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The importance of service firms cooperating with digital platforms is widely acknowledged. The authors study three contractual relationships (fixed-cost, cost-sharing, and profit-sharing) between service firms (specifically hotels) and digital platforms in a highly fragmented service supply chain to examine which of these contract types optimizes profits.

The authors extend prior models analyzing the optimal expected total profit from the travel service firm (hotel)–digital platform relationship, providing new insights into each contract type’s ability to coordinate decentralized systems and optimize profits for both parties.

This study finds that fixed cost contracts cannot coordinate the decentralized system. Cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the decentralized system but only allow one channel profit split. In contrast, profit-sharing contracts may not always perfectly coordinate the decentralized system but support alternative profit allocations. Practically, both profit-sharing and cost-sharing contracts are preferable to fixed-cost contracts.

The paper includes implications for travel service firm managers to consider when structuring contracts with digital platforms to focus on profit optimization. Profit-sharing contracts are most preferable when cost and revenue data are fully shared between parties, while cost-sharing contracts are preferable over fixed-cost contracts.

This study extends prior investigations into the utility of different contract types on the optimal profit of a travel service firm (hotel)-digital platform provider relationship. The research fills a gap in the literature concerning the contracts used in these relationship types.

Marketing is a hot topic, and the purpose of this study is to investigate how shareholding strategies can be applied to achieve strategic synergy between firms in vertical supply chains to improve retailers’ marketing efforts from a long-term perspective.

This study constructs Stackelberg models to analyze the operating mechanisms of shareholding supply chains under forward, backward and cross-shareholding strategies. The authors analyze the effects of shareholding on prices, marketing efforts and profits, and explore the strategic preferences and outcomes of different supply chain members.

Forward/backward shareholding plays the same role as cross/nonshareholding in supply chains because the effect of the retailer’s shareholding is offset by the power status of the manufacturer, and the retailer can still profit when wholesale prices are higher than selling prices in certain cases. A manufacturer’s shareholding in a retailer can benefit consumers and improve marketing efforts by reducing retailers’ marketing costs, while a retailer’s shareholding in a manufacturer has no such effect. None of all shareholding strategies can coordinate the interests of all members; however, an effective rebate policy can resolve this problem.

The results reveal the operational mechanism of shareholding supply chains and provide reference values for managers who want to improve marketing efforts and economic performance using a shareholding strategy.

In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions.

For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store.

By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP.

Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption.

From the perspective of local government tax administration, the impact of geographic dispersion on the corporate tax burden is investigated in this paper.

Using unbalanced panel data with a sample of listed companies from 2003 to 2020 in China, this paper focuses on the effect of geographic dispersion on corporate tax burden and the mechanisms.

It is found that corporate tax burden is positively related to geographic dispersion. It is also found that geographic dispersion affects the corporate tax burden by increasing the effort of local government tax administration. In addition, the relation between geographic dispersion and corporate tax burden is more pronounced for local SOEs prior to the implementation of Golden Tax Project III and in cases where local governments face stronger financial pressure to obtain revenue.

This study has important implications for the promotion of the coordinated development of the regional economy, as well as the legalization, modernization and informatization of tax administration.

Under the carbon tax policy, the authors examine the operational decisions of the low-carbon supply chain with the triple bottom line.

This paper uses the Stackelberg game theory to obtain the optimal wholesale prices, retail prices, sales quantities and carbon emissions in different cases, and investigates the effect of the carbon tax policy.

This study’s main results are as follows: (1) the optimal retail price of the centralized supply chain is the lowest, while that of the decentralized supply chain where the manufacturer undertakes the carbon emission reduction (CER) responsibility and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the highest under certain conditions. (2) The sales quantity when the retailer undertakes the CER responsibility and the CSR is the largest. (3) The supply chain obtains the highest profits when the retailer undertakes the CER responsibility and the CSR. (4) The environmental performance impact decreases with the carbon tax.

The results of this study can provide decision-making suggestions for low-carbon supply chains. Besides, this paper provides implications for the government to promote the low-carbon market.

Most of the existing studies only consider economic responsibility and social responsibility or only consider economic responsibility and environmental responsibility. This paper is the first study that examines the operational decisions of low-carbon supply chains with the triple bottom line under the carbon tax policy.

Every day, small and big incidents happen all over the world, and given the human, financial and spiritual damage they cause, proper planning should be sought to deal with them so they can be appropriately managed in times of crisis. This study aims to examine humanitarian supply chain models.

A new model is developed to pursue the necessary relations in an optimal way that will minimize human, financial and moral losses. In this developed model, in order to optimize the problem and minimize the amount of human and financial losses, the following subjects have been applied: magnitude of the areas in which an accident may occur as obtained by multiple attribute decision-making methods, the distances between relief centers, the number of available rescuers, the number of rescuers required and the risk level of each patient which is determined using previous data and machine learning (ML) algorithms.

For this purpose, a case study in the east of Tehran has been conducted. According to the results obtained from the algorithms, problem modeling and case study, the accuracy of the proposed model is evaluated very well.

Obtaining each injured person's priority using ML techniques and each area's importance or risk level, besides developing a bi-objective mathematical model and using multiple attribute decision-making methods, make this study unique among very few studies that concern ML in the humanitarian supply chain. Moreover, the findings validate the results and the model's functionality very well.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) are crucial to the procurement of global infrastructure projects. Moreover, a price mode based on a cluster of core concessionary items is key to the delivery of value-for-money and successful project outcomes. However, existing research has yet to fully identify PPP concessionary items, nor yet described the range of practical price modes. This study provides taxonomy of core concessionary items impacting PPP projects, systematically classifies price modes, and assesses the applicability and risk impacts of those price modes on PPP projects.

This study adopts a comparative case study method in analyzing core concessionary items and alternative price modes. China is taken as the context, as it is one of the world’s largest PPP markets. In ensuring research validity and reliability, diverse data sources are utilized, with a graphic content analysis tool developed to capture the structure of price modes.

Eight PPP price modes are identified. These are: (1) UP (Unit Price) mode, (2) ALS (Annual Lump Sum) mode, (3) IRR (Internal Rate of Return) mode, (4) RP (Return for Investing Capital (RIC) - Profit Rate of O&M (PROM)) mode, (5) RFP (RIC - Financing Interest Rate (FR) - PROM) mode, (6) RFPL (RIC - FR - PROM - Lower Limit of User Charge (LLoUC)) mode, (7) RFL (RIC - FR - Lump Sum/Fixed Unit Price O&M Contract (LSOM/FUP)) mode, and (8) RFLL (RIC - FR - LSOM/FUP - LLoUC) mode. Other main findings are as follows: (1) Five risk allocation configurations can be achieved via these price modes. Yet while different price modes enable the allocation of specific risks, these do not always align with contracting parties’ original intentions. (2) IRR and RP modes may be less applicable in general because of their vulnerability in allocating critical risks and capacity for spurring opportunistic behavior.

By depicting the paths by which concessionary items in price modes affect cash flow, a systematic analysis of price modes was conducted exposing structural characteristics, along with risk allocation choice implications. The study is unique in: (1) Providing a systematic classification of PPP price modes used in PPP projects, (2) Presenting a comprehensive identification and streamlining of concessionary items in PPP practice, and (3) Analyzing the risk effects of different price modes. Together, these outcomes offer a hitherto unavailable perspective on PPP project risk management. The value of the study lies in the following: (1) Existing studies employ diverse concessionary items, but their applicability varies. This study offers an overarching framework facilitating decision-making in selecting appropriate PPP price modes and in determining concessionary items. (2) This study adds to the understanding of PPP price modes in significant ways that will aid local governments and potential sponsors in crafting and administrating more workable contract designs.

Motivated by the wide application of procurement strategies in retailing, this paper aims to examine the effect of procurement strategies on decisions and profits and strategic inventory (SI) is considered.

The game-theoretic models are developed under a two-period fresh product supply chain (FSC), and consist of the mode of purchasing products only in the first period without SI (Scenario S), the mode of purchasing products in every period without SI (Scenario T) and the mode of purchasing products in every period with SI (Scenario TS).

Conducting the calculating and comparing, some major findings can be concluded. In general, two-period purchasing strategies (Scenarios T and TS) promote a higher freshness-keeping effort than the single buying strategy (Scenario S). Regarding the pricing strategy, SI and Scenario S can both contribute to obtaining a lower wholesale price, the retailer's pricing is relatively complicated and hinges on the consumer's sensitivity to freshness-keeping effort and the holding cost. Besides, comparing the sales quantity and the profit, the authors find that Scenario TS stimulates more demands and brings more profits for the manufacturer. However, Scenario TS is not the optimal selection for the reason that SI sometimes hurts the retailer and even the whole supply chain. Whereas, when the holding cost is in a certain range, Scenario TS will lead to a win-win situation.

The main findings of this study can give the enterprises some advice on the procurement strategies of fresh products and the decisions of pricing and the freshness-keeping effort.