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The purpose of the study is to investigate the financing channels and carbon emission abatement preferences of supply chain members, and further examine the optimal contract design of the retailer.

This paper develops a low-carbon supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacturer, in which the retailer provides trade credit to the manufacturer. Considering the cap-and-trade regulation, the manufacturer with uncertain yield makes decision on whether to invest in emission abatement. There are bank loan and trade credit to finance production for the manufacturer and green credit to finance emission abatement investment. Meanwhile, the retailer may provide the manufacturer with three kinds of contracts to improve emission abatement efficiency, namely, revenue sharing, cost sharing or both sharing.

The results show that the retailer prefers to offer financing service at lower interest rate, but trade (and green) credit financing is always optimal for manufacturer and supply chain. The investment in emission abatement is value-added to all players. The sharing contracts offered by the retailer at lower sharing ratios can realize Pareto improvement of the system regardless of the financing scheme. However, comparing with the revenue or cost sharing contract, the existence of optimal sharing ratios makes the both sharing contract more favorable to the retailer.

The findings provide guidance for the emission-dependent manufacturer in financing and emission abatement decisions, as well as recommendations for the retailer to offer loan service and sharing contract.

This paper integrates green credit into bank loan or trade credit to analyze the financing decision of the manufacturer with uncertain yield and further considers the influence of three kinds of sharing contracts introduced by the retailer on improving operational performance.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of hunger marketing strategy on supply chain pricing and coordinate the supply chain through a two-period pricing model.

According to a two-period pricing model with hunger marketing strategy, the authors investigate two different scenarios: the centralized system and the decentralized system. The optimal or equilibrium solutions are calculated and compared in two different scenarios.

First, the hunger marketing strategy can improve the total profit of the supply chain by increasing the retail price and the total sales volume. Second, the hunger marketing strategy aggravates the double marginalization effect. Third, the authors introduce the revenue-sharing contract and characterize the conditions under which the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain and be accepted by both the members.

First, the authors suppose the same retail price in two periods for mathematic simplicity; second, they do not consider the discount factor for the revenue during the two periods.

This paper provides a guide to policymakers in terms of product pricing and supply rate.

First, the authors suppose the same retail price in two periods for mathematic simplicity; second, they do not consider the discount factor for the revenue during the two periods.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how customers’ self-control affects their purchase decisions and to discuss the pricing decisions of the retailer under different forms of contract.

The authors use the literature on hyperbolic discounting to model customers’ self-control problems. In this framework, the authors examine how the customers’ self-control affects the optimal pricing decision and the selection of the optimal contract form when there is a supplier and a retailer in the supply chain.

The study’s results show that when wholesale price contract is compared with buyback contract, buyback contract is better when customers’ self-control is weak; when quantity-discount contract is compared with wholesale price contract and buyback contract, although quantity discount can encourage customers to purchase more units of products, but both wholesale price contract and buyback contract can be better than quantity-discount contract in some cases. Additionally, the authors demonstrate that revenue sharing contract can increase the supply chain’s profit. The authors also find that sometimes customers’ preplan will lead to the result that the supplier produces more unhealthy products.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the decision-making of the retailer by developing an analytical framework combining customer’s self-control and supply chain contract. These results have important implications for the supplier and the retailer that sell vice goods.

The cluster supply chain is widely used in the professional towns in China, and improves the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises through integrating the supply chain with the industrial cluster. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

This paper studies a cluster supply chain under vendor managed inventory (VMI) system, which includes vendors, third-party logistics (TPL) enterprises and retail enterprises, and aims to study the replenishment decisions and coordination contracts in the supply chain. The economic order quantity model is applied to analyze the influence of marginal transportation cost factor under two replenishment modes – direct delivery and milk-run delivery, in order to find out the optimal replenishment decisions corresponding to different marginal transportation cost factors. And then, the revenue sharing contract is used to identify the change of profits of enterprises in the supply chain before and after the coordination contract.

It is concluded that the marginal transportation cost factor is an important factor influencing the replenishment decision especially in milk-run delivery, and the introduction of the revenue sharing contract can improve the revenue in the supply chain.

This is the first study that explores the relationship between a single transport cost and a single transport batch of cluster supply chain in centralized VMI & TPL system. The conclusions of the study have certain theoretical significance for the decision making and coordination of cluster supply chain.

This study aims to model collaborative product development (CPD) among a focal firm (FF) and a fairness-concerned external partner (EP). The model is used to explore the impact of fairness concerns on revenue distributing contract and innovation efforts. The study also examines the role of follow-up sales in product development decisions.

A sequential game-theoretic model is developed to analyze product development decisions between the two parties, where participants exert innovation efforts to promote the product value and a revenue-sharing contract is used to distribute the revenue.

Fairness concern of EP has significant impacts on decisions. FF has incentives to change the contract in that fairness concerns might decrease his profit. Conditions and results change when the contract is endogenously decided. First, FF tends to develop the product independently. Second, FF may share a smaller revenue fraction with EP, as FF relies more on his own efforts during CPD. Third, FF cannot benefit from fairness concerns, as his profit is not higher than that in the benchmark. Finally, the existence of follow-up sales does not change FF’s decision about whether to collaborate with EP.

This study incorporates fairness preference into CPD decisions. Besides, a new concept of fairness called “effort-related fairness” is proposed.

The construction industry has long been criticized for unethical conduct. The owner usually manages the contractor's opportunistic behaviors by employing a professional supervisor, but there is a risk of covert collusion between the supervisor and contractor. Based on the principal–agent theory and collusion theory, this paper aims to investigate optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts.

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework comprising an owner, supervisor and contractor, who interact and pursue maximized self-profits. Built upon the fixed-price incentive contract, cost-reimbursement contract, and revenue-sharing contract, different collusion-proof incentive contracts are investigated. A real project case is used to validate the developed model and derived results.

This paper shows that the presence of unethical collusion undermines the owner's interests. Especially, the possibility of agent collusion may induce the owner to abandon extracting quality information from the supervisor. Furthermore, information asymmetry significantly affects the construction contract selection, and the application conditions for different incentive contracts are provided.

This study still has some limitations that deserve further exploration. First, this study explores contractor–supervisor collusion but ignores the possibility of the supervisor abusing authority to extort the contractor. Second, to focus on collusion, this paper ignores the supervision costs. What's the optimal supervision effort that the owner should induce the supervisor to exert? Finally, this paper assumes that the colluders involved always keep their promises. However, what if the colluders may break their promises?

Several collusion-proof incentive contracts are explored in a project management setting. The proposed incentive contracts can provide the project owner with effective and practical tools to inhibit covert collusion in construction management and thus safeguard construction project quality.

This study expands the organization collusion theory to the field of construction management and investigates the optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts. In addition, this study is the first to investigate the effects of information asymmetry on contract selection.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to describe a decision support tool based on various types of contracts in a two‐level supply chain. A supply chain (SC) consists of disparate but interdependent members, dependent on each other to manage various resources (inventory, money and information). The conflicting objectives between these members may cause uncertainties in supply and demand, which can be managed by adopting coordination with the help of contracts (such as buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility). Design/methodology/approach: A decision support tool for SC coordination using contracts (DSTSCCC) has been developed to explore the applicability of contracts and to compare different types of contracts in various situations. The DSTSCC is comprised of an analytical module, which is an extension of the classical newsboy problem and a simulation module. Findings: DSTSCCC helps in determining decision variables for different scenarios of contracts in the best interest of all SC members as well as whole SC. Practical implications: DSTSCCC is a simple‐to‐use and easy‐to‐implement decision making tool which helps in taking decisions prior to the actual start of SC activities. The prior decisions may help to handle future exceptions. SC members may jointly select the most profitable contract to share risks and rewards. Originality/value: DSTSCCC comprised of analytical module and simulation module presents an Integrative framework which cannot be dealt in isolation. The output of analytical module becomes input for simulation to quantify performance measures. The improvement in performance measures after satisfying the objectives of all SC members helps in realizing coordination in SC.

Members in a supply chain account for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in different ways. This paper considers a socially responsible supply chain in which the manufacturer innovates in a sustainable product while the retailer exhibits CSR concerns. This paper aims to investigate how socially responsible behavior, namely, sustainable innovations or CSR concerns, affects the pure profit, environmental impact and social welfare, in such a socially responsible supply chain.

This paper first constructs an integrated case as a benchmark and then develops a Manufacturer-Stackelberg game in a decentralized scenario. The pure profit, environmental impact and social welfare are confirmed and analyzed in centralized and decentralized cases. Moreover, two unique coordinating contracts, i.e. wholesale price discount contract and revenue-sharing contract, are used in this socially responsible supply chain.

Analytical analysis shows that, under certain conditions, the optimal CSR strategies hold for maximizing pure channel profit, minimizing environmental impact and maximizing social welfare. Whether the performance in a centralized case outnumbers that in a decentralized case depends on the CSR concerns level and environment-friendly degree of the product. In addition, it is found that a wholesale price discount contract is better for the retailer whereas a revenue-sharing contract is better for the manufacturer in pure profit to improve coordinating efficiency.

These results can offer managerial implications to the socially responsible supply chain in terms of pricing decisions, CSR strategies and sustainability innovations. Specifically, under certain conditions, placing more CSR concerns level increases pure channel profit and the social welfare. A balance between the pure profit and the social welfare is hereby achieved for the two socially responsible individuals by designing a proper contract.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is among the first studies so far to combine the CSR concerns strategy and sustainability innovation into a socially responsible supply chain.

When developing a new product, a buying firm solicits revenue sharing bids from two competing suppliers. Bidding behaviors of suppliers do not always align with predictions from rational agent models due to task uncertainty and bounded rationality, which could result in non-optimal supplier offers and ultimately hurt buying firm interests. This paper aims to discuss the aforementioned issues.

The authors built an analytical model that considers the impact of supplier technological risk, buyer–supplier coordination cost and supplier loss aversion on the optimal bid of the supplier. Next, using limited information processing capacity as a theoretic lens, the authors explore antecedents to the size of a focal supplier's bidding error, the absolute difference between the actual bid and the optimal bid. The authors used quantitative lab experimental data to test the hypotheses.

(1) Bounded rational bidders often fail to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant competitive information when placing bids, (2) loss aversion of a bidder significantly affects not only levels of bids, particularly for bidders with competitive disadvantages, but also sizes of the bidding error and (3) competitive information that has clearer performance implications are more influential in reducing sizes of bidding errors.

The results provide a comprehensive view of the bidding behaviors of a bounded rational supplier in an innovation outsourcing context with competition. With the results, managers now have a better understanding of behavioral influencers behind non-optimal supplier bids in an innovation outsourcing context.

This study examines the potential of contracts as one of the supply chain coordination mechanisms under competitive conditions. It also investigates a two-echelon supply chain model with two manufacturers and two retailers to develop a competitive structure in grey stochastic demand.

Supply chain demand is considered as a stochastic phenomenon depending on the selling price of the product. Also, products can be replaced by market manufacturers. Each retailer faces the pricing of products from two manufacturers, leading to competition between downstream retailers. In the present study, the duopoly supply chain model was presented based on the wholesale price contract, revenue-sharing contract and quantity discount contract separately.

Grey optimization and analysis of their coordination were presented. The results showed the high performance of revenue-sharing contracts in the supply chain. Thus, manufacturers will give the next priority to quantity discount contracts.

Ordering is the main factor contributing to competitive decision-making. Meanwhile, decision-making along with ordering and pricing will be required due to the nature of the demand.