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Article
Publication date: 11 January 2021

Nourhen Sallemi, Rim Zouari Hadiji and Ghazi Zouari

This paper aims to examine the effect of governance mechanisms (board size, board independence, duality, the Sharia board size, Sharia board meetings and ownership…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to examine the effect of governance mechanisms (board size, board independence, duality, the Sharia board size, Sharia board meetings and ownership concentration) on the performance of insurance providers of distinguishable Muamalah contracts (wakalah and hybrid), moderated by the length of senior leaders’ servicing time.

Design/methodology/approach

The full sample includes 21 listed Takaful companies divided into two subsamples – 12 insurance wakalah contracts offered in the South East Asian (SEA) countries and 9 insurance hybrid contracts offered in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period of 2012–2018. The methodology is informed by Baron and Kenny’s (1986) moderation process approach.

Findings

The results of this study indicate that the larger the size of directors’ board and the higher the number of outside directors, the greater the SEA wakalah Takaful insurance performance. Nondual functions and a larger size of Sharia board along with a highly-concentrated ownership structure have a positive effect on the Takaful insurance performance in both the SEA and GCC regions. Furthermore, the higher the Sharia board meetings, the higher performance of all types of Takaful insurance providers in the sample. As for the moderating effect of the director’s seniority, it is found to negatively moderate the relationship between the governance mechanisms and the Takaful performance in both regions.

Originality/value

This paper highlights that the leader’s entrenchment stands as an obstructing factor impeding the governance mechanisms from enhancing Takaful performance. Thus, it serves to contribute to clearly understanding the appropriate governance mechanisms usefully fit for a Takaful insurance effective performance, applying the wakalah and hybrid contract types. Such a contribution should be appreciated by the concerned regulators engaged in setting up limited serving periods for the directors whereby the Takaful insurance practice could be efficiently managed and supervised.

Details

Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1759-0817

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Article
Publication date: 6 April 2012

Hamadi Fakhfakh, Ghazi Zouari and Rim ZouariHadiji

This research attempts to explain the decentralization of investment decision. To do so, it highlights the role of the internal capital market in the allocation of

Abstract

Purpose

This research attempts to explain the decentralization of investment decision. To do so, it highlights the role of the internal capital market in the allocation of decision rights and control as a factor explaining the effectiveness of investment management. The authors aim to apply the theory of the organizational architecture to the investment decision to understand its complexity and its efficiency.

Design/methodology/approach

An empirical test was realized on a sample of 63 Tunisian firms using the methods of canonical correlation and cross tabulations.

Findings

Even if organizational complexity has a linear and negative impact (opposite sign to what is expected) on the investment decision decentralization, which creates value, it appears that there is a positive association with the uncertainty of the environment, and a negative one with the scarcity and sharing of financial resources between units on the internal capital market.

Originality/value

The authors show that the role played by the internal capital market in the value creating requires the setting of a centralized organizational structure.

Details

Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, vol. 12 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1472-0701

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Article
Publication date: 1 June 2020

Aws AlHares, Ahmed A. Elamer, Ibrahem Alshbili and Maha W. Moustafa

This study aims to examine the impact of board structure on risk-taking measured by research and development (R&D) intensity in OECD countries.

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to examine the impact of board structure on risk-taking measured by research and development (R&D) intensity in OECD countries.

Design/methodology/approach

The study uses a panel data of 200 companies on Forbes global 2000 over the 2010-2014 period. It uses the ordinary least square multiple regression analysis techniques to examine the hypotheses.

Findings

The results show that the frequency of board meetings and board size are significantly and negatively related to risk-taking measured by R&D intensity, with a greater significance among Anglo-American countries than among Continental European countries. The rationale for this is that the legal and accounting systems in the Anglo American countries have greater protection through greater emphasis on compliance and disclosure, and therefore, allowing for less risk-taking.

Research limitations/implications

Future research could investigate risk-taking using different arrangements, conducting face-to-face meetings with the firm’s directors and shareholders.

Practical implications

The results suggest that better-governed firms at the firm- or national-level have a high expectancy of less risk-taking. These results offer regulators a resilient incentive to pursue corporate governance (CG) and disclosure reforms officially and mutually with national-level governance. Thus, these results show the monitoring and legitimacy benefits of governance, resulting in less risk-taking. Finally, the findings offer investors the opportunity to build specific expectations about risk-taking behaviour in terms of R&D intensity in OECD countries.

Originality/value

This study extends and contributes to the extant CG literature, by offering new evidence on the effect of board structure on risk-taking. The findings will help policymakers in different countries in estimating the sufficiency of the available CG reforms to prevent management mishandle and disgrace.

Details

International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, vol. 28 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1834-7649

Keywords

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