Search results

With the establishment of Competition Commission of India (CCI), Competition law-class actions, especially with regards to abuse of dominance by monopolists, are slowly becoming unhappy realities with both government-owned as well as private companies. This case used Coal India Limited (CIL), a public monolith which was penalized recently by CCI, as a subject of analysis to delve deeper into various conceptual understandings related to public sector functioning, such as public versus private provisioning, natural versus designed monopoly, dominance versus abuse of dominance, corporate governance versus government mandated governance, and finally natural resource allocation.

Case B assesses the options available to the government and private operators in light of the SC judgment. It provides scope for examining the dimensions for auction design by illustrating the subsequent exercise undertaken by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India.

This case is one of a pair of cases used in a merger negotiation. It is designed to be used with “British Petroleum, Ltd.” (UVA-F-1263). One-half of the class prepares only the British Petroleum (BP) case, and one-half uses this case. BP and Amoco are considering a merger, and are in the process of negotiating a merger agreement. Macroeconomic assumptions, particularly forecasting future oil prices in an uncertain environment, and assumptions about Amoco's ability to reduce exploration and production costs make Amoco's future cash flows difficult to predict.

This case is one of a pair of cases used in a merger negotiation. It is designed to be used with “Amoco Corporation” (UVA-F-1262). One-half of the class prepares only the Amoco case, and one-half uses this case. BP and Amoco are considering a merger, and are in the process of negotiating a merger agreement. Macroeconomic assumptions, particularly forecasting future oil prices in an uncertain environment, and assumptions about Amoco's ability to reduce exploration and production costs make Amoco's future cash flows difficult to predict.

BHP, an Australian mining company, threatens to enter the potash mining industry through a hostile takeover of the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan. Complicating matters is the fact that the Canadian potash industry has operated as a legal cartel in which the provincial government has a stake. This case enables students to assess BHP's strategy in terms of value creation and value capture, how it relates to its existing investments in the industry, and the risks and rewards of alternatives to BHP's strategy

-How cartels help firms capture value in an industry and how the threat of entry can limit the cartel members' ability to do so -How firms outside a cartel can capture value though a competitive threat -The range of strategies available to incumbents and

Flying J was a family-owned company that operated travel plazas, oil refineries, a bank for trucking companies, and other related businesses. In early 2009, Crystal Call Maggelet, the majority shareholder and new CEO of Flying J, was tasked with saving the company founded by her father in 1968. In the intervening forty years Flying J had grown from four gas stations to a vertically integrated $18 billion company. Declining crude oil prices, decreased cash reserves, and multiple internal challenges forced most Flying J subsidiaries to file for bankruptcy protection. This came as a surprise to the company's lenders, suppliers, customers, and employees, who did not know the company was in trouble until it was unable to meet payroll just days before Christmas 2008.

Maggelet was determined not only to return her family's company to profitability but also to repay all of Flying J's debts, retain as many of the firm's 12,000 employees as possible, and avoid compromising employees' savings (e.g., 401K retirement accounts). All of the company's advisors told her it could not be done. They thought a more likely outcome would be paying creditors nine cents on every dollar owed. If that happened, Maggelet's family's holdings would be almost entirely wiped out according to the “priority of claims” rules in bankruptcy, and the family would end up with only 1.2 percent of a restructured Flying J.

However, to the surprise of its advisors and creditors, Flying J paid its debts in full, mostly by cutting operating costs before selling assets. The family was left with a smaller, but still very profitable company.

After students have analyzed the case they will be able to:

• Determine governance issues in family-owned businesses

• Identify the pursuit of growth as a typical cause of bankruptcy

• Understand why cash flow accounting is more important than GAAP accounting

• Grasp how huge variations can occur when calculating enterprise valuations of distressed businesses

• Understand the differences among law, governance, and ethics

Determine governance issues in family-owned businesses

Identify the pursuit of growth as a typical cause of bankruptcy

Understand why cash flow accounting is more important than GAAP accounting

Grasp how huge variations can occur when calculating enterprise valuations of distressed businesses

Understand the differences among law, governance, and ethics

In mid-February 2009, amid the global financial crisis, the news was grim. The U.S. economy had been in recession since December 2007. If the downturn lasted into early spring, it would become America's longest postwar recession. The economy had shed 3.5 million jobs over the previous 12 months, the worst 12-month period on record. Bank lending was plummeting; the few banks with funds available were holding onto them. With this massive shift into liquid assets (cash and cash equivalents) and away from lending of any sort (even for productive uses or, in many cases, the working capital firms needed to survive), the economy would likely grind to a halt. On this brisk mid-February day in Washington, Timothy Geithner and Ben Bernanke rolled up their sleeves and reevaluated their plans to address the nearly impossible task of righting the ship. In terms of monetary and fiscal policy, were they doing all they could to halt this epic slide? Were they doing too much?

The case describes the policies followed by the Government of India to attract private investments for Oil & Gas exploration. This case is based around observations made by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on some of the petroleum sharing contracts and the remedial measures suggested by a committee appointed by the Government. The case describes how such contracts are structured elsewhere and raises issue about how such contracts can be structured and managed by the state.

The learning outcomes of this paper are as follows: to understand the characteristics of a natural monopoly such as telecommunications sector and impact of “network externality”; to understand the role of a regulator in maintaining a balance between competition and consolidation of telecom sector; to understand the importance of first-mover advantage in telecom sector and coping mechanism of late entrants; to understand different pricing mechanisms of “natural monopolies” that can be adopted to remain profitable; to understand social cost of price floor in telecommunications sector.

Indian telecom sector is going through a downturn where most of the private sector telecom service providers have reported huge losses, failed to pay adjusted gross revenue (AGR) dues and reported decline in average revenue per user over a period of 3–4 years. Fierce competition in the sector leads to rock bottom calling and data charges. Bharti Airtel benefitted for being the first mover in terms of market share but with entry of JIO in 2016, the service providers have entered a price war. As a result, service providers have requested Mr. R.S. Sharma, Chairman of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to come up with a floor on calling charges and requested the government for a bailout package. Currently, Mr. R.S. Sharma, Chairman TRAI is facing a dilemma whether to regulate and come up with a floor on calling and data charges or leave the sector for market correction. Mr. Sharma can also recommend to amend the definition of AGR. Telecommunications sector exhibit the characteristics of a natural monopoly where there is a need of a regulator to introduce “competition for the sector” and “competition in the sector.” In India, TRAI is the regulatory body responsible for introducing “competition for the sector” by auction and “competition in the sector” by deregulating calling and data charges, maintaining at least three private and one public service provider, decreasing “switching cost” of the customers, etc. The case deals with the issues of why there is a need of a regulator in natural monopolies, how different chairmen of TRAI have successfully introduced competition “for” and “in” the sector, and how Indian telecom sector went through a downturn? What should TRAI do to maintain competition in the sector?

The case deals with the issue of managing telecommunications sector (a natural monopoly) by a regulator in the context of India. The regulator had successfully introduced “competition in the sector” and “competition for the sector.” This led to sharp increase in subscriber base and decrease in calling and data charges. Presently, fierce competition in the sector has left the service providers cash crunched. The case deals with the dilemma faced by the chairman of the regulatory body in India on whether the regulator should come up with a price floor or market correction. Study level: MBA, Executive MBA.

Teaching Notes are available for educators only.

CSS 10: Public sector management.

Case A uses the context of unfair, non-transparent process of spectrum allocation by the Indian government to private operators that led to Supreme Court (SC) cancel 122 licenses. It gives scope to discuss the relationship between policy and regulatory agencies and their effectiveness, role of other institutes outside telecom sector such as the Prime Minister Office, Empowered Group of Ministers and the Comptroller & Auditor General of India.