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We present a specific mathematical model for predicting allocative behaviors in the context of reward expectations theory. We test the goodness of fit of the model to data from two empirical studies and demonstrate that it fits quite well. We also suggest alternative research uses for the model.

It is the general purpose of this chapter to introduce assumptions, postulates and hypotheses concerning the social nature of human emotions. I will propose some universal social causes of emotion categories by integrating Kemper’s (1978) power and status dimensions in dyadic relations to universal structures of human groups. These structures, of Self and Other meeting or not meeting expectations and receiving rewards or not, predict specific emotion categories. Power and status dimensions are added to the model and defined in terms of expectation/sanction (E/S) states, and are proposed to be universal as well. Furthermore, changing E/S conditions produce corresponding changes in power/status relations, and changes in emotion categories. These changing social structural conditions cause individual anxieties to emerge. Extending Kemper’s theoretical conceptualizations, gaining or losing power-advantage or status-advantage predicts syndromes of universal anxiety emotions.

Recent developments in identity theory are used to understand emotions in distributive justice theory. Three issues are examined: the consistency vs. enhancement dynamic, the status dynamic, and the resource dynamic. Results reveal individuals initially react positively to over-rewards; later they react more negatively. We suggest that the enhancement process occurs initially; the consistency process occurs later. Regarding status, persons respond negatively to unjust outcomes when they come from higher status persons. Finally, positive emotions are a resource for individuals initially and across encounters, buffering the effect of repeated unjust outcomes. Overall, this study helps develop emotions in distributive justice theory.

This study aims to investigate the situational factors that intensify the impact of leader bottom-line mentality (BLM) on employee pro-self-unethical behavior. In particular, the moderating role of contingent rewards and punishments is evaluated under the lens of situational strength theory.

Data were collected from 218 full-time employees working in the USA in a time-lagged study and analyzed using SPSS Process Macro.

Statistical analysis reveal contingent rewards and punishments significantly moderate the positive relationship between BLM and pro-self-unethical behavior.

This paper highlights the need for more balanced reward systems that incorporate moral conduct into work performance. It also emphasizes the role of robust accountability and monitoring systems in minimizing employees’ unethical behavior.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the moderating role of contingent rewards and punishments on the relationship between leader BLM and subordinate pro-self-unethical behavior. Moreover, it provides significant empirical support to situational strength theory.

This study examines how the structure of referent networks, or the social network defined by knowing others’ reward levels, affects perceptions of distributive justice. The homogeneity of rewards in the referent network, the amount of inequality in the referent network, and an individual’s reward level are all associated with distributive justice perceptions. Several moderating relationships are also examined.

We relied on data from a controlled laboratory experiment to test a series of theoretically derived hypotheses.

The study shows that several aspects about the structure of the referent network are important for shaping perceptions of distributive justice. Specifically, the reward heterogeneity and amount of inequality in the network are found to be negatively associated with distributive justice, while reward levels are found to be positively associated with distributive justice. Furthermore, the effect of reward levels on distributive justice is moderated by both (i) the presence of a referential standard for rewards and (ii) the amount of inequality in the network.

While being among the first studies to demonstrate effects of referent networks on perceptions of fairness, it is unclear how group memberships combine with referent network effects and which factors may blur these relationships in uncontrolled environments. Subsequent scholarship on the effect of referent networks on justice perceptions should leverage multiple data sources.

Research on the effects of referents on justice perceptions has focused on particular referent individuals. We recast this issue in terms of referent networks, which highlights the empirical reality that individuals have a variety of sources or alters which could operate as referents.

A fundamental ethical question is how a redistributive system should reward individual effort. Marginal productivity reward has been justified either as a way of ensuring efficiency or as a way of respecting people's self-ownership. Both these arguments have their limitations. We show that marginal productivity reward is implied by one intuitively appealing requirement on the reward structure, which we name non-negative reward. This result can be interpreted in one of two ways. It can be seen as a new justification of marginal productivity reward that avoids the limitations of the traditional arguments. Alternatively, it can be seen as a result showing that any redistributive system that makes transfers conditional on effort, sometimes will make the reward individuals get for their additional effort completely conditional on others effort. Finally, we also show that no genuine redistributive system satisfies both non-negative reward and the liberal requirement of no forced labour.

The purpose of this research is to identify how a reward programme name (“loyalty programme” (LP) versus “customer club” (CC)) influences the type of central rewards expected and their impact on loyalty to the retailer.

The authors conducted a survey followed by an experiment.

Central rewards from programmes called LP are equally hard and soft, whereas central rewards from programmes called CC are mainly soft. Providing customers with central rewards increases satisfaction with the programme and loyalty to the retailer, but only for programmes called LP.

Loyalty managers are advised to pay particular attention to the consistency between the type of rewards they offer and the reward programme name that carries them. Contrary to the name LP that leads to me-too programmes, the name CC offers more flexibility to choose the rewards, providing opportunities to stand out from competing programmes.

By building on a new and original theoretical approach, this research is the first attempt to investigate the effect of the reward programme naming decisions on customers' evaluations and responses.

Gamification, the integration of game mechanics to influence behavior and engagement, is a much-touted method of improving participant action. Characteristics of online video games (e.g., World of Warcraft, Farmville, The Sims) have been shown to improve motivation, sustain learner engagement, and increase satisfaction. Gamification is used in websites, businesses, medicine, law enforcement, and increasingly in education. However, gamification is only beneficial to an activity if the relationship between the activity and the final goal are understood. This chapter looks at the gamification in education, in particular second language acquisition, and examines seven basic game mechanics: achievement, appointment, rewards, leaderboards, privacy, social engagement loops (or viral mechanics), and modifiers. The discussion describes implementation of game mechanics and potential pitfalls of gamification.

To determine the role of status information conveyance in a negative reward allocation setting.

Using previously published experimental data, we test the relative effects of status information conveyed by expressive and indicative status cues on the allocation of a negative reward. Further, we construct an alternative graph theoretic model of expectation advantage which is also tested to determine its model fit relative to the classic model of Reward Expectations Theory.

Results provide strong support for the conclusion that status information conveyed by expressive status cues influences reward allocations more than information conveyed by indicative cues. We also find evidence that our alternative graph theoretic model of expectation advantage improves model fit.

This research is the first to test the relative impact of expressive versus indicative status cues on the allocation of negative rewards and shows that status characteristics can have differential impacts on these allocations contingent on how characteristics are conveyed. Furthermore, the research suggests a graph theoretic model that allows for this differentiation based on information conveyance and provides empirical support for its structure in a negative reward allocation environment.

Future research is required to validate the results in positive reward situations.

The results show that an individual’s expectations are altered by varying the manner in which status information is presented, thereby influencing the construction and maintenance of status hierarchies and the inequalities those structures generate. Thus, this research has implications for any group or evaluative task where status processes are relevant.