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The “resource curse phenomenon” has received a lot of attention from researchers; however, there has not been any sound explanation to back this phenomenon since the main reason why natural resource should restrain economic growth instead of boosting economic growth remains unanswered. This paper contributes to literature on “resource curse hypothesis” by examining the role of government effectiveness in influencing the impact of gas resource rent on economic growth.

The study adopted the Cobb-Douglass production and incorporated gas resource rent, institutional quality (government effectiveness), inflation and exchange rate as additional variables that influences total output (gross domestic product). The author estimated the empirical form of the Cobb-Douglass production using autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) and Toda and Yamamoto (1995) as the main estimation strategies while other time series approaches were used as a robustness check.

The estimates from the ARDL short-run and the long-run dynamics suggest that the direct impact of gas resource rent on economic growth was positive but not statistically significant. At the same time, the interacting of gas resource rent and government effectiveness showed a positive and statistically significant effect of nearly 0.4123 and 0.8724 on economic growth in the long run and short run, respectively. The results from the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) also indicated that economic growth has a strong influence on gas resource rent while government effectiveness drives economic growth and not vice versa.

The findings from this study imply that government effectiveness plays a crucial role in averting the “resource curse phenomenon”. Hence, improving government effectiveness and efficiency through minimizing corruption among state institutions would be imperative in curbing the “resource curse phenomenon” in developing countries.

The influential role of government effectiveness on the relationship between gas resource rent on economic growth is examined.

While the relationship between natural resource rent and economic growth is well documented in the literature, not much robust analysis has been done to estimate the causative relationship between oil resource rent and economic growth in Ghana. This might be due to the fact that commercial production of crude oil started not long ago in Ghana. This paper aims to examine the causal relationship between oil resource rent and economic growth for the period of 2011 to 2020 in Ghana.

The study incorporates economic growth as a function of oil resource rent, non-oil revenue, foreign direct investment, capital and interest rate in a Cobb–Douglass production function/model. The study used four different estimation strategies including the autoregressive distributed lags model, Toda–Yamamoto test approach, nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags model and nonlinear Granger causality.

The main finding revealed that 1% increase in oil resource rent generates 0.84% increase in economic growth of Ghana in the long run. Contrary, the authors find an insignificant positive effect of oil resource rent on economic growth of Ghana in the short run for the period under study. The result from the Toda–Yamamoto test approach also showed a unidirectional causality running from oil resource rent to economic growth of Ghana, providing evidence in support of the resource blessing hypothesis in Ghana. The results are robust to two different alternative estimation strategies.

The causal relationship between crude oil resource rent and economic growth is examined.

A tax based on land value is in many ways ideal, but many economists dismiss it by assuming it could not raise enough revenue. Standard sources of data omit much of the potential tax base, and undervalue what they do measure. The purpose of this paper is to present more comprehensive and accurate measures of land rents and values, and several modes of raising revenues from them besides the conventional property tax.

The paper identifies 16 elements of land's taxable capacity that received authorities either trivialize or omit. These 16 elements come in four groups.

In Group A, Elements 1‐4 correct for the downward bias in standard sources. In Group B, Elements 5‐10 broaden the concepts of land and rent beyond the conventional narrow perception, while Elements 11‐12 estimate rents to be gained by abating other kinds of taxes. In Group C, Elements 13‐14 explain how using the land tax, since it has no excess burden, uncaps feasible tax rates. In Group D, Elements 15‐16 define some moot possibilities that may warrant further exploration.

This paper shows how previous estimates of rent and land values have been narrowly limited to a fraction of the whole, thus giving a false impression that the tax capacity is low. The paper adds 14 elements to the traditional narrow “single tax” base, plus two moot elements advanced for future consideration. Any one of these 16 elements indicates a much higher land tax base than economists commonly recognize today. Taken together they are overwhelming, and cast an entirely new light on this subject.

In recent years, alliances have become even more popular than mergers and acquisitions. Alliance formation has led to the emergence of interconnected firms, which are embedded in alliance networks. This paper offers a theory of network resources to evaluate the competitive advantage of interconnected firms. It distinguishes shared resources from non-shared resources, identifies various types of rent, and illustrates how firm-, relation-, and partner-specific factors determine the contribution of network resources to the rents that interconnected firms extract from their alliance networks. This paper revisits traditional assumptions of the resource-based view and suggests that the nature of relationships may matter more than the nature of resources in creating and sustaining the competitive advantage of interconnected firms.

When understood as an inevitable inconsistency of individual plans, disequilibrium is not only a necessary condition for the existence, and hence understanding, of the market process as we know it, it is also the glue connecting three other “Austrian” themes. In equilibrium heterogeneity of resources would have no strategic significance, specific and private knowledge would be much less problematic, and no profits net of contractual rent payments would be earned. In the real world of disequilibrium firm differences are not a mystery, rent is not an indication of inefficiency or monopoly power, and there is room to analyze, admire, reward, and consult about successful business strategy. Rent appropriation comes from ownership of valuable resources. And a successful strategy, one that earns enhanced rents, is one that acquires ownership of valuable and value-creating resources. Such a strategy is dependent for its success on superior vision (or luck), something which cannot exist in equilibrium.

Allyn Young′s lectures, as recorded by the young Nicholas Kaldor, survey the historical roots of the subject from Aristotle through to the modern neo‐classical writers. The focus throughout is on the conditions making for economic progress, with stress on the institutional developments that extend and are extended by the size of the market. Organisational changes that promote the division of labour and specialisation within and between firms and industries, and which promote competition and mobility, are seen as the vital factors in growth. In the absence of new markets, inventions as such play only a minor role. The economic system is an inter‐related whole, or a living “organon”. It is from this perspective that micro‐economic relations are analysed, and this helps expose certain fallacies of composition associated with the marginal productivity theory of production and distribution. Factors are paid not because they are productive but because they are scarce. Likewise he shows why Marshallian supply and demand schedules, based on the “one thing at a time” approach, cannot adequately describe the dynamic growth properties of the system. Supply and demand cannot be simply integrated to arrive at a picture of the whole economy. These notes are complemented by eleven articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which were published shortly after Young′s sudden death in 1929.

The purpose of this paper is to look at the recent history of proposals to tax resource rents in Australia, from Australia’s Future Tax System Report (the “Henry Tax Review”) through to the proposed Resource Super Profits Tax (“RSPT”) and then the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (“MRRT”). The process of change from Henry to the RSPT to the MRRT can best be understood in the context of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) as a capitalist workers’ party. The author argues that it is this tension in the ALP, the shift in its internal balance further towards capital and the lack of class struggle, that has seen Labor preside over what the father of rent tax in Australia, Ross Garnaut, describes as a “problematic” tax.

Qualitative research using Marxist tools.

The paper argues that the poor health of the MRRT is a consequence of the nature of the Labor Party as a capitalist workers’ party, the shifts in power and influence within its material constitution and in essence the ascendency of capital in the capitalist workers’ party.

A very original approach to understanding the nature of the MRRT in Australia.

Numerous studies have set out to examine the relationship between strategic resources and firm performance. The traditional VRIO attributes have been the point of departure in most resource‐based studies. This paper sets out to argue that the relationship between resources and performance is more complex. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate the complex relationship between a strategic resource and firm performance by providing an overview of different factors that can influence this relationship.

Relevant literature is reviewed and discussed.

It was found that five criteria must be fulfilled for resources to generate superior performance. These are identified and discussed. These criteria fit with existing resources, management capability, marketing capability, firm appropriation of rent, and non‐competitive disadvantages.

By using the criteria identified, resource‐based theory can become less tautological. Also, the criteria highlight the importance of resource utilization and appropriation of resource‐based rents.

The paper could contribute to an increased awareness among practitioners of the importance of focusing on factors which are additional to the VRIO‐attributes when analyzing potential strategic resources. The criteria provide an easy‐to‐access framework for strategic analysis.

Whereas some specific aspects of the relationship between the possession of resources and firm performance have been reviewed in some RBT contributions, few studies have addressed the issue using a more holistic approach. Thus, this paper affords a broader approach on the relationship between strategic resources and firm performance.

Studies concerning Soviet taxation demonstrate a diversity of opinions on the nature of turnover taxes. Four major views on the subject have emerged: (1) turnover taxes are simply a sales (excise) tax on articles' of consumption sold to the Soviet consumer; (2) not all turnover taxes are a sales tax, some of them are a substitute for rent on production of certain industrial materials; (3) in addition to being a sales (excise) tax on consumer goods and rent on some industrial materials, there exists a third type of turnover tax which is levied on agricultural production of the peasantry; (4) turnover taxes are a portion of the surplus product produced in industry and agriculture.

Against the background of the enormous economic transition China is undertaking, government intervention over corporate behavior is a frequent and, arguably, necessary measure. Among the most serious problems facing China, economically and reputationally, are environmental issues. So, how is the government intervening in the environmental performance of Chinese enterprises? And how are Chinese enterprises responding? These are the questions to be answered in this study.

This paper sampled listed companies on China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The data were collected from the HeXun corporate social responsibility report, CSMAR and WIND databases. A Tobit model was used to conduct the main 2SLS regression analysis, and the robustness tests followed the propensity score matching method.

The analysis shows that environmental performance is positively related to the government subsidies a company receives. The “Eight-point Regulation of the Centre” crack-down on social corruption introduced in 2012 has weakened rent-seeking overall, but rent-seeking behavior through the cloak of corporate environmental performance has become more serious. As a result, non-polluting and state-owned enterprises are significantly less concerned about their environmental performance, while polluting and private enterprises are more motivated to become good environmental citizens.

This research provides a greater understanding of the drivers behind environmentally-responsible behavior in Chinese companies. These insights can be used by policymakers and environmental regulators to incentivize a more widespread ground-swell of change across the gamut of Chinese business.

Environmental policy and practice informed by research-driven recommendations can not only make valuable contributions to the health and well-being of Chinese society but also, as a significant contributor to climate change, environmental reforms have global benefits.

This study explores the motivations behind rent-seeking associated with environmental investment. The findings expand the research horizon of relevant literature on corporate political rent-seeking and deepen the understandings of the economic consequences of corporate investment into environmental practice. The results provide empirical evidence for the Chinese government to implement environmental regulations based on incentives beyond simple profit-making.