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To study these issues, the authors chose a GFSC with one producer and one material supplier as research object, the supplier will offer green material to the producer and the producer will make green food using green production technology. Then, the authors proposed that consumers' perceived value was determined by the trustworthiness levels of the related green and quality-safety information provided by the supplier and the producer. Then, considering the trustworthiness levels of the green and quality information provided by the supplier and the producer, the authors improved the demand function. Afterwards, we constructed four investment models and their income models are built and then a cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract (hereafter, CSRS) was adopted to coordinate the GFSC.

With the growth of consumers environmental awareness and life level, consumers' requirements for green and high quality food are growing. In recently years, to increase consumers' perceived trustworthiness on the product greenness and quality levels, stakeholders in green food supply chain (hereafter, GFSC) start to adopt the blockchain-based traceability system (hereafter, BLTS). For investors, they need to know the investment conditions and how to coordinate the GFSC.

(1) When the revenue-sharing coefficient is less than three-fourths and higher then a certain vaule, the cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract can make the GFSC coordinate. (2) The investment cost threshold of the BLTS has a positive relationship with the trustworthiness improvement levels of the green and quality information, the green degree of food products and the quality of food products. (3) In the proposed four investment situations, as the growth of consumers perceived credibility coefficient about the greenness information and the quality information, chain members' revenues will increase. In addition, comparing with co-investing the BLTS, benefits of chain members are lower than them in the sole investment model.

(1) The demand function we proposed can help chain members forecast market demand to support production or ordering decisions. (2) The investment decision policies can offer a theoretical reference for chain members to use the BLTS. (3) The CSRS will offer the theoretical reference for coordinating the supply chain after using the BLTS. Furthermore, our study method can be referenced by other scholars. (4) The study method can offer a method reference for researchers who do a similar discussion in a manufacturing supply chain. Although, our research cannot guide the industrial practices, it can serve as a reference of the similar research in industry.

This study examines whether and how government fiscal pressure influences corporate charitable giving (CCG).

The authors exploit sub-national tax revenue sharing changes as exogenous variations to government’s fiscal pressure at the city level and then construct a quasi difference-in-differences (DiD) model to conduct the analysis based on a sample that consists of 14,168 firm-year observations in China during the period of 2003 to 2012.

The authors found that firms increase charitable donations when local governments face higher fiscal pressure. Such effects are more pronounced for firms that have stronger demand for political connectedness in the sample period. Furthermore, this study’s findings suggest that the timing strategy of donating helps firms to lower the effective tax rate and to build stronger political connections. In addition, donating firms outperform non-donating firms in terms of bank loan access and market reputation.

The authors contribute to at least three lines of literature: first, extend the understanding of timing strategies of corporate charitable behaviors; second, contribute to the literature studying the “crowd out” effect between government-provided charitable funds and private donations; finally, contribute to the emerging literature exploring the financial interests associated with corporate donation strategy (Claessens et al., 2008; Cull et al., 2015).

The purpose of the study is to investigate the financing channels and carbon emission abatement preferences of supply chain members, and further examine the optimal contract design of the retailer.

This paper develops a low-carbon supply chain composed of one retailer and one manufacturer, in which the retailer provides trade credit to the manufacturer. Considering the cap-and-trade regulation, the manufacturer with uncertain yield makes decision on whether to invest in emission abatement. There are bank loan and trade credit to finance production for the manufacturer and green credit to finance emission abatement investment. Meanwhile, the retailer may provide the manufacturer with three kinds of contracts to improve emission abatement efficiency, namely, revenue sharing, cost sharing or both sharing.

The results show that the retailer prefers to offer financing service at lower interest rate, but trade (and green) credit financing is always optimal for manufacturer and supply chain. The investment in emission abatement is value-added to all players. The sharing contracts offered by the retailer at lower sharing ratios can realize Pareto improvement of the system regardless of the financing scheme. However, comparing with the revenue or cost sharing contract, the existence of optimal sharing ratios makes the both sharing contract more favorable to the retailer.

The findings provide guidance for the emission-dependent manufacturer in financing and emission abatement decisions, as well as recommendations for the retailer to offer loan service and sharing contract.

This paper integrates green credit into bank loan or trade credit to analyze the financing decision of the manufacturer with uncertain yield and further considers the influence of three kinds of sharing contracts introduced by the retailer on improving operational performance.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the pricing decisions and earning potential of the software supplier and the smart device manufacturer in different software promotion strategies.

Based on game theory, the authors formulate two promotion models, that is, the supplier implements software promotion activities individually (SP model) or outsources the promotion activity to the manufacturer under profit-sharing contract (MP model) when taking different channel power structures into consideration. Besides, in order to test the robustness of the conclusions, the authors also extend the basic model to the following situations: (1) the customers have different price elasticity toward service fee and product price; (2) the revenue sharing contract is employed by the supply chain members; and (3) the manufacturer's product promotion practice is taken into consideration.

The optimal service fee (product price) of the supplier (manufacturer) under SP model is always lower (higher) than that under MP model. Surprisingly, if the supplier is the channel leader and the profit sharing ratio exceeds certain threshold, the manufacturer's profit decreases in profit sharing ratio, which remains robust in three extension models. Moreover, the supply chain's profit in supplier-led game is always lower than that in Nash game irrespective of the promotion strategy in profit sharing context. When revenue sharing contract is adopted, the result holds only when the revenue sharing ratio is relatively low.

The authors originally explore two promotion strategies of the software supplier when taking the channel power structures into considerations, which has not been explored in the literature to the best of the authors' knowledge.

This paper aims to study the interplay between a risk-averse national brand manufacturer's (NBM) selling mode decision and a risk-neutral e-platform's private brand (PB) introduction decision.

A game theory model is used to solve selling mode decision, that is whether transform the selling mode from the wholesale mode to the marketplace mode, and PB introduction decision, that is, whether introduce the PB.

The results show that for the NBM, under certain condition, the NBM's selling mode decision is not affected by the e-platform's PB introduction decision. High revenue-sharing rate is conducive only when the difference in consumer preference between the PB and the national brand (NB) is small. The NBM's risk aversion will improve the applicability of the marketplace mode. For the e-platform, high PB preference of consumers and risk-averse behavior of the NBM is not conducive to PB introduction. For the supply chain, scenarios that the NB monopolizes the market under the wholesale mode and PB introduction under the marketplace mode should be prevented. PB introduction under the wholesale mode will become the only equilibrium with the increase of risk aversion of the NBM. Finally, the authors extend the scenario that consumers prefer the PB and the e-platform is risk-averse enterprise and find that PB introduction under the wholesale mode is detrimental to the NBM but beneficial to the supply chain. The impact of consumers' PB preference on the e-platform's PB introduction is opposite to the basic model. The impact of the e-platform's risk aversion on game equilibrium is opposite to that of the NBM's risk aversion.

This paper is first to study selling mode decision and PB introduction decision when considering enterprises' risk-averse attitude.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate both the impact of different reward types and the adoption of knowledge-sharing practice on a crowdsourcing-based open innovation contest. Despite the benefit of knowledge sharing, contestants could struggle to find a balance between knowledge sharing and knowledge protection in open innovation.

The authors' approach follows a stylised contest model in a game-theoretical setting in which contestants first decide on their efforts and then the contest sponsor chooses the winner. Moreover, the outcome of an open innovation contest is delineated as either intermediate goods that require further refinement and risk-taking versus a market-ready end product for the contest sponsor. The authors also investigate how knowledge sharing among contestants would be influenced by reward types such as fixed-monetary prizes vs performance-contingent awards.

The contest sponsor will lower the prize level after adopting knowledge sharing. Therefore, the total effort will decline regardless of the reward type. Moreover, the choice of reward types depends on the contest sponsor's characteristics because the performance-contingent award is suitable for a large market size but the fixed-monetary prize can more efficiently raise the quantity of contestant inputs.

Prior studies have tested the connection between contest performance and knowledge sharing in crowdsourcing-based contests; however, there is not an integrated framework to best design the operation of a contest when considering different reward types and knowledge-sharing practices.

Industry practice has shown that technology licensing has an important effect on the R&D cooperation between firms. Different licensing methods will significantly impact a supply chain member's cooperative and price R&D decisions. However, there is scant literature investigating the decision on technology licensing and its impact on a supply chain member's price and cooperative R&D decisions. To address this gap, the authors investigate the R&D cooperation and the technology licensing in a supply chain formed of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), a contract manufacturer (CM), and a third-party manufacturer which will compete with the OEM when the technology licensing occurs.

The authors investigate two licensing patterns, royalty licensing, fixed fee licensing together with the no licensing, within the R&D cooperative supply chain by developing two three-stage and a two-stage Stackelberg models.

Compare to the no licensing strategy, technology licensing always benefits to the OEM and the society especially when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are more significant; the royalty licensing benefits to the OEM more when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are higher; the fixed fee licensing benefits to the OEM more when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are lower.

The royalty licensing is more effective for mitigating price competition intensity and helping firms to maintain higher sales margins; the fixed fee licensing induces firms' lower sales margins but increases the firms' sales quantities; in most cases, the fixed fee licensing is optimal from the perspectives of consumer and society, however, the CM's investment intention to the R&D technology with the fixed fee licensing is lower.

So far, different licensing models under the R&D cooperation have not been investigated, and the authors propose two three-stage Stackelberg models with considering the competition caused by technology licensing under the R&D cooperation to deal with the cooperative R&D and technology licensing issues.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of greening and promotional effort dependent stochastic market demand on the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits when the quality of used products for remanufacturing is uncertain in a reverse supply chain.

The proposed model is developed to obtain optimal profits for the remanufacturer, the collector and the whole supply chain. Both the centralized and decentralized scenarios are considered. To motivate the collector through profit enhancement, the remanufacturer designs a cost-sharing contract. Through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis, the consequences of greenness and promotional effort on optimal profits are investigated.

The results show that the remanufacturer gets benefited from greening and promotional effort enhancement. However, a higher value of minimum acceptable quality level decreases the profits of the manufacturer and the collector. A cost-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain and improves the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits. Besides green innovation, remanufacturing mitigates the harmful effects of waste in the environment.

Two different viewpoints of remanufacturing are considered here – environmental sustainability and economic sustainability. This paper considers a reverse supply chain with a remanufacturer who remanufactures the used products collected by the collector. The quality of used products is uncertain, and customer demand is stochastic, green and promotional effort sensitive. These two types of uncertainty with green and promotional effort sensitive customer demand differs the current paper from the existing literature.

The construction industry has long been criticized for unethical conduct. The owner usually manages the contractor's opportunistic behaviors by employing a professional supervisor, but there is a risk of covert collusion between the supervisor and contractor. Based on the principal–agent theory and collusion theory, this paper aims to investigate optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts.

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework comprising an owner, supervisor and contractor, who interact and pursue maximized self-profits. Built upon the fixed-price incentive contract, cost-reimbursement contract, and revenue-sharing contract, different collusion-proof incentive contracts are investigated. A real project case is used to validate the developed model and derived results.

This paper shows that the presence of unethical collusion undermines the owner's interests. Especially, the possibility of agent collusion may induce the owner to abandon extracting quality information from the supervisor. Furthermore, information asymmetry significantly affects the construction contract selection, and the application conditions for different incentive contracts are provided.

This study still has some limitations that deserve further exploration. First, this study explores contractor–supervisor collusion but ignores the possibility of the supervisor abusing authority to extort the contractor. Second, to focus on collusion, this paper ignores the supervision costs. What's the optimal supervision effort that the owner should induce the supervisor to exert? Finally, this paper assumes that the colluders involved always keep their promises. However, what if the colluders may break their promises?

Several collusion-proof incentive contracts are explored in a project management setting. The proposed incentive contracts can provide the project owner with effective and practical tools to inhibit covert collusion in construction management and thus safeguard construction project quality.

This study expands the organization collusion theory to the field of construction management and investigates the optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts. In addition, this study is the first to investigate the effects of information asymmetry on contract selection.

Supply chain network is complicated to manage due to the involvement of a number of agents. Formation of virtual organization using Industry 4.0 (I4.0) is an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to overcome the complexities of the channel. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of I4.0-based virtual organization to coordinate sustainable supply chain.

In this paper, we model and compare I4.0-based virtual organization models using four other traditional contracts with centralized supply chain. The non-cooperative game theoretic approach has been used for the analysis of models.

Our game-theoretic analysis shows that investment in I4.0 and sustainable innovation are beneficial for the overall supply chain. Our results show that linear two-part tariff contract and I4.0-based virtual organization model can perfectly coordinated with the supply chain.

This study consider deterministic model settings with full information game. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study I4.0-based coordination models under information asymmetry and uncertain situations.

The paper includes implications for the development of I4.0-based coordination model to tackle the problems of channel coordination.

This study proposes I4.0-based game-theoretic model for the sustainable supply chain coordination.