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During the banking crisis of October 2008, Iceland became the first developed country in decades to seek the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Iceland’s IMF programme provided a measure of stability at a time of intense turbulence. The IMF’s credibility was helpful during this period of collapse not just of the banks but also of the public trust towards almost all Icelandic institutions. Importantly, the IMF implicitly supported Iceland’s policy of letting institutional creditors of the banks rather than Icelandic taxpayers bear the costs of their collapse; this provided credibility for the policy and limited repercussions. In a reversal of previous IMF policy, capital controls were imposed. The controls helped stabilise the exchange rate, and inflation subsided. The controls also helped recovery after the crisis by shielding the economy from international financial shocks. The direct fiscal cost of the Icelandic crisis was very high, but the considerable and painful fiscal tightening that was a part of the programme was needed to avoid a sovereign debt crisis. This helped in regaining trust from international markets. Mistakes were made in the design and implementation of the IMF programme, but overall, we judge that its contribution was positive. The programme provided one of the elements for restoring trust in Iceland when it was most needed, both domestically and internationally, during the depth of the crisis in 2009–2010.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

This analysis attempts a comparative specification of certain aspects of the country studies contained in this volume. The point of departure is the banking crises of the early 1990s (deep in Finland, Norway and Sweden, mini-crisis in Denmark and absent in Iceland) and the contrast to Iceland's financial meltdown in 2007/2008 (no crisis in the three, a new mini-crisis in Denmark). Detailed process tracing of the Icelandic crisis is provided. The case account is then used to shed light on the different roles of neoliberalism, economics expert knowledge and populist right-wing party formation in the five Nordic political economies.

The purpose of this paper is to illuminate change processes in Vietnam, China, and the USSR.

“Policy ethnography” may be used to examine the emergence of policy rationalities that may or may not be locally feasible. Through the use of a conceptual heuristics to interpret practice, this paper contrasts approaches in the development of “conservative” transition rationalities suited to the shift from plan to market whilst retaining a ruling Communist Party in power. Comparison is made between Vietnam, where a successful “conservative” transition occurred, and a failed policy experiment in the Soviet Union. The discussion extends to China, where, as in the case of Vietnam, a policy‐oriented policy rationality of transition may be observed.

Through the use of a conceptual heuristics to interpret practice this paper, contrasts approaches in the development of “conservative” transition rationalities suited to the shift from plan to market whilst retaining a ruling Communist Party in power. Comparison is made between Vietnam, where a successful “conservative” transition occurred, and a failed policy experiment in the Soviet Union. The discussion extends to China, where, as in the case of Vietnam, a policy‐oriented policy rationality of transition may be observed.

Further research into the development of conservative policy rationalities in other context is advised.

The paper concludes that attaining a successful heuristics amongst policy consumers is likely a necessary condition of a managed conservative transition, and that this heuristics does well to define system changes as a process, rather than a discrete step, in constructing a cognitive basis for policy rationality.

The paper consistently avoids realist arguments about policy, which would suggest judgments as to whether policy is “correct” or “incorrect”, and focuses upon the creation of policy rationalities.