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This paper reviews the prevalence of the use of risk ratings by commercial banks that participated in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Bank Lending to Farmers between 1997 and 2002. Adoption of risk rating procedures held about steady over the period, with a little less than half the banks on the panel either not using a risk rating system, or reporting the same rating for all their loans in the survey. However, most of these banks were small, and roughly four‐fifths of all sample loans carried an informative risk rating. After controlling for the size and performance of the bank and as many nonprice terms of the loan as possible, findings reveal that banks consistently charged higher rates of interest for the farm loans they characterized as riskier, with an average difference in rates between the most risky and least risky loans of about 1 and a half percentage points.

This research aims to model the relationship between the credit risk signals in the credit default swap (CDS) market and agency credit ratings, and determines the factors that help explain the variation in such signals.

A comprehensive analysis of the differences in the relative credit risk assessments of CDS-based risk signals and agency ratings is provided. It is shown that the divergence between credit risk signals in the CDS market and agency ratings is explained by factors which the rating agencies may consider differently than credit market participants.

The results suggest that agency credit ratings of relative riskiness of a reference entity do not always correspond with assessments by CDS spreads, as the price of risk is a function of additional macro and micro factors that can be explained using statistical analysis.

This research is unique in modeling the relationship between the credit risk assessments of the CDS market and the agency ratings, which to the best of the authors' knowledge has not been analyzed before in terms of their agreement and the level of discrepancy between them. This model can be used by investors in debt instruments that are not explicitly CDSs or which have illiquid CDS contracts, to replicate market-based, point-in-time credit risk signals. Based on both market-based and firm-specific factors in this model, the results can be used to augment through-the-cycle credit risk assessments, analyze issues surrounding the pricing of CDSs and examine the policies of credit rating agencies.

A credit risk model suitable for agricultural lenders is identified. The model incorporates sector correlations and is applied to the loan portfolio of an agricultural credit association to create a distribution of loan losses. The distribution is used to derive the lender’s expected and unexpected losses. Results of the analysis indicate that the association is more than adequately capitalized based on 1997S2002 data. Since the capital position of the association is lower than that of most other associations in the Farm Credit System, this raises the issue of overcapitalization in the System.

Since sovereign ratings provided by credit rating agencies (CRAs) are a key determinant of the interest rates a country faces in the international financial market and once sovereign ratings may have a constraining impact on the ratings assigned to domestic banks or companies, some studies have focused on identifying the determinants of sovereign credit risk assessments provided by CRAs. In particular, this study estimates the effect of fiscal credibility on sovereign risk using four different comprehensive credit rating (CCR) measures obtained from CRAs' announcements and two different fiscal credibility indicators.

We build comprehensive credit rating (CCR) measures to capture sovereign risk. These measures are calculated using sovereign ratings, the rating outlooks and credit watches issued by the three main credit rating agencies (S&P, Moody's and Fitch) for long-term foreign-currency Brazilian bonds. Based on monthly data from 2003 to 2018, we use different econometric estimation techniques in order to provide robust results.

The results indicate that fiscal credibility exerts both short- and long-run effects on sovereign risk perception, and macroeconomic fundamentals are important long-run determinants.

Since fiscal credibility reflects the government's ability to maintain budgetary balance and sustainable public debt, the government should keep its commitment to responsible fiscal policies so as not to deteriorate expectations formed by financial market experts about the fiscal scenario and, thus, to achieve better credit assessments issued by CRAs with respect to sovereign debt bonds. Sovereign credit rating assessment is a voluntary practice. It is up to the country whether they want to apply for a rating assessment or not. Thus, without a sovereign rating, one must find an alternative to measure the sovereign risk of a country. In this sense, an important practical implication that this study provides is that fiscal credibility can be used as a leading indicator of sovereign risk perceptions obtained from CRAs or even as a proxy for sovereign risk.

This paper is the first to verify how important the expectations of financial market experts in relation to the fiscal effort required to keep public debt at a sustainable level (i.e. fiscal credibility) are to sovereign risk perception of credit rating agencies. In this sense, the study is the first to address this relation, and thus it contributes to the literature that seeks to understand the determinants of sovereign ratings in emerging countries.

Relative risk ratings measure the degree by which a country’s sovereign rating is better or worse than other countries (Basu et al., 2013). However, the literature on the impacts of sovereign ratings on capital flows has not covered the role of relative risk ratings. This paper aims to examine the effect of relative risk ratings on private capital flows to emerging and frontier market economies is filled. In the analysis, the effect of relative risk ratings to that of absolute sovereign ratings in influencing private capital flows are compared.

This paper examines the influence of sovereign credit ratings and relative risk ratings on private capital flows to 26 emerging and frontier market economies using quarterly data for a 20-year period between 1998 and 2017. A dynamic panel regression model is used to estimate the relationship between ratings and capital flows after controlling for other factors that can influence capital flows such as growth and interest rate differentials and global risk conditions.

The analysis finds that while absolute sovereign credit ratings were an important determinant of net capital inflows prior to the global financial crisis in 2008, the influence of relative risk ratings increased in the post-crisis period. The post-crisis effect of relative ratings appears to be driven mostly by portfolio flows. The main results are robust to an alternate measure of capital flows (gross capital flows instead of net capital flows), to the use of fixed gross domestic product weights in calculating relative risk ratings and to the potential endogeneity of absolute and relative ratings.

This study advances the literature on being the first attempt to understand the impact of relative risk ratings on capital flows and also comparing the impact of absolute sovereign ratings and relative risk ratings on capital flows in the pre- and post-global financial crisis periods. The findings imply that emerging and frontier markets need to pay greater attention to their relative economic performance and not just their sovereign ratings.

This paper aims to analyze thoroughly all of the sources of research used to develop the money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) low-risk rating, a rating attained by Norway according to the Basel Institute of Governance, and determine the reasons why Norway is one of only two countries in the world according to the 2012 report, with the other being Estonia, to gain an overall low-risk ML and TF rating.

The differences between the USA and Norway which has obtained a low-risk ranking, were compared and contrasted.

Beginning with the Basel Institute Rating index as a legitimate source for use in assessing anti-money-laundering (AML)/TF risk, and the amount of documentation used in the index’s methodology, it has been proven that the low-risk rating Norway has received is well deserved, and that the US rating of medium risk is also deserved for the time the report was published. Achieving a low-risk rating is not as ambiguous as recently thought and neither is its application on a global scale.

The paper identifies practical areas of improvement and concerns in addressing the overall issue of ML and terrorist financing.