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In this study, we examine the relationship between political connections of private firms and the initial public offering process. Using registration statement information, we create a unique database of politically connected IPO firms. We find that political connections are substitutes to high-quality underwriters and big four auditors. Politically connected firms manage earnings more highly upward than non-connected firms prior to the public offering. Politically connected firms also exhibit less underpricing than non-connected firms. Finally, politically connected IPO firms have superior post-IPO returns relative to non-connected IPO firms.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and interpret expectations of regulators about the interface between regulators and internal audit.

Contemporary pronouncements are subjected to a content analysis about the relationship demands that regulators place upon internal audit. Comparison is made with internal auditing standards. The paper identifies the significant challenges and considers the future.

Regulators are increasingly prescriptive about what they expect from internal audit. The scope of internal audit work must cover all matters of interest to the regulator. Internal audit is now regarded as part of the supervisory process. Unlike financial reporting and external auditing, there is no attempt to regulate the setting of internal audit standards, but regulators themselves are enunciating internal audit requirements that go beyond the standards.

The paper draws mainly upon developments in the financial sector, which is leading the way in prescribing the interface between regulator and internal audit.

The enhanced requirements of regulators impact upon internal audit's other relationships on the internal audit universe and scope, and on staffing internal audit.

This is the first attempt to synthesise what regulators currently require from their relationship with internal audit, which needs to be reflected in internal audit charters and in future releases of global internal auditing standards.

The paper aims to offer an exploration of the Banking Act 1987 which was passed following the failure of Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) in 1984. This Act extended the role of auditors in banking supervision by removing traditional confidentiality constraints and created a new role of “reporting accountant”. The paper seeks to examine the origin and development of these new reporting roles. In addition, the paper considers the extent to which the findings of this historical investigation might contribute to current debates on the role of auditors in banking supervision.

The paper draws on official documents, personal accounts of individuals responsible for dealing with the JMB crisis, and semi‐structured interviews conducted with audit partners and banking supervisors who had direct experience of implementing the supervisory reforms instituted under the Banking Act 1987. Power's explanatory schema of controversy, closure and credibility is adopted as a framework for the analysis of documentary sources and interview data.

The failure of JMB generated sufficient controversy so as to require reform of the system of banking supervision. The paper shows that JMB was a controversy since it disturbed what went before and carried with it sufficient allies for change. To achieve closure of the controversy, agreement by key actors about changes to the nature of the role of auditors was required to ensure legitimacy for the reforms. Backstage work undertaken by the auditing profession and the Bank of England provided the necessary credibility to renormalise practice around the new supervisory arrangements.

The paper develops Power's schema which is then employed to analyse the emergence of the new role of reporting accountant and extended role for auditors in UK banking supervision. The paper provides empirical evidence on the processes of controversy, closure and credibility that help to ensure the legitimacy of accounting and auditing change.

The purpose of this paper is to strengthen the theoretical understanding of the processes through which a new regulator seeks to gain legitimacy within an existing regulatory space. The authors do this by investigating the case of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profit Commission (ACNC).

Synthesising legitimacy theory with the concept of regulatory space, the authors analyse formal public discourse surrounding the establishment and operations of the ACNC.

Regulation is essentially a context-bound political process in which a new regulator needs to establish legitimacy to ensure its survival. It must convince its constituents that it has developed processes to operate effectively and professionally in addressing constituents’ needs, to bargain authoritatively with other regulators in establishing its operational boundaries, and to engage politically with government and constituents. Over a relatively short time, the ACNC built legitimacy, despite the political threats to its formal regulatory authority.

The conclusions are based on the analysis of one case. There is scope for further investigations of the processes by which new regulators establish their legitimacy in different contexts.

The potential for a political threat to the authority of a new regulator, and the difficulty of achieving regulatory reform, particularly in a federated system such as Australia, highlight the necessity for a new regulator to develop a compelling discourse of legitimacy.

The authors synthesise regulatory space and legitimacy perspectives, contributing to an understanding of the processes of regulation.

This paper, set in the context of a rationale for financial regulation, considers how the Financial Services Authority’s (the regulator) approach to establishing compliance competent organisations in the life assurance sector (the regulated) has evolved from a prescriptive approach to one of cooperation with those regulated, in order to establish a working partnership. It focuses on investment business and the resulting importance of conduct of business regulation. It reviews the regulator’s approach, linking academic theory to existing practice and the progress made in the developing and evolving relationship between the regulator and the regulated. It establishes what steps/phases have already taken place within life assurance companies seeking to incorporate and change their compliance culture. It creates a template for the review of progress in seeking to achieve the regulator’s goal of compliant competent organisations, while identifying the essential elements of the new partnership approach. This approach will not only meet the regulator’s stated aim of improving consumer protection but also benefit life assurance companies themselves.

Companies have much to gain by establishing and nurturing a smooth working relationship with regulators.

Compliance is defined as conforming to a rule, such as a policy framework, standard or law. Regulatory compliance encompasses all processes that require an entity to be aware of and conform to relevant regulations. As a result, organisation of compliance function remains complex due to the overwhelming set of compliance requirements that exert pressure on various business segments. This report aims to investigate how banks and financial services firms are responding to the regulatory-driven changes to the current compliance landscape, with particular attention paid to nascent challenges and structural changes affecting the organisation of compliance.

The current research project is based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with five universal banks and three financial services firms to pursue the best practices of adapting to the accelerating change in the regulatory-driven compliance landscape.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, banks and financial institutions across the globe have been required to adapt to numerous regulatory reforms that are exerting increased pressure on compliance functions. Amid recent events of multi-million fines to banks that displayed flawed surveillance systems and control failings, the changing regulatory landscape has shown that the relationship with the regulators and compliance with the new regulatory frameworks is a difficult process even for the tier-1 global banks.

Embarking on a peer review of the structures, roles, strategies and responsibilities of different compliance functions across banks and financial services institutions, this paper provides advice to financial institutions on ways of dealing with the complex emerging issues to ensure that the regulatory and compliance arrangements do not turn detrimental. At this point, the paper recognizes that the precise design of a compliance function will vary across individual banks and financial services firms. Nonetheless, this paper addresses the root issues and characteristics that are commonly shared despite the differences in organisations of compliance.

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether successful subsidised arts organisations are more likely to apply a relationship rather than transactional marketing approach to overcome the tendency of not‐for‐profit organisations generally, and subsidised arts organisations particularly, to use marketing for short‐term, tactical purposes.

Research was undertaken to identify whether “successful” subsidised performing arts organisations were indeed more strategic in their focus, whether they had applied a relationship marketing approach and whether such an approach had been influential in the development of their “success”. Preliminary research led to the production of a conceptual framework that identifies major partnerships and specific stakeholder types that need to be considered by a subsidised performing arts organisation if an effective relationship marketing approach is to be developed. This was used as the basis for subsequent research involving a multiple case study approach studying two “successful” theatres and one “unsuccessful” theatre in depth. The strengths of relationship between the various key stakeholder roles and artistic directors within the three theatres were analysed.

Although this research is limited to a case study analysis of three theatres, it does seem to provide evidence to suggest that building strong relationships with stakeholders other than end users can be advantageous to subsidised performing arts organisations.

It is likely that this approach could be successful for the subsidised arts generally and indeed for all those organisations in the not‐for‐profit sector where those who pay do not necessarily receive the service.

This article provides a discussion on successful subsidised arts organisations.

In 2007 Conseco's CEO, C. James Prieur, faced a complicated set of problems with his company's long-term care (LTC) insurance subsidiary, Conseco Senior Health Insurance (CSHI). CSHI faced the threat of congressional hearings and an investigation by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, triggered by an unflattering New York Times article alleging that CSHI had an unusually large number of customer complaints and was denying legitimate claims. This threat came in addition to broader systemic problems, including the fact that the entire LTC industry was barely profitable. What little profitability existed was dependent on the goodwill of state insurance regulators, to whom the industry was highly beholden for approvals of rate increases to keep it afloat. Furthermore, CSHI had unique strategic challenges that could not be ignored: First, the expense of administering CSHI's uniquely heterogeneous set of policies put it at a disadvantage relative to the rest of the industry and made rate increases especially necessary. Second, state regulators were negatively predisposed toward Conseco because of its notorious reputation and thus were often unwilling to grant rate increases. Finally, CSHI was dependent on capital infusions totaling more than $1 billion from its parent company, Conseco, for which Conseco had received no dividends in return. Faced with pressure from Conseco shareholders and the looming congressional investigations, what should Prieur do? Students will discuss the available options in the context of a long-term relationship between Conseco and state insurance regulators. Prieur's solution to this problem proved to be innovative for the industry and to have far-reaching consequences for CSHI's corporate structure.

After reading and analyzing this case, students will be able to: evaluate the impact of a regulatory environment on business strategy; and assess the pros and cons of various market strategies as well as recommend important non-market strategies for a firm in crisis in a highly regulated industry.

The purpose of this paper is to use the New Zealand electricity industry as a case study to describe and understand the importance of collaborative relationships in coping with the changes faced by sectors of the industry over the last two decades.

A multi‐method qualitative approach is used to investigate the nature of industry relationships. Data were collected through two‐phase in‐depth interviews with key electricity employees. Secondary documents and archival records were used to support participant contributions.

The research finds that the majority of the collaborative relationships in the New Zealand electricity industry are “forced”. Nevertheless, and despite the preclusions of competition, relationships continue to support the strategic imperatives of firms and form an important component of firm‐level operation.

The study provides an understanding of collaboration within a new contextual setting – the New Zealand electricity industry. To the best of one's knowledge, no other study has attempted to assess the importance of collaboration on these industry players. The qualitative analysis undertaken made it possible to discover insights that would not have emerged from more commonly used quantitative methodologies.