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The purpose of this paper is to examine how changes in creditors' rights affect the dividend policy behavior of corporate firms.

The authors use the implementation of the bankruptcy and insolvency code (IBC) in India in 2016 as a quasi-natural experiment setup. Differential application of this law allows them to use the Difference in Differences approach to extract the marginal impact of change in creditors' rights on the dividend policy.

The authors show that firms responded to strengthening creditors' rights by decreasing their dividend payout. Further, the authors observe that this negative response is conditioned on firm leverage and the nature of the creditor, i.e. public or private. The firms with a greater leverage ratio and a greater proportion of private debt in the total debt in the pre-event period have shown greater response to the change in the law. Lastly, the authors show that stock markets positively respond to the observed decrease in dividends only when a corresponding decrease in the leverage accompanies such a decrease.

The authors contribute to the finance and law literature from several aspects. First, the authors extend this stream by bringing to light the dividend policy response of firms when they are subjected to a change in creditors' rights. Second, the authors also show how firm-level factors like financial policy and the nature of the creditor condition their response to IBC. Lastly, the authors also examine the market reaction to the dividend policy response of firms to the change in bankruptcy law.

Using a sample of listed Chinese companies that issued bonds from 2010 to 2019, the authors empirically test the link between CSR and corporate bond pricing, and the mechanism and channels behind this link.

This study systematically examines whether and how corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects the corporate bond market in China.

Firms with better CSR have higher corporate bond credit ratings and lower corporate bond yield spreads. These associations remain stable in robustness checks, including checks that use regional typhoon disaster as an instrumental variable. The effects of CSR are more significant for firms with a worse information environment and for those operating in high-risk environments. Better CSR is associated with less earnings management, fewer financial restatements and less analyst forecast divergence. In addition, the effects of CSR are more pronounced after the 2013 market-oriented reform and when issuers are non-state-owned enterprises.

Because market participants can incorporate firms' CSR into their decision-making, establishing an effective channel for communicating CSR between issuers and market participants will enhance the effects of CSR.

Researchers need to attend to the mechanisms behind the link between CSR and corporate bond pricing, and to the characteristics of strong environmental contingency in emerging markets, specifically the periods and scenarios in which the effects of CSR change.

This study provides systemic evidence that CSR benefits corporate bond pricing through both informational and reputational channels and that the effects of CSR vary by time and firm. These findings enrich the literatures on both the economic consequences of CSR and the determinants of corporate bond pricing, and provide a plausible explanation for mixed findings on the effects of CSR in previous studies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between restrictive covenants and accounting conservatism. More specially, the authors try to explain how the use of restrictive covenants of public debt may affect accounting conservatism.

The sample is composed of non-financial firms and for each firm one debt contract is considered. The authors have used the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) models to test the relationships. All variables were retrieved from Mergent Fixed Investment Securities and COMPUSTAT Databases.

The findings of this study show that the more the firm relies on bond covenants, the higher is the degree of conservatism. The authors found also that these firms also exhibited a widely significantly increased level of conservatism in the years following the issuance of debt.

The results should be interpreted with caution because the use of covenants does not take into consideration the tightness of their inclusion in the public debt contract.

This paper makes a timely contribution to the debate of timely loss recognition by confirming the complementarity between the inclusion of restrictive covenants in the debt agreement and the accounting conservatism before and after the emission of public debt.

To determine the effect that covenants have on the credit ratings assigned by the two major agencies.

The authors examine 1,822 bond issues from 1991 to 2018, with a two-stage methodology to account for the endogeneity of the firms' choices and the ordinal nature of the ratings. The authors use Hendry's model selection method to find the best-fitting models from 37 control variables; the final models feature 20–24 orthogonalized variables, all significant at 5% and most at 1%.

The study’s results suggest that restrictive covenants positively affect ratings, particularly for bonds on the border of junk and investment grade. However, this effect appears to be decreasing with time, suggesting the financial crisis of 2008 has impacted ratings. Additionally, divergent covenant treatment leads to split ratings where the two agencies assign different levels of ratings on the same bonds. The study’s findings provide key insights into the factors that differentiate ratings given by each agency.

Managers must balance the perceived benefits of covenants against the costs, included lower credit ratings.

No other study has examined this issue controlling for both the ordinal nature of the ratings and the endogeneity in the decision to include specific covenants.

This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it examines if option and stock compensations raise creditor's risk, and which one is more important than the other. Second, it explores if CEO's compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence to raise creditor's risk. Third, it investigates how banks use different loan terms to alleviate their credit risk.

This study used advanced regression analysis and use of generalized methods of moment methodology.

The results show that option compensation is more important than stock compensation in raising credit risk; option compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence, giving rise to a much higher credit risk; and covenant usage is more important than other loan contract terms in mitigating credit risk given that covenant use could not be substituted away by using other loan contract terms such as increasing interest rate, reducing principal or shortening loan duration. This paper has practical implications for credit markets.

The main implication is that hand-collect data are available up to 2010.

It informs creditors the potential sources of loan risk emanating from option rather than stock incentives; it informs creditors that option incentive interacts with CEO overconfidence rendering the credit risk bigger than expected, and it informs creditors the importance of using covenants vis-à-vis other loan contract terms for mitigating compensation and overconfidence risk.

Banks are alerted to the risk due to the interaction between overconfidence and compensations, implying that overconfident managers remunerated with options compensations are more risky than overconfident managers who are not remunerated as such.

This paper is original: (1) The authors show that option compensation is more risky than stock compensation from viewpoint of creditors. This has not been assessed. (2) Interaction between managerial compensation and managerial overconfidence has not been assessed before. (3) Use of different loan contract terms to alleviate risk from overconfident managers (who are prone to over investment but who are innovative according to the literature) has not been evaluated.

This study aims to examine the economic consequences of, and managerial behaviour in response to, the introduction of IFRS 16 Leases. It extends the debt covenant hypothesis to explain why firms reduce the use of operating leases with the introduction.

This study develops a model, based on operating leases as an alternative financing source and the determinants of debt policy, to estimate the effects of gearing on operating lease intensity. High gearing is a proxy to probably closer to the violation of, or expected to violate, the gearing restriction in debt covenants given the retrospective capitalisation of operating leases, when IFRS 16 takes effect.

This study finds that operating lease intensity fell between 2011 (immediately after the first exposure draft leading to IFRS 16) and 2018 (immediately prior to the effective date of IFRS 16). It also finds that gearing affects changes in operating lease intensity over 2011 and 2018, consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis.

The introduction of IFRS 16 is a natural experiment with unique characteristics (the active lobbying behaviour, ex ante evidence on adverse economic consequences, a prolonged standard-setting period, etc.) valuable for accounting research.

A showcase about the relevance of financial reporting for contracting interests of firms and managers and a good reference for accounting standard setters in considering and managing the economic consequences of proposed accounting standards.

This study adds to the limited research on the consequences of accounting standards and documents the ex-post impact on firm leverage ratios and the behavioural aspects of reporting entities.

This paper aims to use doctrinal legal investigative methods combined with economic analysis to investigate the efficacy of the Law.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the inherent absurdity in the modern law of town and village greens (TVGs). The author wishes to show that the public understanding of what constitutes a green worth protecting is incomparable with how the Law currently operates, instead providing a crude vehicle to prevent development.

Applying an efficiency maximisation framework to the law of TVGs the Law fails to protect land worth protecting, as well as prevents allocatively efficient bargaining from taking place.

This research has not presented empirical evidence to suggest the extent of the damage identified. This is a separate question to the marginal impacts of the damage.

A Law and Economics analysis of TVG Law in England and Wales has not been attempted before.

This paper addresses the following questions: Why do some firms employ multiple debt types? What explains debt heterogeneity? Is the choice of the source of debt a function of corporate governance?

The author's paper is empirical and uses multiple regression analysis.

Firms under weak corporate governance have a higher propensity to use multiple debt types and have a dispersed debt structure. Contrastingly, firms that are well-managed tend to concentrate debt and borrow predominantly from a few creditors. The author also found that while bank debt is negatively associated with debt concentration, market debt is positively associated with debt concentration.

Firms under weak corporate governance have a higher propensity to use multiple debt types and have a dispersed debt structure. Well-managed firms tend to concentrate debt and borrow predominantly from a few creditors. Bank debt is negatively associated with debt concentration and market debt is positively associated with debt concentration.

Policymakers and practitioners need to account not only for changes in the firm’s total debt level but also for changes within the firm’s debt composition. Understanding a manager’s choice of debt structure can incentivize creditors to effectively monitor and use debt concentration as a form of commitment device that transfers some control rights from the manager to creditors.

While a vast body of corporate finance literature examines the conflict between shareholders and management, there is little empirical work on the conflict between creditors and management. In this paper, the author examines how managerial entrenchment affects debt structure. The results provide a comprehensive picture of how corporate governance influences debt choice(s).

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

Procuring relief products and services is a challenging process for humanitarian organizations (HOs), yet it accounts for approximately 65% of relief operations’ costs (Moshtari et al., 2021). This paper aims to examine how procurement internal controls, materials and purchasing procedure standardization influence information integration and procurement performance.

In this study, partial least square structural equation models and multigroup analysis were used to analyze data collected from 170 HOs.

Procurement internal controls and material and purchasing procedure standardization fully mediate between information integration and procurement performance.

The study focuses only on HOs. Since humanitarian procurement projects take place over a period of several years, it is difficult to capture the long-term effects of information integration, procurement internal controls, material and purchasing procedure standardization and procurement performance. In this regard, a longitudinal study could be undertaken, provided that the required resources are available.

Procurement managers should implement information integration practices within acceptable procurement internal controls and standardize material and purchasing procedures to boost procurement performance.

By integrating information through procurement internal controls and standardizing material and purchasing procedures, procurement performance in a humanitarian setting can be systematically optimized.