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Much of the literature on theories of decision making under risk has emphasized differences between theories. One enduring theme has been the attempt to develop a distinction between “normative” and “descriptive” theories of choice. Bernoulli (1738) introduced log utility because expected value theory was alleged to have descriptively incorrect predictions for behavior in St. Petersburg games. Much later, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory because of the alleged descriptive failure of expected utility (EU) theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947).

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that a fundamental cause of market booms and busts is that investor risk attitudes change during market booms. Specifically, the authors propose that an investor’s risk aversion falls as (s)he attempts to “keep up with the Joneses.” This paper studies changing risk attitudes induced by social interactions, and shows that risk-seeking behavior that is initially successful may induce copycat behavior and lead individuals in the same peer group to reduce their degree of risk aversion to attempt to obtain similar rewards, a phenomenon we call “Gain attraction in the presence of social interactions.”

The authors propose a new theoretical model that incorporates the social interaction term into the value function of prospect theory. The modified value function empowers the standard prospect theory by introducing the idea that people often compare themselves to others and then compare their gains to the gains of others. The model predicts that, if people exhibit some degree of envy, they will treat the observed utility achieved by others as destination points and will reposition themselves to the new reference points, and at that point their willingness to accept risk dramatically increases.

The theoretical model is tested empirically against experimental data and survey data. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, the experimental results suggest that, after subjects observed the behavior of the leading investor in the controlled laboratory condition, there was a significant increase in risk-taking behavior. The survey results further confirm that envy is an emotional force behind the dissatisfaction and disappointment among investors when they miss available opportunities that others were able to take advantage of.

This study provides evidence that investment decisions are not made in a social vacuum by isolated individuals, but rather in social settings in which individuals are influenced by the actions and outcomes of their peers. The study also opens up a new research avenue that the reduction in risk aversion induced by peer effects may be an important element explaining how greed is transmitted across the economy during times of financial boom, thus helping to fuel the flames of financial crises.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a deterministic equivalent income model (DEIM) based on the risk cost (RC) and risk aversion of investors. The model fully considers both subjective and objective factors that affect risk investment and reasonably evaluates risk investment schemes to choose the correct investment scheme and gain greater investment returns.

The utility function is used to measure the extent to which an investor is satisfied by investment returns in various scenarios. Risk aversion expresses subjective attitude of investors to risk. RC represents risk loss in currency. This methodology is based on risk aversion function, utility function and RC theory to establish DEIM.

This study shows that investors with different risk preferences have different certainty equivalent returns (CER), so their choices of investment options change accordingly.

In this paper, the authors use DEIM to test an investment case and conclude that the CER and investment scheme both change with different risk preferences. At the same time, case analysis shows that DEIM is reasonable and stable when evaluating risk investment schemes.

In this study, the authors innovate by introducing both the RC and risk aversion degree into risk investment schemes evaluation and by deriving a utility function from the absolute risk aversion function to build a utility decision matrix and establish DEIM. The model combines the subjective and objective factors that influence risk investment decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically test dominant theories and assumptions in behavioral finance, using data from the Standard & Poor's 500 index.

The empirical analysis has three parts: to test the assumption of risk aversion; to examine the dominant theory that the optimal portfolio depends on risk preferences; and to test prospect theory that decision makers prefer certain outcomes over probable outcomes. Finally, an alternative model to test prospect theory is introduced.

The proposed model is more flexible than prospect theory since it does not a priori assume what value of the portfolio induces risk aversion/seeking, while it does not a priori preclude linear preferences. Empirical results show that: investors are risk seeking; a change in the sign of preferences does not necessarily imply a change in the sign of wealth/return and vice versa; and the optimal portfolio does not depend on preferences.

These findings are helpful to risk managers dealing with models of behavioural finance.

The contribution of this paper is that it successfully tests fundamental theories and assumptions in behavioral finance by providing a better alternative to prospect theory in several ways.

Choice under risk has a large stochastic (unpredictable) component. This chapter examines five stochastic models for binary discrete choice under risk and how they combine with “structural” theories of choice under risk. Stochastic models are substantive theoretical hypotheses that are frequently testable in and of themselves, and also identifying restrictions for hypothesis tests, estimation and prediction. Econometric comparisons suggest that for the purpose of prediction (as opposed to explanation), choices of stochastic models may be far more consequential than choices of structures such as expected utility or rank-dependent utility.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate gender differences in risk aversion and determine the effect of personality traits on risk aversion from an African country context.

The study combined both descriptive and analytical designs, and employed t-test, Pearson’s χ² and binary logistic regression as the main analytical techniques. Data for the analysis were obtained from the World Bank’s Skills toward Employment and Productivity survey on Ghana.

Results of the study revealed systematic differences in personality and gender and their associations with risk aversion. Specifically, women were found to be more risk averse than men. Differences in personality also showed that females reported higher levels of personality in all but one of the Big Five personality traits – extraversion. In addition to gender, age and education, the personality traits of conscientiousness and stability were the main predictors of the likelihood of being risk averse. Although personality differences existed between male and female, the interaction terms between gender and personality factors were not statistically significant.

The paper departs from the extant literature on developed countries and western cultures to add to the understanding on how individual differences account for variation in revealed risk preferences.

The extant literature provides evidence that single CEOs are less risk-averse. Building on the theory of risk aversion, the authors argue that the risk aversion trait arising from CEO’s marital status partially explains capital allocation efficiency. The paper aims to examine the association between CEO marital status and capital allocation efficiency.

The primary sample includes 9,671 observations from 1,264 US firms. The authors apply multivariate regression and a series of endogeneity tests to examine the association between CEO marital status and capital allocation efficiency.

Single-CEO firms have higher capital allocation inefficiency than those with married CEOs. The findings continue to hold after a series of endogeneity tests such as propensity score matching, change analysis and instrumental variable regression analysis and are robust to alternative proxies for capital allocation inefficiency. The capital allocation inefficiency in single-CEO firms arises from overinvestment but not underinvestment, and corporate risk-taking channels the effect.

The study is limited to the effect of CEO marital status, not CEO marital quality.

The findings imply that besides information asymmetry and agency conflicts, CEO marital status should receive special attention for capital allocation efficiency. Also, marital status influences the CEOs’ commitment to the general good of society, affecting the potential conflict of interest with different stakeholders from inefficient capital allocation.

This study extends corporate finance literature on CEO marital status by providing novel evidence on the effect of single CEOs on capital allocation efficiency. The authors conclude that CEOs’ personality traits, such as marital status, matter in corporate policy choices.

This chapter conducts a systematic comparison of behavioral economics’s challenges to the standard accounts of economic behaviors within three dimensions: under risk, over time, and regarding other people. A new perspective on two underlying methodological issues, i.e., inter-disciplinarity and the positive/normative distinction, is proposed by following the entanglement thesis of Hilary Putnam, Vivian Walsh, and Amartya Sen. This thesis holds that facts, values, and conventions have inter-dependent meanings in science which can be understood by scrutinizing formal and ordinary language uses. The goal is to provide a broad and self-contained picture of how behavioral economics is changing the mainstream of economics.

The recent surge in behavioral studies on the coordination mechanisms in supply chains (SCs) and advanced methods highlights the role of SC coordination (SCC) and behavioral issues associated with improving the performance of the operations. This study aims to critically review the behavioral aspect of channel coordination mechanisms.

Following a systematic literature review methodology, the authors adopt a combination of bibliometric (to reflect the current state of the field), content (using Leximancer data mining software to develop thematic maps) and theory-oriented qualitative analyzes that provide a holistic conceptual framework to unify the literature’s critical concepts.

The analysis confirms the plethora of risk-oriented publications, demonstrating that the second largest category of studies is concerned with social preferences theory. Most studies were based on experiments, followed by analytical modeling, revealing the impact of heuristics and individual preferences in SC decisions and suggesting promising managerial and theoretical avenues for future research.

The study sheds light on behavioral decision theories applied to SC coordination by categorizing the literature based on the adopted theories. The methodological contributions include using automated content analysis and validating the outcome by interviewing leading scholars conducting active research on “behavioral operations management and SC contracts.” The authors also propose several directions for future research based on the research gaps.