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The purpose of this paper is to highlight the disparity between the disclosures of risk governance (RGOV) categories, namely, structures both at the board and management level, and RGOV practices among five of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-5) countries. Furthermore, this paper investigates the effects of RGOV and its categories on return on assets (ROA).

Using 285 ASEAN-5 bank-year observations comprising hand-collected data for the period of 2010–2014, RGOV indexes are developed on the basis of 12 of the 13 governance guidelines published by the Basel Committee.

Although some banks are found to be early adopters, there is an increasing trend of disclosure for all of the investigated categories. Furthermore, there are no effects of the overall RGOV, board-level RGOV structure and risk management practice on ROA. However, the effect of the management-level RGOV structure on ROA is negative and significant.

Measurements of RGOV indexes are based solely on the examination of criteria that have not been previously tested. Other limitations are related to the information completeness, subjectivity and interpretation.

Management-level RGOV tends to decrease profitability because of the additional costs related to its implementation. Financial regulators may find this result useful as feedback to evaluate the effectiveness of regulation and possible future improvements.

This paper’s uniqueness lies in constructing new RGOV indexes on the basis of the latest bank governance guidelines from the Basel Committee issued on July 9, 2015.

This paper aims to analyse the governance structures of the Indonesian chilli value chain, price volatility issues across the chain and to critically explore the value chain actors' perceptions and responses to price volatility.

The authors used semi-structured interviews with 148 primary actors of the Indonesian chilli value chain. In-depth interviews with 22 key stakeholders – from local, provincial and national levels – were conducted in order to obtain additional information about their roles and the current policies and challenges in the chilli industry. The authors also conducted focus group discussions (FGDs) with farmers and support providers and held a national workshop to gather governance and price volatility risk-related information.

The Indonesian chilli value chains are long, complex and involve multiple actors. Most relationships within the value chains are based on market governance in which price regulates transactions. Most value chain actors shared a similar perception of price volatility and its causes. Under different governance structures, the value chain actors identified production, product characteristics and marketing as a major cause of price volatility. Although strategies applied by the value chain actors varied, in the main they are all aimed at minimising the impact of price volatility. Contractual arrangements are viable alternatives to minimising price risk.

This research relies primarily on qualitative data derived from purposive data collection methods, which may reduce the ability to generalise the findings. A quantitative analysis is required to validate the level of price volatility perceived by the stakeholders and to assess the cause and impact of price volatility across the chain. Future research should focus on proposing and assessing potential policy interventions that address price volatility, in order to facilitate the development of the Indonesian chilli industry.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the governance structures of the Indonesia chilli value chain, the value chain actors' perceptions of price volatility and their responses under the different types of governance in a developing country context.

This study aimed at exploring the differential effects of different corporate governance (CG) indicators on risk management practices in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) and conventional financial institutions (CFIs) of Pakistan. It also investigated the moderating role of institutional quality (IQ) in shaping the effects of CG practices on financial institutions of Pakistan.

A sample of 57 financial institutions including commercial banks, insurance companies and Modarba companies over the period 2006–2017 is used to carry out the empirical analysis. The authors applied the robust two-step system-generalized method of moments estimator, which is also called the dynamic panel data estimator. They also built the PCA-based composite index of CG and IQ by using different indicators to investigate the moderating role of IQ. They used three proxies for risk taking, five for CG and one for Shari’ah governance. To test the validity of the instruments, they applied the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) AR (1) and AR (2) tests and the J-statistic of Hansen (1982).

The results provided strong evidence that several individual characteristics of CG and the composite index are significantly related to the operational risk, the liquidity risk and the Z-score (a proxy for solvency risk). The results also revealed that IQ significantly and substantially contributes in reducing the level of risks. Finally, the estimation results indicated that the effects of CG on risk management are significantly different at IFIs and CFIs. This differential impact is mainly attributed to the fundamental differences in business models, operational strategies and contractual obligations of both types of institutions.

The findings of this study are important for enhancing our understanding of how CG relates to risk taking in Islamic and conventional financial services industries and how good quality institutions are important for formulating the governance effects on the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions. The findings suggest that a suitable size of board should be chosen to manage the risk effectively. As the findings show that the risk-taking behavior of IFIs differs from that of CFIs, the regulators and international standard setting bodies should tailor the regulatory frameworks accordingly.

This paper is different from the existing studies in four aspects. First, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first empirical investigation in Pakistan, which does the comparison of IFIs and CFIs while examining the impacts of CG on risk management. Second, the paper constructs the composite index of CG by considering several different indicators of governance and examines the combined effect of governance indicators on risk management process. Third, this paper adds to the growing literature on the role of IQ by investigating whether it acts as a moderator between CG structures and risk management and if yes, then whether this moderating role is different for IFIs and CFIs. Finally, the paper builds upon the existing research work on the CG effects for different types of financial institutions by proposing a single regression based analytical framework for comparing the effects across two different types of institutions, harvesting the benefits of higher degrees of freedom and avoiding/minimizing the measurement error.

The purpose of this paper is to show the importance of policy discussions on the role of governance in limiting excessive risk-taking at times of turmoil.

Corporate governance measures are regressed on measures of risk taking using a sample of US bank holding companies (BHCs) during 2002-2014.

Results show that BHCs with more concentrated shareholders, more managerial ownership, smaller boards, and less outside directors undertake less risky investments with respect to total assets, loans, and off-balance-sheet items. Capital adequacy effect is overpowering pushing for more risky positions. Finally, banks with good governance push for less risky positions, even with larger capital ratios, during the financial crisis period relative to the precrisis boom.

This paper extends research on the association between bank ownership structure and risk taking. It adds to prior research by examining a key feature of banks, namely, their bank-specific capital adequacy. The relevance of this study stems from recent initiatives undertaken by the Basel Committee, the Group of Thirty (G30), and bank regulators to address deficient corporate governance structures that led to bank breakdowns.

One of the innovations of this paper is the use of risk-weighted measures to proxy for risk taking in banks, using risk weights used by bank regulators to adjust for operational risk, credit risk, and market risk.

This study aims to explore the relationship between risk governance characteristics (chief risk officer [CRO], chief financial officer [CFO] and senior directors [SENIOR]) and regulatory adjustments (RAs) in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development public commercial banks.

Using principal component analysis (PCA) and regression models, the research analyzes a representative data set of these banks.

A significant negative correlation between risk governance characteristics and RAs is found. Sensitivity analysis on the regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio and the total capital ratio indicates mixed outcomes, suggesting a complex relationship that warrants further exploration.

The study’s limited sample size calls for further research to confirm findings and explore risk governance’s impact on banks’ capital structures.

Enhanced risk governance could reduce RAs, influencing banking policy.

The study advocates for improved banking regulatory practices, potentially increasing sector stability and public trust.

This study contributes to understanding risk governance’s role in regulatory compliance, offering insights for policymaking in banking.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the simultaneous effect of corporate governance (CG) of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic banks (IBs) on efficiency and risk.

The authors include Shariah supervisory board (SSB) size, Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-duality and ownership structure as CG variables. Efficiency and risk are measured using the data envelopment analysis (DEA)/stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and Z-score, respectively. This paper also examines the risk-efficiency relationship. To test the hypotheses, the authors used seemingly unrelated regressions on a sample of 56 GCC IBs during the period 2004-2013.

The results indicate that implementing rigorous CG structures correlate with higher efficiency levels. Particularly, the authors show that the governance structure of IBs allows them to take higher risks to achieve a high efficiency level. In addition, results show that bank efficiency and risk are positively related.

This paper gives some insights to policy makers. It points out detail attention toward the importance of CG in IB that influences the efficiency level and risk-taking behavior. Thus, IB should improve governance procedures that can lead to higher efficiency and survival in a competitive environment and sustain financial crisis. Moreover, the economic conditions of a country are the main determinant of an IB’s efficiency and risk relationships.

The simultaneous effect of the CG of the GCC IBs on efficiency and risk is examined, taking into consideration different CG proxies, i.e., SSB size, CEO-duality and ownership structure, and different efficiency estimation techniques, i.e., SFA and DEA.

This study aims to investigate the quality of disclosure of a cutting-edge reporting tool – integrated reporting (<IR>) – in terms of its effectiveness to report on COVID-19 pandemic information, its ability to provide forward-looking information and risk impact implications, and its quality determinants in challenging times.

Thanks to a content analysis of 247 <IR> for FY20, an integrated reporting disclosure score was developed to assess the disclosure quality provided by the sampled companies. Three research questions were tested through logistic regressions.

Non-financial disclosure activities struggle to provide adequate information in terms of potential future scenarios, risk assessment and forward-looking analyses. However, companies incorporated in “Anglo-Saxon” territories drafted integrated reports of higher quality. More recently, incorporated companies have made a greater effort to measure and report COVID-19 pandemic impacts on environmental, social and governance and business activities, also increasing their risk assessment and mitigation efforts. Concerning the determinants of disclosure quality, leverage, corporate governance structures, country of incorporation and belonging to “high impact” industries all lead to a higher quality of <IR> disclosure.

Examining in detail corporate social responsibility activities and corporate governance integrity is pivotal to orienting strategy towards sustainable trajectories: to do so, corporate reporting and disclosure practices are essential tools. In this context, corporate governance systems that emphasize board diversity are proven, even in disruptive circumstances, to play a crucial role in providing corporate reports of higher quality. High disclosure quality that goes beyond mere financial results is considered to be necessary to remain competitive strategically, socially and environmentally.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the potential influence of corporate governance mechanisms on risk disclosure quality in Tunisia.

The authors examine 152 annual reports of Tunisian non-financial-listed firms during 2008–2013, and use the manual content analysis method to measure the risk disclosure quality.

The authors find that the quality of risk disclosure in Tunisian companies is relatively low, and also find that the quality of risk disclosure is positively associated with institutional ownership, board independence, the presence of women on the board, the presence of family members on the board and the independence of audit committee. Managerial ownership has a negative effect on risk disclosure quality. Finally, the authors find that the revolution decreases the influence of concentration ownership, government ownership, family ownership and audit committee size on risk disclosure quality.

Using a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms and a new measure for risk disclosure quality in Tunisia, the authors provide the first empirical evidence on the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on risk disclosure quality in a developing country. The study has theoretical and practical implications for both developed and developing countries.

Against the backdrop of an Indian banking sector that finds itself entangled in the triple deadlock of increasing competition, technological changes and strict regulatory compliance, the study aims to examine the need for reinforcing stringent corporate and risk governance mechanisms as an instrument for improving efficiency and productivity levels.

The authors construct three separate indices, namely, supervisory board index, audit index and risk governance index to measure the governance practices of commercial banks. A slacks-based data envelopment analysis technical efficiency (TE) measure, a variable returns to scale cost efficiency model and Malmquist productivity index are employed to determine TE, cost efficiency and productivity change, respectively. A two-step system-generalized method of moments estimation accounts for the dynamic relationship between governance and efficiency.

The authors show that strict audit and risk governance mechanisms are associated with better efficiency and productivity levels. However, consistent with the free-rider hypothesis, large, independent and diverse boards lead to cost inefficiencies. Strict risk governance structures circumvent the negative effects of high regulatory capital and improve efficiency and total factor productivity. However, friendly boards do not perform efficiently in the presence of regulatory capital, implying that incentives arising from maintaining high levels of equity capital make them more susceptible to risk-taking, and board composition is unable to sidestep this behaviour.

The paper contributes to the literature that explores the linkages between governance, efficiency and productivity. The inferences hold relevance in the post-COVID world, as regulators try to circumvent the additional stress on the banking system by adopting sound corporate and risk governance mechanisms.

The purpose of this research is to reveal the impact of public legal protection on the efficiency of internal corporate governance in banks. In addition, this research proposes a new corporate governance index that could be employed by the banking sector to evaluate the performance of their internal corporate governance mechanisms.

Orbis database, annual reports and direct questionnaire are used to collect corporate governance data of 127 banks from 14 countries during 2020. The Mann–Whitney U-test is employed to compare the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms based on three subsamples of countries having different legal protection levels (weak, middle and strong).

This research suggests a new corporate governance index for banks based on seven constructs and 62 variables. This new non-parametric index could be used by bankers to improve the monitoring process and enhance the overall performance of banking. The results of this research show that the existence of a strong public legal protection environment within a specific country enhances the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector and thus, leads to improve the protection of shareholders, depositors and other relevant stakeholders. However, in countries that are characterized by weak legal protection level, the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms is very low and there are possibilities of entrenchment, expropriation and extraction of private benefits. These findings could be interpreted within the prediction of agency, moral hazard, asymmetric information, political and entrenchment theories.

This research paper provides information that bankers and other relevant stakeholders in the banking sector working in MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) and European countries. A strong public legal protection level could improve the efficiency of internal corporate governance mechanisms within banks.