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The need for food safety and food quality standards is acknowledged by public regulators, private actors, and the society. The purpose of this paper is to identify the types of actors in the multilevel transnational food chain regulatory governance and how their interlinking affects regulatory outcomes over time.

Food chain regulatory standards emerge within a complex process beyond the state. Based on interdisciplinary theoretical perspectives, namely regulatory governance and political economy, this paper provides a integrative framework of analysis by identifying the types of actors and their interactions in the food chain regulatory governance.

Food chain regulatory standards setting have been mainly studied either from the public regulator or the firm self-regulating point of view. This paper demonstrates how the political and economics dynamics of the interactions among public and private actors operate within the transnational food standards setting process. The study identifies the groups of interdependent actors (public and private) that interact within the transnational food chain regulatory process and develop public-private regulations, self-regulations, and co-regulations over time. In this process, the actors’ different power, operational and regulatory capacity, experience, resources affect the regulatory outcome with socio-economic and governance implications.

The paper does not examine in detail how these interactions operate empirically on specific regulations.

The paper offers an integrative thorough understanding of the food chain regulatory standard setting process, relevant for academics, policy makers, the industry, and society.

The paper constitutes new research by identifying the actors and interactions in the integrative regulatory governance of the food chain standards.

This paper examines the need for international regulation of financial markets and suggests the possible role that a global financial supervisor might play in providing effective regulation of international financial markets. The first part discusses the nature of systemic risk in the international financial system and the necessity for international Minimum Standards of prudential supervision for banking institutions. The second part examines the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to devise non‐binding international standards for managing systemic risk in financial markets. Recent financial crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America suggest, however, that informal efforts by international bodies such as the Basel Committee are inadequate to address the risk of systemic failure in financial systems. The third part therefore argues that efficient international financial regulation requires certain regulatory functions to be performed by a global supervisor acting in conjunction with national regulatory authorities. These functions should involve the authorisation of financial institutions, generation of rules and standards of regulatory practice, surveillance of financial markets, and coordination with national authorities in implementing and enforcing such standards.

The need for international regulation of financial markets became apparent in the mid‐1970s in response to the post‐Bretton Woods liberalisation of financial markets. The elimination of the fixed exchange rate parity with gold resulted in the privatisation of financial risk, which created pressure to eliminate controls on cross‐border capital movements and the further deregulation of financial markets. It became necessary for national regulatory authorities to promote safe and sound banking systems through the effective management of systemic risk in national markets. Similarly, the need for international standards of prudential supervision was also recognised, to prevent solvent banking institutions in one jurisdiction from losing business to less respectable institutions operating in other jurisdictions whose laws permitted cut‐rate financial services and other risky financial practices. The privatisation of financial risk also created the need for financial institutions to spread their risks over many assets and activities, which led, in turn, to a significant increase in short‐term cross‐border portfolio investment that has, in many instances, exposed capital‐importing countries to increased systemic risk due to the volatility of such investments.

In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted a landmark resolution proclaiming the establishment of a New International Economic Order. One of the basic aims of this declaration was to enhance the voice and participation of developing countries in the international economic decision-making process based on norms of equitable governance. More than four decades have passed since its adoption. This paper aims to reflect on the past 43 years of the global financial regulatory system in light of the notion of equitable governance as envisioned by the “New International Economic Order”.

This paper surveys the global financial regulatory system from the vantage point of equitable economic governance. This discussion covers the period that comes after the 1974 UN landmark resolutions that declare the establishment of a “New International Economic Order”. The authors use qualitative and quantitative approach in this study. They use descriptive statistics and intuitive discussions of certain cases to carry the objective of the paper forward.

First, part of the development in global financial regulation manifests the establishment of informal networks that embark on global regulatory issues, while being very exclusive in their membership policies. Second, the lack of full and effective participation of developing countries in the decision-making and norm setting remains unsolved in the global financial regulatory system. Third, the shadow role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was of great significance in assisting the implementation of non-binding regulatory rules of international finance in developing countries despite the concerns of legitimacy and equity in the making of international standards. In sum, the global financial regulatory system that emerged in the past four decades is quite different from that aspired by the NIEO.

The declaration of NIEO coincides with the collapse of the Bretton Wood’s fixed exchange rate which in turn leads to the emergence of a new financial system and regulatory development. This period marked the proliferation of informal networks that make policy recommendations or non-binding rules with global implications. As far as the literature review goes far, this paper is the first to survey the post Bretton Wood’s period of the global financial regulatory architecture based on the tenets of the “New International Economic Order”.

Amid increased size and complexity of the banking industry, operational risk has a greater potential to occur in more harmful ways than many other sources of risk. This paper seeks to provide a succinct overview of the current regulatory framework of operational risk under the New Basel Accord with a view to inform a critical debate about the influence of data collection, loss reporting, and model specification on the consistency of risk‐sensitive capital rules.

The paper's approach is to investigate the regulatory implications of varying characteristics of operational risk and different methods to identify operational risk exposure.

The findings reveal that effective operational risk measurement hinges on how the reporting of operational risk losses and the model sensitivity of quantitative methods affect the generation of consistent risk estimates.

The presented findings offer tractable recommendations for a more coherent and consistent regulation of operational risk.

Strong versions of the Precautionary Principle (PP) require regulators to prohibit or impose technology controls on activities that pose uncertain risks of possibly significant environmental harm. This decision rule is conceptually unsound and would diminish social welfare. Uncertainty as such does not justify regulatory precaution. While they should reject PP, regulators should take appropriate account of societal aversion to risks of large harm and the value of obtaining additional information before allowing environmentally risky activities to proceed.

The purpose of this study is to examine international financial reporting standards (IFRSs) adoption in Ethiopia to explain transnational political-economic antecedents of this change and its associated consequences on the regulatory landscape of accounting.

Using a neo-Gramscian theory of globalization and the state, the study examines interview and document review evidence pertaining to IFRS adoption in Ethiopia by focusing on the period from 1991 to 2014.

The study illustrates that a dialectical rather than deterministic interaction between global and national forces explains IFRS adoption in Ethiopia, i.e. IFRS adoption falls within the broader scheme of universalizing regulatory institutions in the globalizing world economy. Compared to the commonly understood trends of IFRS adoption circumscribed within a pre-existing regulatory framework, this study illustrates IFRS adoption as a primary driver of major reforms to the accounting regulatory landscape.

This study contributes original theoretically grounded insights into the transnational political-economic rationale for IFRS adoption and consequences of the adoption on the accounting regulatory landscape.

The current research aims to explore how the implementation of new regulatory forms contributes to firm self-regulation.

Longitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012.

Examining firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012 has several important findings regarding how the introduction of specific regulatory forms contributes to firm-initiated vehicle recalls. Firms are not likely to self-regulate in response to surveillance or standards-based regulation while information-based regulation results in a greater likelihood of firm self-regulation.

This result suggests that even at the product level; firms become increasingly motivated to self-regulate as regulators introduce information-based regulations.

This paper aims to provide an overview of different issues related to jurisdictional arbitrage found in general regulatory arbitrage literature and their projection to the specific area of cryptoasset regulation.

By distinguishing any parallel, analogous and neighbouring concepts, this paper attempts to clarify the notion of jurisdictional arbitrage. By discussing certain aspects and effects of three regulatory regimes, BitLicense, 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5) and the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCa), it makes clear that national/State/regional policymakers have already failed to create arbitrage-proof regulatory frameworks by acting exclusively within their jurisdictional limits. Against this background, this paper discusses briefly regulatory competition and international harmonisation as alternative solutions to inappropriate and ineffective national/regional legislative approaches.

Based on a structured theoretical analysis, this paper reaches three important findings. First, academics, international bodies and other commentators use inaccurately the general concept of “regulatory arbitrage” to refer to the specific problem of jurisdictional arbitrage creating in this way an interpretative confusion; second, commentators confuse jurisdictional conflicts with jurisdictional arbitrage; third, the solutions to this regulatory problem can actually be found in its underlying causes.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first specific-issue paper on jurisdictional arbitrage in the context of cryptoasset regulation and aims to trigger further academic discussion on this evolving phenomenon and inform the development of future cryptoasset regulation combatting this problem.

Explicit barriers to international trade, investment, technology, and financial flows have been reduced considerably. As a result, “macro-liberalization” of international economic transactions has largely run its course. Now, attention needs to shift from international rules for governments to international rules dealing with the various aspects of the international operations of firms – what are called “micro-issues” in this chapter; these include, by way of example, cross-border mergers and acquisitions and international bankruptcies. Such international rules for the principal actors in international production and markets would complement (or replace) the unilateral rules that exist at the national level. International rules would set the direct parameters for certain aspects of the international activities of firms and hence provide the global governance for operating in the global production and trading spaces. This chapter exemplifies for a number of areas the state of rule-making for some micro-issues, analyzes the nature of this rule-making, and suggests a way forward. Developing international micro-regulatory frameworks of rules of the road for the various aspects of the international operations of firms in the globalizing world economy should be the new frontier of international commercial diplomacy.