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The Basel committee proposes making regulatory capital requirements more risk sensitive. Cost‐benefit assessment suggests that this yields greater efficiency in the use of regulatory capital, but has substantial enforcement and compliance costs and may well increase the severity of banking crises. Better if the new Accord sets risk‐insensitive regulatory minimum capital standards and encourages banks to set risk‐sensitive desired capital targets with generous reductions in required capital for healthy banks with effective systems of risk management. Ten specific suggestions for improvement of the new Accord are made.

Post 1991, given the advent of liberalization and economic reforms, the Indian telecom sector witnessed a remarkable growth in terms of subscriber base and reduced competitive tariff among the service providers. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of regulatory announcements on systemic risk among the Indian telecom firms.

This study employed a two-step methodology to measure the impact of regulatory announcements on systemic risk. In the first step, CAPM along with the Kalman filter was used to estimate the daily β (systemic risk). In the second step, event study methodology was used to assess the impact of regulatory announcements on daily β derived from the first step.

The results of this study indicate that regulatory announcements did impact systemic risk among telecom firms. The study also found that regulatory announcements either increased or decreased systemic risk, depending upon the type of regulatory announcements. Further, this study estimated the market-perceived regulatory risk premiums for individual telecom firms.

The regulatory risk premium was either positive or negative, depending upon the different types of regulatory announcements for the telecom sector firms. Thus, this study contributes to the theory of literature by testing the buffering hypothesis in the context of Indian telecom firms.

The study findings will be useful for investors and policy-makers to estimate the regulatory risk premium as and when there is an anticipated regulatory announcement in the Indian telecom sector.

This is one of the first research studies in exploring regulatory risk among the Indian telecom firms. The research findings indicate that regulatory risk does exist in the telecom firms of India.

Several recent developments (notably, the breakdown of traditional distinctions between different types of financial activity, the globalisation of financial markets and increasing emphasis on systemic stability as a regulatory objective) have prompted policy‐makers to search for an ‘optimum’ regulatory structure that is adapted to the new market environment. Further impetus has been given to this debate by the radical overhaul of regulatory structures, along quite different lines in Australia, the UK and Japan, and the ongoing deliberations within the US Congress over structured financial reform. This paper examines alternative ways of organising the regulatory function in the context of the new financial market environment. The first section reviews the objectives, targets and techniques of regulation. The second section describes the new market environment and the restructuring of the financial services industry. The third section assesses the implications of this new environment for the structure of regulation. The fourth section addresses the international dimension. The final section provides a summary and conclusion. The paper is based on a presentation made at the World Bank Conference, El Salvador, June 1998.

Companies vary in their attitudes toward regulatory (ethics) risk. The purpose of this study is to assess how regulatory risk‐averse, risk neutral and risk seeking companies employ distinct managerial risk and slack accumulation strategies and differ in their auditor scores and bankruptcy risk.

The authors test their hypotheses using the GAO‐assembled database of financial restatements that allows contrasting voluntary restaters (firms that restated without being prompted either by external auditors or the SEC) and forced restaters (firms requested to restate by the SEC or external auditors). The paper uses logistic regression for comparing different groups of firms to test the hypotheses.

The results of the data analysis mostly supported the hypotheses. The findings suggest that a firm's attitude towards regulatory risk is associated with organizational slack (available and potential), risk (managerial and organizational), and auditor's rating.

Some limitations of the study are: use of cross sectional data does not allow testing causal effects, relying on GAO office for categorizing firms in different regulatory category introduces the possibility of bias in analysis, and use of only North American firms in the sample limits the generalizability of the findings.

Firms' attitudes toward regulatory risk and their respective risk and slack management strategies could be used to detect fraud early on before such firms transgress from the realm of legality to borderline legality and illegality.

Some contributions of the study are: it shows that a firm's fraud tendency or regulatory risk behavior is associated with the type of slack accumulated and available in the firm, regulatory risk‐averse companies take less managerial and bankruptcy risks, and earn higher evaluations from auditors, it demonstrates that regulatory risk‐averse companies differ from regulatory risk neutral companies.

Motivated by recent financial liberalization policies in emerging markets, this study investigates whether bank competition and regulatory capital affect bank risk taking in an international banking context.

Bank competition is regressed, using GLS regression, on various measures of bank risk, to reflect regulatory, accounting and market-based risk-taking. The authors use a sample of publicly traded banks operating in Africa during 2004–2019.

Results show that higher level of bank competition increases bank risk taking and results in greater financial fragility in the absence of banking capital regulations. Furthermore, larger capital adequacy ratios control the risk-taking incentives of managers and guard banks against the risk of default. Further tests confirm the significance of market-based risk measures over accounting and regulatory measures.

Findings are relevant to bank managers and regulators in their sustained effort of finding an optimal balance between bank competition and financial stability. Increased competition should be balanced with capital regulations to curtail bank excessive risky behavior and derive the social benefits of greater competition in the market while sustaining overall economic growth.

This study provides novel evidence in an international context. First, it uses regulatory, accounting and market-based measures of bank risk taking to reflect regulators', management and market participants' emphasis. Another original contribution is the investigation of bank competition across African economies characterized by financial liberalization, stringent banking system and interesting socio-economic challenges.

The study focuses on drug safety regulation capture, reveals the inner mechanism and evolutionary characteristics of drug safety regulation capture and provides suggestions for effective regulation by pharmacovigilance.

The article introduces prospect theory into the game strategy analysis of drug safety events, constructs a benefit perception matrix based on psychological perception and analyzes the risk selection strategies and constraints on stable outcomes for both drug companies and drug regulatory authorities. Moreover, simulation was used to analyze the choice of results of different parameters on the game strategy.

The results found that the system does not have a stable equilibrium strategy under the role of cognitive psychology. The risk transfer coefficient, penalty cost, risk loss, regulatory benefit, regulatory success probability and risk discount coefficient directly acted in the direction of system evolution toward the system stable strategy. There is a critical effect on the behavioral strategies of drug manufacturers and drug supervisors, which exceeds a certain intensity before the behavioral strategies in repeated games tend to stabilize.

In this article, the authors constructed the perceived benefit matrix through the prospect value function to analyze the behavioral evolution game strategies of drug companies and FDA in the regulatory process, and to evaluate the evolution law of each factor.

The purpose of this paper is to set the proposed new capital adequacy arrangements in the wider context of what is termed a regulatory regime. The central theme is that the components of the regulatory regime need to be combined in an overall regulatory strategy, and that while all the components are necessary, none alone is sufficient. The optimum mix of the components of the regime changes over time as market conditions and compliance culture change. It is argued that, in current conditions, there needs to be a shift within the regime in five dimensions. The proposed new Accord is discussed in terms of this regulatory regime paradigm. The Accord is a welcome move in the direction of a broader approach to bank regulation and a recognition that other mechanisms (notably an enhanced role for market discipline) are needed.

Very little is known about the influences of corporate strategy and regulation on the risk of regulated firms. The current study addresses this gap by examining the relationship among the level of diversification, the regulatory environment, and risk levels of regulated electric utility companies. Results suggest that both the regulatory environment and level of diversification impact firm risk. Specifically, the regulatory environment in which a firm operates moderates the relationship between diversification and risk. Electric utilities operating in the least favorable regulatory environments benefited the most from diversification in terms of risk reduction, while electric utilities in the most favorable regulatory environments experienced increases in risk from diversification. These findings extend previous studies by showing how both the regulatory environment and corporate strategy impact the risk of regulated utilities.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory policy adopted by the Basel Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. The pathology of the new “securitisation framework” is carefully highlighted to facilitate a general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although a simplified sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset securitisation transactions is incorporated, the author does not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework.

Chief executive officer (CEO) ability may have an effect on various corporate reporting decisions, and consequently, the CEO ability is subject to scrutiny by regulatory reviewers. However, theoretical literature provides mixed evidence on how the CEO ability affects the regulatory review risk. Thus, this study aims to empirically examine the effect of CEO ability on regulatory review risk.

To measure CEO ability, this study uses the CEO ability-score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). Further, to measure regulatory review risk, the study uses the probability of receiving a comment letter from the Securities and Exchange Organization of Iran.

This study finds that the relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk is generally negative and statistically significant but not economically significant, i.e. the relationship is very small. In this regard, the study shows that the relationship is negative and also statistically and economically significant for firms with low levels of agency conflicts and high levels of corporate governance quality; and is positive and also statistically and economically significant for firms with high levels of agency conflicts and low levels of corporate governance quality. In addition, while the study finds no evidence that the regulatory reviewers’ workload compression influences the general relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk, it documents that low (high) regulatory reviewers’ workload compression weakens (strengthens) both the relationships stated above.

Collectively, the results suggest that the agency conflicts/corporate governance quality and regulatory reviewers’ workload compression are important factors in the analysis of the relationship between the CEO ability and regulatory review risk. The results offer insights into the opposing theoretical viewpoints about the relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk. Thus, the results will be of interest to boards of directors and other stakeholders involved in the regulatory review process.