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The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of psychological climate perceptions on the employee’s intent to comply with the organization’s whistle-blower policies. This study also endeavors to add evidence to the debate concerning the effectiveness of implementing anti-retaliation measures to improve whistle-blowing behavior. Survey results show that psychological climate perceptions of fairness and commitment to the organization influence the employee’s attitude toward whistle-blower policies, perception of how important others within the organization view the act of whistle-blowing and the employee’s intent to blow the whistle. The results of this study also suggest that anti-retaliation measures used by government policy makers and organizations to improve whistle-blowing behavior may not be an effective strategy. This manuscript discusses the implications of the findings on whistle-blowing behavior and the debate concerning anti-retaliation measures.

The appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process have increasingly come under scrutiny in recent years. Several Members and commentators alike have recommended large-scale amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to provide alternatives to retaliatory measures, with the most notable including compensation, collective retaliation, and increased special and differential treatment for developing countries and/or widespread loss of privileges for non-conforming respondents.

Unfortunately, many of the proposals failed to first identify the aims and objectives of the retaliatory phase, or even of dispute settlement more generally. This chapter takes a more holistic approach in its analysis of whether any of the current proposals will improve (or harm) the system. In doing so, this chapter will first assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures by evaluating the goals and objectives in which it is designed to achieve. It will then evaluate some of the more prominent proposals for amending the DSU under the same framework. Taking such an approach will allow for a more comprehensive review and will reveal not only the problems with retaliatory trade measures, but also its positive aspects, and not only the positive aspects of the suggested alternatives but also where they may be detrimental to the system.

Among the primary suggestions for reform of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO has been remedies for noncompliance. Prior literature has considered remedies in the context of deliberate breach of commitments. The WTO increasingly has, however, been negotiating commitments in subjective areas of policy. Thus, we provide a model of the DSU under which members' interpretations of concessions differ. This induces disputes regarding violation of commitments.

The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has promoted compliance primarily through authorization of retaliation (prospective punishment) after expiration of a reasonable period of time for the implementation of a verdict. As has been noted, this does not compensate a complainant for a violation of obligations and enables the respondent to circumvent punishment for imposing a cost upon a member of the WTO by reforming its offending policy reasonably promptly. We consider retrospective penalties (compensation for a loss) with and without reinforcement by retaliation as alternative enforcement mechanisms and find that a simple retaliatory punishment scheme is preferable. A penalty is unenforceable, as a member that is unwilling to reform its policy after an adverse judgment can decline to provide compensation. A penalty reinforced by retaliation can reduce compliance relative to a simple prospective punishment by raising the cost of abiding by the judgement.

Remedies also affect the negotiation of commitments. Members are more willing to make and less willing to accept unenforceable commitments. In this regard, the simple prospective punishment scheme is preferable.

The act of reporting illegal and unethical practices in the workplace has become an increasingly important issue for researchers and organizational management over the past several decades. This study tested a model of whistleblowing in which perceived organizational retaliation and upward communication satisfaction were hypothesized to act as predictors of types of whistleblowing intentions using a representative sample of employees working in Kirklareli, Turkey (n = 1,012). Structural equation modeling indicated that perceptions of upward communication satisfaction were positively associated to blowing the whistle to internal channels like immediate supervisor and upper management and negatively related to staying silent and external whistleblowing. In addition, perceived threat of retaliation from an organization was negatively related to blowing the whistle to internal channels and positively related to staying silent and external whistleblowing. The present study has contributed to our understanding of whistleblowing in a relatively new national context by clarifying its associations with perceived organizational retaliation and communication with management.

Given the conflicting attitudes that people have toward those who report wrongdoing and a lack of empirical research specifically examining subsequent hiring, it is an open question as to whether accounting professionals would want to work with former whistleblowers. The authors examine this question using an experimental design, in which participants evaluate an employment candidate before and after the person discloses having been a whistleblower. Four manipulations of whistleblowing are used in both a within-subjects and a between-subjects manipulation. The authors’ results demonstrate that accounting professionals’ intentions to recommend a candidate for hire decrease after they are informed that a strong candidate has a whistleblowing past. A candidate is viewed most negatively, however, when discovering malfeasance and electing not to blow the whistle internally. Moreover, when the whistle is blown internally and the superior takes no action, the candidate who remained silent and chose not to continue to push the issue is viewed more negatively than the candidate who proceeded to blow the whistle externally. Although a candidate having a whistleblowing past appears to pose a cautionary signal in the interview process, participants reacted more harshly when the candidate failed to act or lacked the durable moral courage to see the matter through to completion.

Limited participation of least developed countries (LDCs) in the WTO's dispute settlement system has been the focus of intensive debate among WTO scholars, diplomats and, in particular, WTO lawyers. Central to this debate are the major hurdles (financial and political) that LDCs are generally perceived to face in using the existing system of remedies in the WTO system to enforce compliance. Of the two existing compliance enforcement mechanisms, the first – compensation – is often unrealistic because the WTO Member whose measures have been found to be WTO inconsistent has to agree with it; while the second – retaliation (i.e., the suspension of concessions with regard to the non-complying Member) – is a costly and in many ways counter-productive “shooting oneself in the foot” remedy that LDCs in particular can usually ill afford.

This chapter briefly discusses proposals for reform that have been proposed to alleviate these problems. The chapter then reviews two additional instruments that LDCs could pursue to improve their ability to enforce compliance and make the WTO dispute settlement system a more viable instrument: limited use of direct effect; and increased use of the instrument of publicity and public relations, including through civil society. These instruments, whether independently, or in combination with existing mechanisms and other new compliance enforcement measures, could provide useful tools for the WTO's poorest Members to increase the chances for pay-off from WTO litigation and for compliance with WTO law by larger and more powerful trading partners.

The Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act sets new whistleblowing standards for internal accountants and external auditors who fail to resolve differences internally with top management on financial reporting matters. Whistleblowers are eligible to receive a financial reward under Dodd-Frank if they “voluntarily” provide “original” information and meet other criteria. Interpretation 102-4 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Code establishes reporting obligations for external auditors to meet the requirements of Dodd-Frank. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate the standards to better understand the whistleblowing process. A review of the literature identifies areas of concern in deciding whether to blow the whistle. The paper contributes to the literature by integrating thoughts, ideas, and issues raised by prior researchers and considerations specific to the whistleblowing process. The analysis results in the proposal of specific unanswered questions about the process that can guide future researchers.

This chapter explores cultural factors that influence the propensity to blow-the-whistle in China, Taiwan, Russia, and the United States. This study found that culture and traditions have strong impact on the propensity of whistleblowing. This research analyzed 1,541 working adults in China, Taiwan, Russia, and the United States. Statistical analysis of self-developed questionnaires reveal that: (a) Americans have a greater disposition to engage in whistleblowing than Chinese, Taiwanese, and Russian; (b) Americans have a smallest level of fear of retaliation to whistleblowers than Chinese, Taiwanese, and Russian; (c) the intention of Chinese, American, and Taiwanese to whistle-blow is influenced to a greater degree by position of wrongdoers than that of Russian; and (d) guanxi (personal relationships or networks) has a greater effect on the propensity to whistle-blow for Chinese and Taiwanese than for Americans and Russian. Auditors and managers need to be aware that employees in different cultures respond differently to factors that influence whistleblowing activities. The results of this study will help auditors and managers better assess risk and the effectiveness of internal controls and ethical standards.