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This paper aims to examine the recent evolution of the regulation of statutory auditing since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the USA by comparing the regulatory structures for auditing in the USA, France and Canada.

Using publicly available documents, the paper seeks to understand how the regulatory structures for statutory auditing have changed in the period since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The USA, France and Canada were chosen for analysis because prior to Sarbanes-Oxley the regulatory structures of these three countries were relatively distinct, whereas subsequent to the Act they appear to be becoming similar.

The authors interpret the increasing apparent similarity in the regulatory structures for statutory auditing in these three countries to be the result of external pressures from global capital markets for standardized regulatory practices. However, this apparent similarity may also be a form of “decoupling”, whereby actors in the institutional field of professional regulation, under pressures from powerful external forces, seek to enhance their legitimacy while maintaining internal flexibility and a certain capacity for resistance against external pressures in the institutional field.

The paper relies on a qualitative analysis of regulatory structures based on a review and analysis of publicly available documents and legislation. As such, it has limitations similar to other qualitative studies.

The regulation of statutory auditing is important to society both to assure the proper functioning of capital markets and to provide reliable information to the general public. Gaining a better understanding of the regulatory structures for statutory auditing advances the public interest.

There have been few prior research efforts that have examined the regulation of statutory auditing through the lens of new institutional theory.

Several recent developments (notably, the breakdown of traditional distinctions between different types of financial activity, the globalisation of financial markets and increasing emphasis on systemic stability as a regulatory objective) have prompted policy‐makers to search for an ‘optimum’ regulatory structure that is adapted to the new market environment. Further impetus has been given to this debate by the radical overhaul of regulatory structures, along quite different lines in Australia, the UK and Japan, and the ongoing deliberations within the US Congress over structured financial reform. This paper examines alternative ways of organising the regulatory function in the context of the new financial market environment. The first section reviews the objectives, targets and techniques of regulation. The second section describes the new market environment and the restructuring of the financial services industry. The third section assesses the implications of this new environment for the structure of regulation. The fourth section addresses the international dimension. The final section provides a summary and conclusion. The paper is based on a presentation made at the World Bank Conference, El Salvador, June 1998.

The growth of new trading opportunities, advances in technology, and investor interest in fast, cheap execution have all challenged the dominance of traditional exchanges and encouraged the development of alternative trading systems. This article explores the vigorous debate among market participants that has ensued, and outlines their various positions on how these developments should impact the existing regulatory structure.

This paper aims to analyze how the administrative structure of pension regulators affects regulatory capture or regulatory influence. It uses a historical institutionalist methodology to analyze regulatory capture.

The authors argue that the less complex allocation of regulatory authority in Ireland makes it more susceptible to regulatory capture or regulatory influence by the regulated industry than in the USA. Also, it is argued that stand-alone agencies are more susceptible to regulatory capture than are agencies that are embedded within larger departments of government. The authors present a five-step process in regulatory capture, with the later steps being used by the regulated industry if the earlier ones have failed.

The authors find that if the regulated industry has difficulty achieving regulatory capture through influencing the executive branch of government, it can also attempt to influence the legislative and judicial branches, as evidenced by a regulatory episode the USA has recently completed. Ireland has also recently completed reforms that may make regulatory capture more difficult. With a complex regulatory structure including overlapping authority as in the USA, when one agency has been strongly influenced by the regulated industry, another agency may take action to protect the public.

The paper presents international evidence as to the effect of the administrative structure of regulators on regulatory outcomes. It tests a hypothesis that the more complex, overlapping allocation of regulatory authority in the USA makes it less susceptible to regulatory capture.

The purpose of this paper is to present a cross-country qualitative comparative analysis of telecom regulatory frameworks of five countries with that of India. Adopting an institutionalist approach, this paper contributes to understanding of how institutional frameworks in these five countries are structured as compared to that in India so as to ensure division of the authority and scope of the regulator vis-a-vis that of the ministry, and the bureaucracy; financial autonomy of the regulator; redressal of grievances of individual consumers; and modification in the framework to cater to convergence of telecom and broadcasting.

The study is based on literature review of research papers, secondary research and documents published by the regulators of the five countries. The research methodology used is qualitative comparative analysis case-based research of five countries. The variables for comparison have been sourced from the World Bank Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory System. The researcher has adopted qualitative research method to bring forth the similarity, as well as the diversity in the regulatory setup of the five countries in comparison with India.

Analysis reveals that there is an absence of clear role definition for policy formulating body, the DoT and the regulatory body, the TRAI. The involvement of a number of bodies leads to duplication of regulatory functions in the TRAI, DoT and the Telecom Commission. Secondly, with respect to standards, compliance and spectrum management, the TEC and WPC function as divisions of DoT; however, the TRAI is entrusted with ensuring interoperability among service providers as well as spectrum management. This leads to duplication of regulatory functions and absence of a single authority. Lastly, funding of the TRAI is done through the departmental allocation given to DoT alone with no additional funds coming in the form of regulatory fees. This is seen to be specific to TRAI as other sector regulators in India have been empowered to collect fees from industry participants. The Indian framework shows two commonalities in comparison with the five countries; firstly, India has adopted self-regulation through the setting up of the Telco-consumer group-led consumer redressal process. The second similarity being convergence of the regulatory functions performed by the TRAI for the telecom as well as the information and broadcasting ministries, although the two ministries continue to function independently.

The paper furthers the understanding of the good practices in the design of telecom regulatory framework. It brings out the similarity and diversity in these frameworks. And, most importantly, it highlights limitations that the Indian telecom regulatory framework has in areas of role definition for the regulator, its autonomy and regulation of telecom-media convergence.

The purpose of this paper is to examine insurance regulation theories, regulatory agency structures and measures.

This study investigates significance of regulatory agency structure, key regulatory measures, political stability and cultural dimension in insurance markets of 56 developed and developing countries for 2005‐2009.

It was found that insurance consumption is lower in countries with an authority exclusively for insurance regulation but life insurance consumption is higher when the agency is part of government or when another agency is jointly responsible for insurance regulation. Market entry regulation leads to lower consumption whereas market exit regulation has the opposite effect. Solvency regulation and required use of standard forms for insurer financials lead to greater consumption of insurance. A positive impact on the nonlife market is observed for accounting regulation and regulator's intervention power.

Price control regulation may lower consumption of insurance whereas tariff rating brings about a rise in the consumption. Regulation of insurance intermediaries or corporate governance may lower insurance consumption whereas the requirement that insurers employ an actuary or actuaries gives rise to the consumption.

The author found no difference between OECD and non‐OECD countries. However, corruption‐freeness and inflation impact insurance consumption. Using OECD country data only, a negative impact was found of the single agency structure and tariff regulation in the life insurance market and a positive impact of regulation by two or more agencies in the life insurance market and of price control regulation in the nonlife insurance market. Corruption‐freeness positively affects the loss ratio in the life insurance market and the combined ratio in the nonlife insurance market.

This paper aims to trace the evolution of Indian financial market structure and regulation, in the broad dialectic sense and to suggest a consolidated, holistic regulatory model.

The paper sketches the evolution of Indian financial market structure and its regulation in terms of dialectic cycles. The first cycle extending practically over four decades, from the 1950s to the 1980s, was a period of foundation, expansion, and policy introspection. The decade of the 1990s marked the commencement of the second cycle – a period of liberalization and emergence of financial conglomerates. The Indian financial system has since completed one full circle in the dialectic process and is now passing through the last phase (synthesis) of the second cycle. Based on this dialectic approach, a consolidated and holistic regulatory model has been developed and suggested.

The paper concludes that, from a regulatory perspective, the recent developments in the financial sector have led to an appreciation of the limitations of the present segmental approach to financial regulation and favors adopting a consolidated supervisory approach to financial regulation and supervision, irrespective of its structural design.

This paper will be of value to financial regulators, financial intermediaries and investors across all the countries, developed as well as developing. It will facilitate and guide in the process of regulatory restructuring and strengthening the overall health of the financial markets.

The purpose of this study is to explain rationale for regulatory change in Australia and New Zealand after the global financial crisis.

Outline regulatory changes and relate to crisis experience and regulatory shortcomings exposed.

Regulatory change was driven primarily by need, as capital importing nations, to comply with emerging global standards, and the different approaches in both nations are also related to domestic political considerations.

The process of regulatory change in response to the crisis is ongoing.

A number of areas for further improvement in financial regulation are identified.

Costs of poor regulation and financial crises are identified.

A comparison of regulatory approaches in two countries dominated by the same four large banks helps understand the challenges of cross-border financial regulation cooperation.

The aim of this paper was to trace the development of the banking sector from post independence (1962) Jamaica to 2002 when the last major revisions were made to banking legislation.

The paper focuses mainly on the banking crisis that the financial sector suffered from 1992 to 1997. It examines the legislative and regulatory framework that existed during that period and the shortcomings that the financial crisis revealed. The impact of the financial crisis on the development of the legislative and regulatory framework and the resultant changes are also examined. The paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the regulatory and legislative framework existing in the banking sector in Jamaica. Investigative research was done through interviews, newspaper articles and reviewing papers written on this area in conjunction with the analysis of the banking legislation during this period.

The present banking and regulatory framework in Jamaica developed in response to the financial crisis and not in a structured and planned way. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that there were three amendments to the banking legislation in five years crisis primarily to close the loopholes and weaknesses the financial crisis revealed that the regulators did not have the legislative power to remedy.

While papers have been written examining the financial crisis from an economic perspective this paper provides a comprehensive legal analysis of the banking and regulatory framework in Jamaica. This paper will be of interest to regulators and the legal community.

Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from the result of steady regulation reform, absurd bureaucratic interventions have been sharply reduced. Corruption in the process of rent seeking has decreased too. It is impossible to exercise regulatory authority that infringes on the essence of the freedom of the people because people who live in a democratic society would not accept these absurd practices.

This chapter introduces some key features of the regulatory management system in South Korea as well as the challenges that need to be overcome. In particular, the bureaucracy has worked hard to chip away at past regulations that produce rents for various private interest groups but provide little to society at large. Regulatory quality is tied closely to democracy as maintaining a fair and even playing field for entrepreneurs is a key freedom. Introducing checks and balances into the regulatory system can be an important way to facilitate this goal. The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) facilitated to strengthen the logic of regulatory necessity and the logic of improving regulation which increased the level of its institutionalization.