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This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.

The exposition is presented as a mathematical model in order to cover the formal underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper aims to illustrate the theory using some simple examples.

The paper discusses population games and describes the notion of revision protocols that agents use to change strategies. As an example of an evolutionary dynamic, the paper discusses the replicator dynamic in detail. It shows convergence of this dynamic to Nash equilibrium in simple 2 strategy games. The paper then applies this dynamic to a particular class of 3 strategy games to establish the possibility on cyclical behavior around a Nash equilibrium.

The paper can serve as an educational briefing for students and researchers who are new to the field of evolutionary game theory.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

This paper aims to develop a partner selection approach for the high-speed rail (HSR) firms from the perspective of achieving competitive advantage in the international competitive bidding sphere.

The current study developed a partner selection approach based on the evolutionary game theory. Firstly, the current study identified the influencing variables and logical formation path of competitive advantage on the international HSR project by literature review and case analysis. After that, a pay-off model was developed based on the theoretical foundation. Meanwhile, the evolutionary stable strategy was analyzed for different combinations of initial pay-offs.

A real-world case was simulated to verify the effectiveness of the developed approach. The simulation results secured support from three industry professionals, indicating the developed approach is valid.

The current study can help HSR firms to select their partners and develop a cooperation strategy from the perspective of winning awards. Also, the proposed approach is based on the advantage driving variables and formation path, which can contribute to HSR firms' understanding of the sources of competitive advantage.

Recently, the concept of financial technology (FinTech) has attracted extensive attention from international organisations and regulators, in particular, how to achieve a “win–win” situation between financial institutions' FinTech innovation and effective regulation has become a hot topic. This study purposes to explore the evolutionary game relationship between FinTech innovation and regulation by constructing both static and dynamic earmarking game models.

A simulation experiment was conducted using primary data obtained from a commercial bank in China.

The results of the theoretical analysis of evolutionary game models were consistent with the corresponding simulation results, proving the validity of the proposed evolutionary game models. It was also found that the dynamic earmarking game model was more stable and effective than the static earmarking game model in promoting FinTech innovation and regulation. Furthermore, when the regulators utilised a dynamic earmarking mechanism, the evolutionary path of financial institutions and regulators' behaviour strategies took the shape of a spiral and eventually converged to a central point, indicating the existence of an evolutionary stable strategy and Nash equilibrium. Finally, because the behaviour strategies of financial institutions were mainly influenced by the regulators' policies, the regulators were inspired to adjust the corresponding regulation policies on FinTech innovation.

This study bridges the knowledge gap in the existing literature on financial innovation and regulation, in particular by establishing evolutionary game models from the perspective of financial earmarking policies. Also, the case study for simulation experiments can gain a more intuitive insight into FinTech innovation and financial earmarking policies.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the construction of online information disclosure platform on the environmental behavior of enterprises is better than the offline spot check.

Under the background of changing environmental fees into taxes in China, this paper conducts evolutionary game analysis between local governments and enterprises in view of the existing problem of environmental data fraud. Furthermore, through the introduction of government information disclosure platform, this paper discusses the impact of the integration of direct government regulation and indirect public concern regulation on the evolution of environmental behavior of both sides. Finally, the evolutionary game is simulated by adopting system dynamics to analyses the implementation effect of different cases on the game process and game equilibrium.

The results showed that the introduction of information disclosure platform mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuations existing in the game play and stabilize the game. Moreover, it is worth noting that the regulatory effect of local governments investing part of the monitoring cost in the construction of online information platform is proved to be better than that of putting all the monitoring cost into offline investigation. While optimizing the monitoring cost allocation, the local government still needs to attach great importance to organically combine the attention of the public and media with the governmental official platform.

The obtained results confirm that the proposed model can assist local government in refining the effects of their environmental regulatory decisions, especially in the case of corporate data fraud under environmental tax enforcement.

Previous literature only suggested that local governments should reduce the cost of supervision to change the corporate behavior to a better direction, but no further in-depth study. Thus, this study fills the gap by discussing the positive transformation effect of local government cost allocation scheme on corporate environmental behavior.

Currently, many studies have shown an increasing interest in owner-dynamic capabilities (ODCs). Existing studies mainly focus on the dynamic capability basis and capability development within the owner organization, whereas they rarely analyze the capability mobilization within the network of participants in megaprojects. Therefore, this study aims to explain the interaction and evolution of the mobilization strategies of ODCs and the cooperative strategies of other participants.

This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy of the owner, the reciprocal participants and the general participants. Results are numerically simulated with a validation case. The asymptotic stability of multiple group strategies is discussed under the replicator dynamic system.

This study suggests that resource complementarity significantly reduces the difficulty of mobilization. Moreover, these strategies are only effective with sufficient ODCs. The results indicate that reciprocal participants are more sensitive to the change in resource complementarity.

This study provides strategic guidance for mobilizing ODCs in megaprojects to better embrace uncertainty and stress, contributing to the dynamic capability literature with an evolutionary game approach. And new insight for the study of reciprocity preference in megaprojects is also provided.

Promoting low-carbon in the construction industry is important for achieving the overall low-carbon goals. Public–private partnership is very popular in public infrastructure projects. However, different perceptions of low-carbon and behaviors of public and private sectors can hinder the realization of low-carbon in these projects. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to cooperate towards low-carbon goals, an evolutionary game model is constructed.

An evolutionary game model that considers the opportunistic behavior of the participants is developed. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) under different scenarios are examined, and the factors that influence the willingness to cooperate between the government and private investors are investigated.

The results illustrate that a well-designed system of profit distribution and subsidies can enhance collaboration. Excessive subsidies have negative impact on cooperation between the two sides, because these two sides can weaken income distribution and lead to the free-riding behavior of the government. Under the situation of two ESSs, there is also an optimal revenue distribution coefficient that maximizes the probability of cooperation. With the introduction of supervision and punishment mechanism, the opportunistic behavior of private investors is effectively constrained.

An evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation between the public sector and the private sector in the field of low-carbon construction. Based on the analysis of the model, this paper summarizes the conditions and strategies that can enable the two sectors to cooperate.

China's agricultural production trusteeship is characterized by the organic link between household operation of small-scale peasant economy and agricultural socialized services, which releases agricultural development vitality and promotes agricultural modernization. As one of the agricultural production trusteeship modes, the whole process trusteeship is suitable for the actual situation of China's aging population and labor force transfer. This paper aims to construct an evolutionary game model containing multistakeholder to explore the behavior decisions through numerical simulation and to provide useful suggestions for the formation of a positive and stable trusteeship relationship and the sound development of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production.

The paper incorporates village committees, service organizations and farmers into the same research framework, selects “guarantee + dividends” as the income distribution method and applies the evolutionary game method to analyze behavioral choices and evolutionary paths of stakeholders. By constructing the expectation function, establishing the replicator dynamic equations and analyzing the tripartite evolutionary stability strategy, the authors explore the factors that affect the stakeholders’ strategy choice and determine asymptotically stable points and stability conditions.

(1) There is a game relationship among village committees, farmers and service organizations in the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production, asymptotically stable points (0,0,1) and (1,1,1) are obtained through calculation. (2) The proportion of stakeholders' strategy choice, the weight of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production in the performance appraisal of the village committee, the village committee's supervision cost, the village committee's reputation effect and the penalty for false dividends of the service organization will affect the speed at which the curve representing the tripartite relationship approaches two asymptotically stable points.

The countermeasures proposed in the paper have excellent reference value. (1) For areas that have realized the project: Village committees can solve the trusteeship problems exposed in the initial areas and improve farmers' satisfaction with the project. (2) For areas that have not realized the project: Those regions will receive more experience references and enhance their confidence in this project. The limitation of the paper is that it takes the main grain-producing areas in only the three northeastern provinces of China as the research object. The next research object will be extended to the whole country.

This paper propose strategies for realizing the orderly operation of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production: first, increase the proportion of stakeholders' strategy choices; second, reduce the village committee's supervision cost; third, increase the weight of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production in the performance appraisal of the village committee; fourth, improve the village committee's reputation effect; fifth, increase the penalty for false dividends of the service organization.

Agricultural production trusteeship is in its initial stage in China. The interest relationships between stakeholders are not yet clear. The paper innovatively applies the evolutionary game method to the research field of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production. According to conditions in China, based on ensuring the guaranteed income, the paper introduces the dividend income variable and establishes a tripartite game model of village committees, service organization and farmers. The paper provides suggestions for the orderly and healthy development of China's agricultural production trusteeship and provides experience for the operation of other modes of agricultural production trusteeship.

Research on strategic alliances is concerned with two issues: continuation and reconfiguration. Building on prior research that examines the two issues separately, the paper studies them simultaneously. This paper aims to investigate how strategic alliances may exert the synergetic effect between dynamics and stability as well as to discuss the dynamic evolution process and influence factors of strategic alliances.

This paper describes the construction of a two-party evolutionary game model of alliance and partners. The model is used to analyze the evolution process of synergetic mechanism to determine when to terminate and when to continue with a partnership. Further, numerical simulation is used to quantify the results and to gain insight into the effects of various factors on the dynamic evolution of the synergetic mechanism.

This paper reveals several synergetic states of dynamics and stability in the alliances. The results show that synergy states are positively affected by the collaborative innovation benefits, alliance management capability, the intensity of intellectual property protection, liquidated damages and reputation losses, and negatively affected by the absorptive capacity of partners.

The study helps the alliance to achieve long-term development as well as to balance the paradoxical relationship. The results suggest that managers of strategic alliances should focus on building strong and long-term relationships in order to achieve high performance innovations. Managers should also pay close attention to their partners’ behaviors in previous alliances.

This paper provides new insights into the paradoxical relationship in alliance by revealing the evolution of synergetic mechanism between dynamics and stability. The results remind alliances to understand the relationship between dynamics and stability and to notice the influence factors of synergistic effects when they are making decisions.

With the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.

An evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.

First, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.

In this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.