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An inverse relation between performance and managerial turnover at Japanese firms suggests that bank monitoring substitutes for other governance mechanisms (Kaplan, 1994; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995). Morck and Nakamura (1999), however, report that Japanese banks protect their self-interests as creditors rather than the interests of shareholders when appointing corporate directors. We re-examine data on top management changes at Japanese firms and find results consistent with this latter notion. Specifically, management turnover is conditionally related to a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations rather than profitability or stock returns. Bank monitoring is therefore not a substitute for mechanisms that directly serve shareholders’ interests.

We examine bidder returns in Japanese mergers and find that shareholders of bidders experience a significant positive announcement return. Bidder returns are higher when firms acquire targets in the same industry, when their managers performed well before the merger, and when their managers acquire relatively large targets. Unlike non-keiretsu firms, returns to keiretsu firms are higher when they acquire firms operating in different industries. We also find that bidder returns increase with the bidder’s leverage and the bidder’s ties to financial institutions through borrowings. Our evidence is consistent with the view that managerial incentives affect firm value.

This chapter seeks to explain the global influences and dynamics that have led to an eclipsing of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in multinational enterprises in favor of a rapid integration of sustainability practices within corporate strategy, operations, and marketing. The notion of the shareholder primacy norm is surveyed in light of new financial and strategic models for creating value for both shareholders and stakeholders. The purpose of the chapter is to put forward a model that indicates how a standard financial model for the firm might be re-cast to support a corporation's intent to invest in sustainability activities.

Purpose – This chapter traces the creation of a market for strategy by management consulting firms during the second half of the twentieth century in order to demonstrate their impact in shaping debates in the subject and demand for their services by corporate executives.

Design/methodology/approach – Using historical analysis, the chapter draws on institutional theory, including institutional isomorphism. It uses both primary and secondary data from the leading consulting firms to describe how consultants shifted from offering advice on organizational structure to corporate strategy and eventually to corporate legitimacy as a result of the changing economic and regulatory environment of the time.

Findings/originality/value – This study provides a historical context for the emergence of corporate and competitive strategy as an institutional practice in both the United States and around the world, and provides insights into how important this history can be in understanding the debates among consultants and academics during strategy's emergence as an academic subject and practical application.

The opinion that the spiritual controls the physical gave rise to this chapter. The spiritual in this chapter was regarded as the philosophical and organisational theories controlling the practical aspect of construction supply chain management (CSCM). It was discovered that there is a significant omission in adopting theories to explain supply chain management's (SCM) adaptation and modelling in the construction industry. Therefore, this chapter reviews theories such as resource-based view theory (RBV), principal agency theory (PAT), resource dependency theory (RDT), transaction cost economics theory (TCE) and game theory. Each of the theories was analysed to uncover how they support the practice and variables for modelling the construction supply chain (CSC). The existing models of the CSC were also examined in this chapter. It was found that most models were developed drawing on the frameworks of the global supply chain forum (GSCF) and supply chain operations reference model (SCOR). Owing to the shortcoming of GSCF, this book adopted the framework and principles of SCOR for modelling the management of CSC in the era of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR). Also, most of the existing CSC models, such as the seamless CSCM model, maturity model and others, were developed using the SCOR framework.

Whether institutional investors monitor corporations and improve firm value is a key question for corporate governance and investment management. I find little empirical support for the hypothesis that institutions undertake monitoring that increases firm quality and valuation. Granger causation tests show that while quality firms do attract institutional investment, institutions do not monitor and firm value subsequently declines. Instead, institutional incentives are critical; some institutions with strong incentives to monitor do, indeed, monitor. Institutions with concentrated portfolios successfully monitor while institutions with a larger percentage stake do not. Pensions and endowments are better monitors than insurers, banks and mutual funds.

Today, long-term success requires firms to sense changes in their environments early and react efficiently to them. Increasing middle managers’ participation in decision-making about market-related and product-related questions has been suggested as one way of enhancing this strategic responsiveness; abandoning formal planning, such as annual budgets, has been another. Yet, empirical evidence on the matter is scarce and conflicting. Drawing on data from Denmark’s 500 largest firms, we show that participation of middle managers in decision-making about new products and markets to serve, in-deed, increases firms’ strategic responsiveness as assessed by a reduction in firms’ downside risk. However, this effect is not a direct one. Nor does it interact positively or negatively with the emphasis put on formal planning as submitted in literature. Our evidence suggests that emphasis on planning mediates the relation between stronger participation of middle managers in decision-making and the increase in firms’ strategic responsiveness. This has implications for ongoing theory building and practice.