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Risk-sharing is a crucial issue in order to evaluate the performance of a monetary union. By implementing conventional econometric techniques, this paper intends to estimate the degree of risk-sharing through the cross-ownership of assets within 11 European countries in the period 1971–2014. We show that risk-sharing has been increasing after the launch of the euro due to increased cross-ownership of assets. Nevertheless, we also show that despite the extreme needs for adjustment mechanisms as a reaction to asymmetric shocks in the EMU during the crises, the estimated market risk-sharing mechanism seems to have remained marginal in this period. We also show that the degree of asymmetry (potential benefits from risk-sharing) has declined with the start of the EMU, but it has sharply increased during the crises period. This implies that EMU countries have needed good functioning risk-sharing mechanisms during the crisis, while in this period their estimated performance does not seem to have improved. We interpret these results as the evidence of a missing element of the EMU that forced governments to intervene by means of fiscal policy to tackle the imbalances deriving from the financial crisis. Therefore, we conclude that the weakness in the risk-sharing has been one of the channels that allowed the global financial crisis to mutate in a sovereign debt crisis in the EMU.

The relationship between airline and airport is complex, fascinating, and wide open for new research endeavors. In Volume 6 of the series, we conducted the analyses of risk-sharing contract between airline and airport from numerical risk balance assessment and incomplete contract theory perspectives based on an interesting real example of risk-sharing contracts, the Noto Airport Load Factor Guarantee Mechanism (LFGM) contract in Japan.

In this chapter, we further advance the analyses of risk-sharing contracts, based on the real example of Noto LFGM contract, from the perspectives of game theory and principal-agent theory. The risk-sharing arrangements, such as LFGM contract, are relevant to the rapidly changing business environment in Asia’s aviation industries.

We conduct a two-stage game analysis. The first phase is the contract negotiation phase and the second phase is the effort-making phase after signing the contract. We show that the two parties can attain a Pareto optimal utility level by bargaining a simple linear risk-sharing contract in the contract negotiation phase based on the equilibrium effort levels in the effort-making phase.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of risk sharing and non-risk sharing instruments on both the profitability of Islamic banks and the economic growth of the country. This study also aims to improve the profit and loss sharing-based asset growth of Islamic banks.

The data for this study are obtained from the annual reports of all Islamic banks from Bangladesh using Bank scope database and annual report for the period of 1983–2014. The research uses Autoregressive Distributive Lag approach.

The findings reveal that risk sharing instruments are positively related to profitability and the economic growth of the country. This study also finds that non-risk sharing instruments play a predominant role in the profitability of the Islamic bank but are negatively related to the economic growth of the country.

Banks and other financial institutions need to pay greater attention to systemic risk created by risk transfer and apply risk sharing methods of financing more vigorously than has hitherto been the case.

This study will also contribute to the literature as relatively few Islamic financial literatures deal with the relationship between equity financing and profitability which may make a strong contribution to the area of Islamic finance.

The relationship between airports and airlines is very interesting from an economics perspective, and analysis of this relationship is wide open for new research endeavors. For instance, airport and airline interactions can be viewed as a zero-sum game of deciding, say, airport landing charges, while at the same time both entities have an incentive making a joint effort to enhance their ability to generate passenger demand and to contribute to growing regional economies. Within this theoretical framework, their relationship consists of not only a binary choice of conflict or cooperation, but also suggests the possibility of complex mixtures of conflict and cooperation. While understanding the interdependence of airports and airlines is an important issue in transportation economics, research examining the complexity of airport and airline relationships is relatively new to the field. This chapter contributes to this research area, in part, by introducing one very interesting example of an airport and airline relationship that considers an element of conflict and cooperation. Specifically, this chapter examines the economic consequences of a risk sharing contract. Analysis of the risk sharing contract recognizes the relevance of microeconomic theories, such as contract theory and principal–agent theory and reveals how these concepts can be applied to traditional transport economics. Predictions of risk sharing between airlines and airports using these theories are derived using numerical examples. Findings reveal that the risk-sharing agreement based on the Noto Airport Load Factor Guarantee Mechanism (LFGM) contract enables the airport side and the airline side not only to share the monetary consequences of demand fluctuation, but also to secure air flights from a local airport to Tokyo, to jointly enhance their various demand-inducing efforts, and to increase their utilities in order to meet the common target they set in the contract. With the LFGM contract, both sides have consistently maintained the air transport network in a relatively low demand area for more than 10 years without significant outside financial assistance. The findings from this chapter also contribute to better understanding the complex relationships among aviation entities, to the recognition of importance and potential to design properly the airport and airline contract, and to the advancement of economic and public policy analysis of this sector.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) altered the relationship between auditors and their clients by requiring an external audit of companies’ internal controls. Regulatory guidance is interpreted and applied by external auditors to comply with SOX. The purpose of this paper is to apply service operations management theories and techniques to the internal control audit process to better understand the role regulatory guidance plays in audit services. We discuss service operations management theories that apply to the production of audit services and employ the operations management technique of simulation to examine the effects of a historical relationship between the client and the auditor, information sharing between the client and the auditor, and the auditor’s perceived risk of the client on the internal control audit process. The application of service operations management theories and the simulation results illustrate that risk and information sharing are key factors for the audit process. The results suggest the updated Public Company Accounting Oversight Board guidance from Auditing Standard 2 to Auditing Standard 5 appropriately increased audit effectiveness by encouraging risk-based judgments and information sharing. This paper merges accounting and service operations management research to examine the effects of regulatory guidance on the internal control audit process. The paper uses simulation to illustrate the importance of interpreting regulatory guidance and the specific effects of risk and information sharing on the internal control audit process.

The burgeoning practice of peer-to-peer breastmilk sharing in the United States conflicts with public health concerns about the safety of the milk. In-depth interviews with 58 breastmilk sharers highlight the ways in which these respondents counter widespread risk narratives. These caregivers deploy existing social values such as self-reliance, good citizenship, and “crunchy,” or natural, mothering to validate their milk-sharing practices. However, because of stratified reproduction, in which society encourages White motherhood while it disparages motherhood among poor women and women of color, these discourses are more accessible to milk sharers who are White and from middle-class. Black and Latinx milk donors and recipients offer additional rationale for milk sharing that includes reclaiming their legacies as worthy mothers and elevating milk sharing to justice work. In rejecting and reframing risk, all of these milk sharers work toward flattening the good mother/bad mother binary.

Islamic and cooperative banks – including credit unions – are broadly similar in that they both share risk with savers. However, risk sharing goes along with ownership control in cooperatives, whilst Islamic banks share risk with borrowers also, and full downside risk with depositors. Islamic banking is consistent with mutual ownership, which may ease some of the governance and efficiency concerns implied by Shari’ah constraints. Greater risk sharing among cooperative bank stakeholders, along the lines of products offered by Islamic banks, may strengthen cooperatives’ financial resilience.

Can standard business cycle methodology be applied to China? In this chapter, we address this question by examining the macroeconomic time series and identifying dimensions in which China differs from economies (such as Canada and the United States) that are typically the subject of business cycle research. We show that naively applying the standard business cycle tools to China is no more ridiculous than applying it to Canada, although the dimensions along which the model struggles is different. For China, the model cannot account for the low level of consumption (or high saving) as a proportion of income observed in the data. An examination of provincial level consumption data suggests that the absence of channels for intranational consumption risk sharing may be an important reason why the business cycle model has trouble accounting for Chinese consumption and saving behavior.

Take the image of the entrepreneur as a driven accepter of risk, an individual (or set of individuals) hungry to amass a fortune as quickly as possible. This image is consistent with the traditional finance theory view of entrepreneurial startups, one that assumes that profit maximization is the firm’s sole motivation (Chaganti, DeCarolis & Deeds, 1995). Myers’s (1994) cost explanation of the pecking order hypothesis (i.e. entrepreneurs prefer internally generated funds first, debt next, and external equity last) incorporates this economically rational view of entrepreneurs’ financing preferences. According to this view, information asymmetry and uncertainty make the availability of external financing very limited and the cost of it prohibitively high. To compensate, entrepreneurs must give up greater and greater control in order to “buy” funds needed to achieve the desired growth and profitability. Indeed, Brophy and Shulman (1992, p. 65) state, “Those entrepreneurs willing to relinquish absolute independence in order to maximize expected shareholder wealth through corporate growth are deemed rational investors in the finance literature.” Undoubtedly, cost and availability explanations of financing choices are valid for many new and small businesses. However, many entrepreneurship researchers have long been dissatisfied with the incompleteness of this perspective.

Since the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the markets related to housing finance have been restoring their tools and instruments in order to avoid a new crisis. In this period, while attempting to eliminate structural problems in existing housing finance instruments, on the other hand new products were tried to figure out. In particular, products based on risk sharing have frequently come to the forefront, both in the academia and the industry. In this direction, one such innovative product is the participating mortgage, in which the borrower obtains below-market interest rates in return for a percentage of the property’s future appreciation and/or net operating income. Particularly used in conventional markets, participating mortgage can also be applied within the Islamic finance thanks to the model it is based on. This chapter attempts to introduce the method of participating mortgage with detailed background and intellectual investigation. Including the modeling of participating mortgage, this study also shows how this method can be designed under Islamic finance. Furthermore, implications and fields of application are explored with a discussion of challenges. In this chapter, considering the achievements of participating mortgage method, it is asserted that it can enable the product diversity of the Islamic banks, thereby increasing the share in the global banking sector.