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The purpose of this paper is to show how the institutional context in an emerging economy, Russia, moderates the “do or buy” decision of international firms operating in the country. This is examined through the influence of institutional voids on transaction costs and definition of core competencies.

The paper adopts a qualitative research approach, where the empirical data are based on interviews with executives of eight Finnish companies, which have invested in Russia's second largest city, St Petersburg.

The key findings include first, that the formal and informal constraints in the Russian business environment influence outsourcing decisions in terms of increased transaction costs, and in terms of resources needed to be competitive. Second, the authors show that, due to these constraints, a firm in Russia may need to insource functions that it would otherwise outsource as non‐core activities and invest in building of competencies specific to the Russian business environment.

The limitation of the study is its focus on two countries. However, the analytical framework proposed for examining influence of institutions on outsourcing strategies is applicable to other country contexts.

This paper shows how the institutional constraints of the host country, reflecting in this case as underdeveloped market for business services and complex state regulation, can result in a significant need for adaptation of a foreign firm's business processes. This must be taken into account in business planning and allocation of resources to the Russian operations.

The paper provides researchers and practitioners with new information about a little‐studied topic by showing concrete ways of how institutions influence outsourcing strategies in Russia.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of institutional distance, extended to capture subnational institutional variation, on foreign entry mode choice.

As an empirical study, it focuses on manufacturing firms established in Russia by foreign investors from developed countries. The dependent variables, the share of foreign ownership and the entry mode choice binary variable (equal to 1 for full foreign ownership and zero for a joint venture) were obtained from the registry of foreign-owned firms in Russia. The World Bank's regulatory quality (RQ) index on a national level and a respective indicator for the various Russian regions on a subnational level were utilised to measure institutions. Multilevel cross-classified analysis including foreign firms, the various Russian regions and characteristics of the foreign owners’ home countries was applied to for making empirical estimations.

The empirical results show, first, that the regionally adjusted institutional distance, i.e. the distance between the home country and the Russian region in question, when measured in terms of RQ, shifts the ownership structure towards shared ownership. However, nation-level institutional distance between the home country and Russia does not show any statistically significant relationship with the modal choice.

The results indicate that with the exception of industries of strategic importance to the state, the most important “rules of the game” for foreign entry strategies are provided not by the federal government but by the regional governors. The theoretical value of the paper lies in the extension of the institutional distance concept to the subnational level. At the same time, the paper identifies those institutional features that foreign entrants eyeing Russia need to take into account when selecting an entry mode and location within Russia.

This paper seeks to discover whether and how a subsidiary located in a high‐corruption host country can pursue its parent's corporate non‐corrupt strategy, rooted in a low‐corruption home country. Theoretically, it aims to apply the construct of institutional duality. It also aims to argue that the subsidiary's strategic response is contingent to the relative strength of two sets of institutional demands: the articulation of the multinational company's (MNC's) corporate policy towards corruption; and the direct influence of the host country corruption on the subsidiary's daily business.

A qualitative analysis of interviews with executives of 27 Finnish companies (15 large MNCs and 12 small to medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs)) with subsidiaries in Russia was conducted.

The subsidiary's strategic response to host country corruption is contingent to the firm size and the respective resources. Large MNCs can implement their non‐corrupt policy also in their Russian subsidiaries due to their financial and relational resources. SMEs, which lack such resources, need to adapt to the demands from the corrupt environment. This is usually done by “outsourcing” situations prone to corruption to a local intermediary.

The empirical analysis is limited to one pair of countries (Russia and Finland) and selected locations in Russia (Moscow and St Petersburg).

The paper provides examples of business strategies that help to mitigate the negative consequences of host country corruption without giving up one's moral and ethical principles.

The paper enriches the literature on corruption in international business by identifying the firm size as a key determinant for strategic responses to host country corruption.