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The purpose of this paper is to examine the aftermath of the 2006-07 financial crisis and attempts to identify a range of causes that were responsible for it and are likely to trigger similar events in the future. The analytical tradition established by the study of white-collar crime provides the background for such an examination, which avails itself of some conceptualisations derived from classical economic thought.

Explanations of financial crime can resort to general theories based on allegedly universal values. They can posit the existence of criminaloids, namely, individuals who indulge in illegal practices, or ‘honest fraud’, while not deeming themselves culpable. Anomie and control theory in criminology have highlighted how the causes of financial crime are associated with general criminogenic contexts or with individual propensities or mindsets. This paper adds to the existing perspectives a number of variables that can provide a more nuanced picture of financial crimes.

This paper attempts to identify a range of discrete variables that can be termed interstitial in the sense that they can accompany a variety of theoretical hypotheses, locate themselves in the space left in between the different approaches while providing supplementary analytical foci. Ignorance, entitlement, reverse Keynesianism, recklessness, efficiency and the finance curse may offer additional angles from which the causation of financial crime can be observed. Sociological and criminological arguments, in this paper, are interspersed with notions derived from classical economics.

The originality of this contribution is to be found in its use of different theoretical traditions, establishing a dialogue between social theory, criminology and economic thought.

The goal of this chapter is to reexamine the nature and structure of the military–industrial complex (MIC) through the works of John Kenneth Galbraith. MIC, or military power as he prefers, is a coalition of vested interests within the state and industry that promoted the military power in the name of “national security” for their interests. Galbraith’s theory of giant corporations helps us understand the role of military corporations in the MIC. Moreover, he is a critical scholar in examining this topic because he was a political insider in the Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations and a prominent public intellectual against the Vietnam War. Against this background, this chapter has three parts. After explaining the development of military Keynesianism with respect to the main economic thoughts, it examines the history of the MIC and its impact on economic priorities during and after the Cold War through Galbraith’s works. Finally, this chapter discusses MIC’s relevancy today and evaluates Galbraith’s prophecies.

Alvin Hansen and John Williams’ Fiscal Policy Seminar at Harvard University is widely regarded as a key mechanism for the spread of Keynesianism in the United States. An original and regular participant, Richard A. Musgrave was invited to prepare remarks for the fiftieth anniversary of the seminar in 1988. These were never published, though a copy was filed with Musgrave’s papers at Princeton University. Their reproduction here is important for several reasons. First, it is one of the last reminiscences of the original participants. Second, the remarks make an important contribution to our understanding of the Harvard School of macro-fiscal policy. Third, the remarks provide interesting insights into Musgrave’s views on national economic policymaking as well as the intersection between theory and practice. The reminiscence demonstrates the importance of the seminar in shifting Musgrave’s research focus and moving him to a more pragmatic approach to public finance.

This analysis attempts a comparative specification of certain aspects of the country studies contained in this volume. The point of departure is the banking crises of the early 1990s (deep in Finland, Norway and Sweden, mini-crisis in Denmark and absent in Iceland) and the contrast to Iceland's financial meltdown in 2007/2008 (no crisis in the three, a new mini-crisis in Denmark). Detailed process tracing of the Icelandic crisis is provided. The case account is then used to shed light on the different roles of neoliberalism, economics expert knowledge and populist right-wing party formation in the five Nordic political economies.

Keynes, with his heretical contribution to the family of the neo‐classics, was as profound as the heresies of Luther against the Pope. He accepted the institution of profit, private initiative, personal ownership of the means of production, the price mechanism of the market in the production and consumption of goods and distribution of income. He refused to accept, however, the old concept of equilibrium with full employment according to the Say law of the markets. Instead he introduced the concept of equilibrium with unemployment, anathema to the classics.

There are two influential interpretative positions in the current debate on the crisis among Marxists. The first understands financialization as a consequence of the tendential fall of the rate of profit. The other interpretation, prevalent among those influenced by Keynesianism and Neoricardianism, refers to the tendency toward the crisis of realisation, because of the squeeze on the wage bill and the insufficiency of consumer demand. In both cases, the current crisis is the crisis of a feeble capitalism, permanently stagnationist. A Marxian interpretation of the crisis cannot be separated from the tendential fall of the rate of profit. This latter, however, cannot be accepted as it is presented by Marx, and it must be rethought as a meta-theory of the crisis, including within it the different crisis theories that can be derived from Capital. This article first provides a personal survey of Marx's crisis theories, often presented as opposed to each other. Second, it seeks to integrate the different positions into a unitary discourse, within a nonmechanical reading of the fall of the rate of profit. This discourse then mutates into an historical sketch of the long dynamic of capital: from the Great Depression of the end of the nineteenth century, to the Great Crash of the 1930s, to the Social Crisis in the immediate processes of valorisation of the 1960s–1970s (the Great Inflation). Finally, the “new” capitalism (the Great Moderation) and its recent crisis (the Great Recession) are read – integrating Marx and Minsky – as the conjunction between the real subsumption of labour to finance and the fragmentation of labour.

Norway is a small nation state on the northernmost coastline of Western Europe, integrated in the Western world economy. For centuries Norway's integration in the world economy had been based on exports of raw materials such as fish and timber, as well as shipping services. In the early 20th century, furnace-based metals (made possible by cheap hydropower) were added to this export basket. Just as the world economy entered an increasingly unstable phase in 1970s, another natural resource was discovered in Norway: petroleum – that is, oil and natural gas from the North Sea. This chapter analyses the challenges and possibilities inherent in the Norwegian strategy of developing an oil economy in a world economic situation influenced by new and stronger forms of international integration through the four decades between 1970 and 2010.

During times of economic crises, the public policy response is to abandon basic economic thinking and engage in “emergency economic” policies. We explore how the current financial crisis was in part caused by previous emergency economic measures. We then investigate the theoretical limitations of emergency economic responses. We argue that these responses fail to take into consideration the practical conditions of politics, thereby making them unsuitable to remedy the problems of a crisis. Lastly, we provide a preliminary analysis of the consequences resulting from emergency economic policies initiated in response to the 2008 financial crisis.

The chapter presents a short biography of Kalecki, from his early years in Łódź, through his economics research and development of his theory of business cycles, participation in the Keynesian Revolution and work after the Second World War on the economics of socialism and the developing countries. The key role of capital accumulation (investment) in determining levels of employment and total output is put forward as Kalecki's main innovation. There are evident similarities between Kalecki's theory of the business cycle and that of the Austro-Marxist Emil Lederer, as well as in the distributional analysis of Rudolf Hilferding. Kalecki's analysis of monetary circulation, and the centrality of his theory of profits was anticipated by Rosa Luxemburg in her Anti-Critique. But that monetary theory is rooted in a Marxian understanding of money as a means of settlement between capitalists.

Based on Geoffrey Harcourt's Palgrave volumes, this review article attempts to picture how, in a Cambridge environment, Keynes's fragmentary monetary theory of production grew organically out of Marshall's equally fragmentary monetary theory of exchange. The dangers associated with Keynes's close links with Marshall are alluded to. Indeed, without taking account of the classical spirit of Sraffa's work, Keynes's monetary theory may quite easily be integrated into the Marshallian‐neoclassical framework of analysis. However, theorising, not literally, but in the spirit of Keynes and Sraffa, within a Ricardian‐Pasinettian framework of vertical integration, opens the way to a Classical‐Keynesian monetary theory of production.