Search results

1 – 10 of 107
To view the access options for this content please click here
Article

Maryam Dilmaghani

The paper aims to propose an analytical framework for social influence and mathematical formulation for its main components: conformity and peer-pressure. The framework is…

Abstract

Purpose

The paper aims to propose an analytical framework for social influence and mathematical formulation for its main components: conformity and peer-pressure. The framework is conceived to explain why certain behaviours and beliefs propagate in a society and some others disappear. It can also be used to study the emergence and the evolution of the status of the norms in terms of their adoption by the population.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper is theoretical, making use of economic quantitative methods. The author proposes a new formulation for the evolutionary dynamics, increasingly borrowed by social scientists. Then, mathematically treating the equation, the author draws general conclusions in form of lemmas, which are proved.

Findings

The author's main contribution is to show that even behavioural rules and beliefs that emerge in a minority subset of the population, do not procure any benefit for the agents adopting them can under certain conditions, evolve into the consensus of a society, become a norm.

Research limitations/implications

More general conclusion (theorems and lemmas) could be stated and proved. But given that the main contribution of the paper is to the fields of social and behavioural economics, along a number of disciplines less mathematical than economics, the author kept the analysis that required fairy advance mathematics for later.

Practical implications

The paper contributes to the evolutionary game theory, evolution of preferences, and evolution of beliefs and social norms. More precisely, the equation proposed in the paper can be used in the contexts the patterns of heterogeneity in a population are affected or caused by social influence. Or in the contexts, the social institutions are susceptible to affect an agent's sense of identity (e.g. voting, fashion industry, marketing).

Originality/value

In this paper, for the first time, a mathematical formulation is proposed for the social influence and its main psychological components (conformity and status seeking). Using the above, the author proposed a new parametric fitness function for the evolutionary dynamics. The author believes the paper matters to a multidisciplinary public. It answers a question that challenged and puzzled the economists (as well other social scientists): the reasons behind the emergence and the prevalence of social norms do not positively contribute to the utility or payoff of the agents adopting them (and at times they are costly).

Details

International Journal of Social Economics, vol. 41 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0306-8293

Keywords

Content available
Article

Benliu Qiu and Ningxuan Zhang

With the recent development of science and technology, research on information diffusion has become increasingly important.

Abstract

Purpose

With the recent development of science and technology, research on information diffusion has become increasingly important.

Design/methodology/approach

To analyze the process of information diffusion, researchers have proposed a framework with graphical evolutionary game theory (EGT) according to the theory of biological evolution.

Findings

Through this method, one can study and even predict information diffusion.

Originality/value

This paper summarizes three existing works using graphical EGT to discuss how to obtain the static state and the dynamics of information diffusion in social network.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article

Jing Peng, Guoping Tu, Yanhong Liu, Hao Zhang and Bibing Leng

The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the construction of online information disclosure platform on the environmental behavior of enterprises is better than the offline spot check.

Design/methodology/approach

Under the background of changing environmental fees into taxes in China, this paper conducts evolutionary game analysis between local governments and enterprises in view of the existing problem of environmental data fraud. Furthermore, through the introduction of government information disclosure platform, this paper discusses the impact of the integration of direct government regulation and indirect public concern regulation on the evolution of environmental behavior of both sides. Finally, the evolutionary game is simulated by adopting system dynamics to analyses the implementation effect of different cases on the game process and game equilibrium.

Findings

The results showed that the introduction of information disclosure platform mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuations existing in the game play and stabilize the game. Moreover, it is worth noting that the regulatory effect of local governments investing part of the monitoring cost in the construction of online information platform is proved to be better than that of putting all the monitoring cost into offline investigation. While optimizing the monitoring cost allocation, the local government still needs to attach great importance to organically combine the attention of the public and media with the governmental official platform.

Practical implications

The obtained results confirm that the proposed model can assist local government in refining the effects of their environmental regulatory decisions, especially in the case of corporate data fraud under environmental tax enforcement.

Originality/value

Previous literature only suggested that local governments should reduce the cost of supervision to change the corporate behavior to a better direction, but no further in-depth study. Thus, this study fills the gap by discussing the positive transformation effect of local government cost allocation scheme on corporate environmental behavior.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Book part

Partha Gangopadhyay and Manas Chatterji

We can divide the humanity into 5,000 ethnic groups who reside in 160 distinct states in the world. On an average this implies that only one randomly picked state out of…

Abstract

We can divide the humanity into 5,000 ethnic groups who reside in 160 distinct states in the world. On an average this implies that only one randomly picked state out of every 10 states is ethnically homogenous. In other words the borders between different ethnic groups do not accord with national borders. We, hence, live in a melting pot of ethnicity and most countries are ethnically heterogeneous. In an alternative fashion, we can make a statement about our ethnic diversity by making a simple observation that there are over 600 living language groups in 184 states in the world. There is thus a reason to believe that the human race confronts a serious and endemic ethnic diversity, which is also increasingly accompanied with unprecedented ethnic rivalry, competition, conflicts, violent clashes and all-out wars. Our chapter provides a comprehensive investigation into the economic causes and consequences of ethnic heterogeneity in our modern world. In order to understand the basic economics of ethnic diversity, we will focus our attention to what is commonly known as ‘global firms’ who employ people from diverse ethnic backgrounds. The consequences will be examined in the context of modern societies where the global firms play an important economic role.

Details

Peace Science: Theory and Cases
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84855-200-5

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article

Ruihan Zhang and Bing Sun

The purpose of this paper is to determine how high-tech firms should choose between independent research and development and technology introduction as well as to…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to determine how high-tech firms should choose between independent research and development and technology introduction as well as to ascertain the effects of the three elements of competitive dynamics on the evolution of innovative behavior-based decisions and competitive results.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper describes the construction of an evolutionary game model and a multi-agent-based model of innovative behavior-based decisions by heterogeneous high-tech firms. The models are used to analyze the evolution path and evolutionarily stable strategy of innovative behavior-based decisions. In addition, multi-agent-based simulation is used to gain insight into the effects of competitive dynamics on the dynamic evolution of innovative behavior-based decisions.

Findings

This paper reveals four evolutionary equilibrium states of the innovation behavior-based decisions of high-tech firms. Based on the findings, these overall evolutionary trends are not affected by the timing of competitive market entry or the intensity of competition. In addition, simulated evidence is added that the timing of competitive market entry is an important factor affecting market-leading innovative strategies and dynamic competition results, and competition intensity is closely related to the evolutionary speed of innovation behavior-based decisions.

Originality/value

The key contribution of this paper is its new view of innovative behavior-based decisions from a competitive dynamics perspective. The new competitive dynamics-based framework for innovative behavior-based decisions of high-tech firms proposed in the paper can resolve the problem of obtaining a sustainable competitive advantage for high-tech firms in a competitive dynamics context.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article

Yidan Chen and Lanying Sun

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics and evolution of trust in organizational cross alliances.

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics and evolution of trust in organizational cross alliances.

Design/methodology/approach

In alliances between corporations and nonprofit organizations, trust in decision-making is a dynamic process. Using the replicated dynamics model of evolutionary game theory, this paper provides a trust decision model and analyzes four scenarios under different parameters. A numerical simulation is developed to present an intuitive interpretation of the dynamic development of trust decisions and the effects of incentive and punishment mechanisms.

Findings

Under different parameters, bounded rationality and utilities result in different but stable evolutionary strategies; the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy leads directly to whether participants adopt the strategy when the system reaches stability after continued games; and incentive and punishment mechanisms can significantly reduce the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy where the system evolves to meet stable state needs.

Practical implications

The establishment of trust relationships is an important influence on the stable and coordinated development of an alliance. The proposed model can help the alliance build closer trust relationships and provide a theoretical basis for the design of the trust mechanism.

Originality/value

Incentive and punishment bound by some degree of trust are introduced to address the problems of trust decisions and their dynamics; the model created reflects the bounded rationality and utility of each game stage. Useful evolutionary stable strategies using different variables are proposed to address the decision-making problems of trust in cross alliances.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. 46 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article

Weiwei Guo

Knowledge has become the basis of enhancing the core competitiveness of enterprises in this era of knowledge-driven economies. Collaborative knowledge management not only…

Abstract

Purpose

Knowledge has become the basis of enhancing the core competitiveness of enterprises in this era of knowledge-driven economies. Collaborative knowledge management not only realizes the real-time exchange and communication of knowledge among different enterprises, but also facilitates the collaboration and integration of knowledge. Collaborative knowledge management has been successfully applied to different fields. To address the poor ecological responsibility of enterprises, the purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept of collaborative knowledge management in this research to determine if the evolution of the decision-making process in collaborative knowledge management is involved in corporate ecological responsibility (CER).

Design/methodology/approach

This research established an evolutionary game model of collaborative knowledge management for CER. The behavioral, evolutionary law and stable behavioral, evolutionary strategy of the participants was identified according to the replicator dynamics equation. Simulation analysis was conducted using MATLAB software.

Findings

Research results demonstrated that, first, the strategic selection of firms is influenced by cost and interest coefficients. Second, the strategy, selection of enterprises, is related to the common benefits of enterprise cooperation. Third, during the systematic evolution and stabilization of strategies, enterprises adopt the same knowledge strategies.

Originality/value

On the basis of the research findings, policy suggestions were proposed to encourage enterprises to implement collaborative knowledge management strategies in ecological responsibility.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article

Ruihua Wang

Knowledge sharing in a master-apprentice pattern is the process of transferring tacit knowledge from masters to apprentices. In addition, 90 per cent of knowledge required…

Abstract

Purpose

Knowledge sharing in a master-apprentice pattern is the process of transferring tacit knowledge from masters to apprentices. In addition, 90 per cent of knowledge required for organizational innovation is tacit knowledge in the master-apprentice pattern. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the evolution of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern and explore the consequences of how to improve the knowledge sharing in the master-apprentice pattern.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper uses asymmetric evolutionary game theory to study the evolutionary track of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern of innovative organizations by analyzing the utility of masters and apprentices during the process of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern of the innovative organization.

Findings

The results reveal that when the masters obtained utility from sharing knowledge is greater than that from hoarding knowledge, and the apprentices obtained utility from studying hard is greater than the costs, the innovative organization can get the largest utility from the knowledge sharing in the mater-apprentice pattern.

Research limitations/implications

The limitation of the research is that this paper mainly studies knowledge sharing among individuals and does not research knowledge sharing between individuals and organizations.

Practical implications

This research has extended the understanding of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice and its evolution path. Also, the obtained findings are conducive to promoting knowledge sharing in master-apprentice and improving human resource management in innovative organizations.

Originality/value

This paper attempts to construct the evolution path of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern, which is a useful exploration of the dynamics of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern and makes up for the shortcomings of the existing research.

Details

International Journal of Innovation Science, vol. 11 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1757-2223

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Book part

Zacharias Maniadis, Fabio Tufano and John A. List

Efforts in the spirit of this special issue aim at improving the reproducibility of experimental economics, in response to the recent discussions regarding the “research…

Abstract

Efforts in the spirit of this special issue aim at improving the reproducibility of experimental economics, in response to the recent discussions regarding the “research reproducibility crisis.” We put this endeavor in perspective by summarizing the main ways (to our knowledge) that have been proposed – by researchers from several disciplines – to alleviate the problem. We discuss the scope for economic theory to contribute to evaluating the proposals. We argue that a potential key impediment to replication is the expectation of negative reactions by the authors of the individual study, and suggest that incentives for having one’s work replicated should increase.

Details

Replication in Experimental Economics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78560-350-1

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Book part

Partha Gangopadhyay and Manas Chatterji

Our work provides a comprehensive examination of two major issues concerning the fragmentation of state and possible state failure, which will be one of the major…

Abstract

Our work provides a comprehensive examination of two major issues concerning the fragmentation of state and possible state failure, which will be one of the major deterrence for achieving peace in our world. There are two important sources of conflicts – one is for the rural society and the other is relevant for the urban society. In the rural set-up, we argue that the fragmentation of markets leads to clientelism between rich farmers and their subjugated clients, small farmers. We show this as an equilibrium phenomenon in which a handful of rich and powerful players, or farmers, can effectively control millions of small farmers, which can easily challenge the authority and the mandate and the jurisdiction of a nation state. This element of clientelisation can effectively fragment the state in a developing nation.

Details

Peace Science: Theory and Cases
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84855-200-5

1 – 10 of 107