about the chance of success while underestimating risks. The purpose of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that these biases are from the difficulties most decision makers face when interpreting probabilistic information.

Three behavioral experiments were conducted to test the theoretical fitness of the paradigms proposed by the description–experience gap literature, namely, the sampling errors effect, the recency effect and statistical information format. College students were recruited to participate in a series of estimating tasks. And their estimating results were compared given different levels of information completeness.

It was found that the existing paradigms could predict risk decision making in the risk-averse estimating scenarios where test subjects were required to give a relatively conservative estimate, but they seemed to be less effective in predicting decisions in the risk-seeking estimating scenario, where test subjects were asked to give a relatively aggressive estimate.

Based on these findings, an integrative model is proposed to explain the observations pertaining to aggressive planning in capital projects. Two dimensions are deemed to be relevant: including risk-taking intentions, and an information uncertainty continuum that ranges from an implicit experience-based information representation to an explicit description-based information representation.

The Internet is a breeding ground for rumors. A way to tackle the problem involves the use of counter-rumor messages that refute rumors. This paper analyzes users' intention to follow rumors and counter-rumors as a function of two factors: individuals' risk propensity and messages' prior endorsement.

The paper conducted an online experiment. Complete responses from 134 participants were analyzed statistically.

Risk-seeking users were keener to follow counter-rumors compared with risk-averse ones. No difference was detected in terms of their intention to follow rumors. Users' intention to follow rumors always exceeded their intention to follow counter-rumors regardless of whether prior endorsement was low or high.

This paper contributes to the scholarly understanding of people's behavioral responses when, unknowingly, exposed to rumors and counter-rumors on the Internet. Moreover, it dovetails the literature by examining how risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals differ in terms of intention to follow rumors and counter-rumors. It also shows how prior endorsement of such messages drives their likelihood to be followed.

The paper explores the hitherto elusive question: When users are unknowingly exposed to both a rumor and its counter-rumor, which entry is likely to be followed more than the other? It also takes into consideration the roles played by individuals' risk propensity and messages' prior endorsement.

Conventional wisdom holds that the difference between entrepreneurs and managers is large, while uncertainty and risk are virtually interchangeable. Uncertainty and risk are treated as separate constructs and then real‐options thinking and prospect theory are drawn upon to determine how they affect the actions of entrepreneurs and managers. The purpose of this paper is to determine specifically, how the above constructs interact to affect the strategies entrepreneurs and managers are likely to adopt when undertaking new ventures.

The research uses deductive theorizing to build a theoretical model.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is concluded that the difference between entrepreneurs and managers is less than believed, while the effect of the difference between uncertainty and risk is larger. It is determined that entrepreneurs and managers use similar strategies when faced with similar conditions of uncertainty and when they have similar risk preferences. When environmental uncertainty is low, risk‐seeking entrepreneurs and managers will prefer licensing, whereas the risk averse will prefer wholly owned new ventures. When environmental uncertainty is neither high nor low, both risk‐averse and risk‐seeking entrepreneurs and managers will prefer alliances. When environmental uncertainty is high, risk‐averse entrepreneurs and managers will prefer licensing, whereas risk seekers will prefer wholly owned.

By separating uncertainty and risk, this research is able to show how their interactions become the drivers of strategic decisions by entrepreneurs and managers. This is new to the literature, and the work thus reveals an opportunity for further sophistication of strategy theory and an opportunity to reduce the barriers between theory on entrepreneurship and management theory.

This paper reports a new experimental test of the notion that behavior switches from risk averse to risk seeking when gains are “reflected” into the loss domain. We conduct a sequence of experiments that allows us to directly compare choices under reflected gains and losses where real and hypothetical payoffs range from several dollars to over $100. Lotteries with positive payoffs are transformed into lotteries over losses by multiplying all payoffs by –1, that is, by reflecting payoffs around zero. When we use hypothetical payments, more than half of the subjects who are risk averse for gains turn out to be risk seeking for losses. This reflection effect is diminished considerably with cash payoffs, where the modal choice pattern is to exhibit risk aversion for both gains and losses. However, we do observe a significant difference in risk attitudes between losses (where most subjects are approximately risk neutral) and gains (where most subjects are risk averse). Reflection rates are further reduced when payoffs are scaled up by a factor of 15 (for both real and hypothetical payoffs).

This study aims to understand how free-play credits affect risk-seeking behavior in slot players. Extant results suggest they encourage risk aversion, counter to the primary aim of increasing spend per visit. The results inform operators as to the effectiveness of what has become the primary play incentive for casino marketers within many of the world’s markets.

Within a quasi-experimental grouped design, 365 days of player-level performance data from four different casinos were analyzed to determine whether player losses (casino revenues) and time played differed on visits that included free-play redemptions from those that did not. Hypotheses were tested via paired-samples t-tests and Mann–Whitney U tests.

On balance, neither player losses nor time played were significantly different on the free-play visits. Neither the house money effect nor the endowment effect was supported. The results were most consistent with the prospect-theory-with-memory editing rule. No findings indicated increased risk-seeking behavior associated with the free-play offers.

Casino operators are afforded insight related to how costly free-play campaigns affect gaming spend and playtime. Both are critical to understanding the impact of free-play on the gambler’s experience.

The 365-day samples extended existing research by analyzing the impact of free-play offers on risk-taking behaviors within the scope of a perpetual/ongoing campaign. Comparisons of observed daily behavior/outcomes were made between separate tiers of like-kind gamblers from each of four different casinos. Quasi-hedonic editing rules were applied to a multistage decision framework.

We investigate intraday data for KOSPI 200 index and KOSPI 200 index futures. Hourly theoretical futures prices are calculated based on cost of carry model. we compare hourly index futures prices with their theoretical prices. Consistent with a large body of previous researches in this area, we find the persistent deviation of futures prices from their theoretical prices. Futures prices are undervalued relative to their theoretical prices. The data indicate that the difference between futures price and its theoretical price exhibits U-shaped pattern over the trading hours. The differences are higher at open and at 15:00 and are lower over intraday trading hours, implying that previous studies using daily closing prices overstate this mispricing.

We also examine the effect of intraday spot return on the behavior of the difference between the hourly futures price and its theoretical price. The finding indicates that the intraday momentum generates U-shaped pattern of this mispricing. This contrasts with Kim and Park (2011)'s finding that the difference also increases as the prior 60 day spot return increases. Our finding invalidates their explanation the activities of arbitrageurs bring monotonic increasing pattern of the magnitude of this mispricing in their daily data.

We propose a new explanation the U shaped patttern of the difference between the futures price and its theoretical price generated by the intraday spot return's moment. We introduce risk-seeking trader in our new explanation. The trader's risk-seeking behavior is based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). We argue that the risk-seeking traders cause intraday momentum effect to generate the U-shaped pattern of this mispricing. We add speculator's variables to Kim and Park (2011)'s regression equation and estimate it. The results from the regression analysis lend support to our new explanation as well as theirs, implying that speculators and arbitrageurs are present and active in the spot and futures markets and generate different pattern of the mispricing.

A research stream known as prospect theory describes how decision biases lead to results that differ from those predicted by classical utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory hypothesizes that individuals will experience potential losses more intensely than potential gains, and will be more risk‐seeking in loss situations, while more risk‐avoiding in gain situations. This study includes 948 participants from the PRC and 318 students from the USA. All of our attempts to replicate these findings in the Peoples’ Republic of China have revealed a different pattern. Chinese subjects consistently demonstrated risk‐seeking preferences, both in gain and loss situations.