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Prior studies find that US firms with managerial incentives may manipulate the earnings gap to obscure higher performing segments to competitors or to hide underperforming segments from external monitors. The purpose of this study is to complement extant research by examining the association between managerial incentives and segment earnings reporting of cross-listed firms in the USA and the impact of country-level characteristics on this association.

The dependent variable is the earnings gap between firm-level earnings and sum of segment-level earnings. Managerial incentives are proxied by proprietary cost and agency cost. Proprietary cost is measured by the Herfindahl index. Agency cost is measured by inefficient resource transfer activities across segments. Foreign firms in this study are companies listed on major US Stock Exchanges with headquarters outside the USA. Comparable US firms are selected using the Propensity Score Matching procedure as a control group.

The authors find that 1) proprietary cost motive is not the determinant of earnings gap reporting for cross-listed firms; 2) cross-listed firms motivated by agency costs are more likely to manipulate segment earnings reporting than US firms; and 3) among cross-listed firms motivated by agency costs, firms in weak rule of law countries demonstrate more manipulation in segment earnings than firms in strong rule of law countries.

Extant research with regard to segment reporting exclusively focuses on US firms, and little is known about the practice of segment reporting by cross-listed firms originating from different legal regimes. This study fills the gap in the literature by comparing cross-listed firms to US firms in the reporting of segment earnings. The results of this study have implications for regulators and investors who are interested in evaluating the extent of cross-listed firms’ financial reporting quality.

There has been much discussion regarding the necessity of moving away from precise (rules-based) standards toward less precise (principles-based) standards. This study examines the impact of the proposed shift by using a controlled experiment to evaluate the influence of rule precision and information ambiguity on reporting decisions in the presence of monetary incentives to report aggressively. Using motivated reasoning theory as a framework, we predict that the malleability inherent in both rule precision and information ambiguity amplify biased reasoning in a manner that is consistent with individuals’ pecuniary incentives. In contrast, consistent with research exploring ambiguity aversion we predict that high levels of ambiguity will actually attenuate aggressive reporting. Our results support these predictions. Specifically, we find an interactive effect between rule precision and information ambiguity on self-interested reporting decisions at moderate levels of ambiguity. However, consistent with ambiguity aversion, we find decreased self-interested reporting decisions at high levels of ambiguity relative to moderate ambiguity. This study should be of interest to preparers, auditors, and regulators who are interested in identifying situations which amplify and diminish aggressive reporting.

Krull (2004) finds that US multinational corporations (MNCs) increase amounts designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to maximize reported after-tax earnings and meet earnings targets. We extend this research by examining the relationship between executive equity compensation and the opportunistic use of PRE by US MNCs, and the market reaction to earnings management using PRE designations. Firms use equity compensation to incentivize executives to strive for maximum shareholder wealth. One unintended consequence is that executives may engage in earnings management activities to increase their equity compensation. In this study, we examine whether the equity incentives of management are associated with an increased use of PRE. We predict and find strong evidence that the changes in PRE are positively associated with the portion of top managers' compensation that is tied to stock performance. In addition, we find this relationship to be strongest for firms that meet or beat forecasts, but only with the use of PRE to inflate income, suggesting that equity compensation incentivizes managers to opportunistically use PRE, especially to meet analyst forecasts.

Further, we provide evidence that investors react negatively to beating analysts' forecasts with the use of PRE, suggesting that investors find this behavior opportunistic and not fully convincing. This chapter makes an important contribution to what we know about the joint effects of tax policy, generally accepted accounting principles, and incentive compensation on the earnings reporting process.

This study aims to examine how firms choose an auditor in the presence of bilateral information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders regarding firms’ economic performance.

This study presents a one-period reporting bias game with a firm’s risk-neutral manager and investors in the capital market, in which a manager with private information chooses an auditor and reports earnings to investors who acquire their own information. The analysis focuses on the possibility that the manager engages an auditor to constrain earnings management as a commitment device to minimize reporting error cost.

The results show that the manager’s optimal auditor choice is determined based on investor sensitivity to the earnings report, and managerial incentives for earnings management, discounted by the uncertainty of reporting errors. The results for optimal auditor choice are counterintuitive: engaging a higher-quality auditor could seemingly be associated with aggressive earnings management.

This study advances the understanding of the theoretical basis of firms’ auditor choice in the context of market investors’ information acquisition when auditors exercise their discretion in reporting. This issue has received limited attention in the extant literature.

This paper provides a wide-ranging and up-to-date (1997–2016) review of the archival empirical risk-reporting literature. The reviewed papers are classified into two principal themes: the incentives for and/or informativeness of risk reporting. Our review demonstrates areas of significant divergence in the literature specifically: mandatory versus voluntary risk reporting, manual versus automated content analysis, within-country versus cross-country variations in risk reporting, and risk reporting in financial versus non-financial firms. Our paper identifies a number of issues which require further research. In particular we draw attention to two: first, a lack of clarity and consistency around the conceptualization of risk; and second, the potential costs and benefits of standard-setters’ involvement.

Motivated by legitimacy theory, this paper aims to examine comprehensively corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure in Southeast Asian (Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]) countries with the aim of disentangling whether such disclosures are the result of a proactive stance or a reaction to regulations.

After a content analysis of CSR stand-alone reports that relies on the Global Reporting Initiative as the basis for comparison, a multivariate analysis is carried out while controlling for firm-specific incentives and industry, country and year fixed effects.

The paper finds that CSR disclosure increased across the entire ASEAN. Although this increase cannot be directly ascribed to the introduction of regulations in Indonesia and Malaysia, the latter may have impacted choices of disclosure media. In countries where reporting requirements have become mandated, mandatory reporters show low levels, and voluntary reporters high levels, of CSR disclosure. The paper also finds that the attainment of CSR awards is related to disclosure. Additional analyses reveal a substitution effect between voluntary and mandatory incentives in countries with high levels of law enforcement.

The evidence suggests that the introduction of regulations can be effective in improving the level and breadth of CSR reporting only in the presence of institutions that ensure the enforcement of the disclosure regulations.

The evidence suggests that organizations are reluctant to report on issues such as child labor, human rights and corruption. Organizations opportunistically employ related disclosure strategies that deviate from the underlying CSR performance.

The paper analyzes not only the level and breadth of CSR disclosure but also the motivation for its use across the still under-investigated ASEAN area, thus allowing an examination of the influence of institutional incentives above and beyond the firm-specific factors that drive CSR activities.

This paper describes a series of cross-curricular exercises intended to introduce students to specific differences between US GAAP and IFRS, while also helping students understand how US GAAP and IFRS differently answer broader fundamental questions about accounting. These questions involve relevance, reliability, and managers’ use of judgment. Students play varying roles of financial statement stakeholders, according to the roles represented by three courses in the accounting curriculum. In all courses, the managers of the hypothetical firm face strong reporting incentives. Students make decisions according to the roles they play in each course. We observed that students not only identified the differences between US GAAP and IFRS, but also came to appreciate the potential impact of IFRS on stakeholders. Students also appreciated the effect of reporting incentives on managers under different reporting regimes.

The purpose of this research is to first examine whether the amount of impairment losses recognized by Thai listed firms is associated with the economic indicators suggested in the relevant accounting standard. Second, the study investigates whether efficiency versus opportunism dominates accounting for impairment by Thai listed firms.

The multiple regression model is used to test whether impairment indicators and reporting incentives associate with impairment losses for a sample of 1,418 non‐financial listed Thai companies during 1999‐2004.

Impairment losses are associated with all three levels (macro, industry, and firm‐specific performance measures) of impairment indicators described in Thai Accounting Standard (TAS) No. 36 (which is in accordance with the IAS No. 36). The results also reveal that management opportunistically recognizes impairment losses to smooth earnings when earnings increase. Inconsistent with Francis et al. and Riedl, the association between impairment losses and economic factors is relatively greater than that between impairment losses and reporting incentives behaviors.

This is the first study that provides empirical evidence for the indicators of assets' impairment prescribed in TAS/IAS No. 36. The results support the pre‐condition indicators for measurement of impairment losses under TAS/IAS No. 36 in the emerging Thai capital market. Further, efficiency is documented to dominate opportunism as the principal of Thai firms' accounting policy with respect to asset impairment.

According to the SEC, the proposed roadmap for adopting principles-based International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is still a priority. The adoption of IFRS will ultimately demand greater emphasis on practitioner judgment (Mintz, 2010). This chapter focuses on the need for building the judgment skills of the practitioner. Our methodology follows a three-step process. We start with accounting standards, reviewing similarities and differences between “rules-based” and “principles-based” standards and conclude that, while applying any standard requires judgment, applying principles-based standards requires more judgment. We then focus on preparer incentives that can influence this requisite judgment. We use the “fraud triangle” to analyze the influence of incentives on judgment under each standards setting approach. Our third and most important step involves equipping practitioners to make judgments in the presence of incentives. We present and discuss a model that considers economic, social (legal), and ethical dimensions for making principled judgments in the presence of incentives and advocate-improved education for accountants in implementing that model.

The study aims at reviewing a synthesis of disclosure, transparency, and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) implementation in an attempt to provide directions for future research. Prior research overwhelmingly supports that the IFRS adoption or effective implementation of IFRS will enhance high-quality financial reporting, transparency, enhance the country’s investment environment, and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Dayanandan, Donker, Ivanof, & Karahan, 2016; Gláserová, 2013; Muniandy & Ali, 2012). However, some researchers provide conflicting evidence that developing countries implementing IFRS are probably not going to encounter higher FDI inflows (Gheorghe, 2009; Lasmin, 2012). It has also been argued that the IFRS adoption decreases the management earnings in countries with high levels of financial disclosure. In general, the study indicates that the adoption of IFRS has improved the financial reporting quality. The common law countries have strong rules to protect investors, strict legal enforcement, and high levels of transparency of financial information. From the extensive structured review of literature using the Scopus database tool, the study reviewed 105 articles, and in particular, the topic-related 94 articles were analysed. All 94 articles were retrieved from a range of 59 journals. Most of the articles (77 of 94) were published 2010–2018. The top five journals based on the citations are Journal of Accounting Research (187 citations), Abacus (125 citations), European Accounting Review (107 citations), Journal of Accounting and Economics (78 citations), and Accounting and Business Research (66 citations). The most-cited authors are Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2013); Daske and Gebhardt (2006); and Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn (2013). Surprisingly, 65 of 94 articles did not utilise the theory. In particular, four theories have been used frequently: agency theory (15), economic theory (5), signalling theory (2), and accounting theory (2). The study calls for future research on the theoretical implications and policy-related research on disclosure and transparency which may inform the local and international standard setters.