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Government reforms have seen shifts from rules-based to principles-based risk regulatory governance. This paper examines the effects of principles-based risk regulatory reforms on public sector risk management (RM) and management control practices in public sector organizations (PSOs).

The principles-based regulation focuses on providing autonomy to PSOs while maintaining control over their actions without direct intervention. This resonates with Foucault's notion of how modern forms of governments operate. The research is informed by Foucault's concept of governmentality. The authors conducted a qualitative field study of an Australian PSO, gathering and analysing data from interviews, focus groups, and archival documents.

The findings show the capillary modes by which principles-based risk regulatory regime penetrates and works with management control practices in pursuit of regulatory goals within the PSO the authors studied. In addition, the authors find that the principles-based approach (focusing on autonomy) and rules-based approach (focusing on control) are not opposites in kind and effect but rather, autonomy should be understood as a central pillar of control. Furthermore, the findings show how cultural controls and formal controls are not in conflict but are interconnected in RM practices, with cultural controls providing control architecture for RM and formal control translating the control architecture into routines. Finally, the study provides insights into how enterprise risk management (ERM) provides capabilities for and routinizes RM practices in a PSO and the management control systems (MCS) that enabled this to occur.

The paper provides novel insights into how MCS are infiltrated, mobilized and deployed to enact principles-based risk regulatory reforms. These insights are useful for regulators, practitioners and researchers.

Existing research on innovation has mainly focused on how to promote technological innovation in megaprojects and management innovation (MI) in megaprojects is still an unknown research field. The purposes of this study are to examine the effect of MI on megaproject performance and how the top management team (TMT) regulatory focus affects the use of MI in projects. At the same time, the moderating effects of project uncertainties are also tested.

On the basis of an explorative/exploitative ambidextrous analysis framework, this study divides MI into two dimensions: explorative and exploitative MI, and integrates the theoretical perspectives of the TMT regulatory focus and project uncertainties into a research model. Taking 314 responses from megaprojects’ TMTs in China as research data, this study empirically tests the above model.

Results show that exploratory MI has a U-shaped relationship with megaproject performance; whereas exploitative MI has an inverted U-shaped relationship with megaproject performance. The TMT promotion focus has a positive effect on exploratory and exploitative MI; and the TMT prevention focus has a negative effect on exploratory MI but has a positive effect on exploitative MI. Project uncertainties have a positive moderating effect on the positive relationship between TMT promotion focus and exploratory MI, whereas it has a negative moderating effect on the negative relationship between the TMT prevention focus and exploratory MI.

By empirically measuring the relationship between two types of MIs and megaproject performance, this study clarifies the differential mechanism of the effect of different MIs on megaproject performance. This study also examines the MI of megaprojects from the perspective of the TMT regulatory focus and expounds how changes in uncertainties affect the relationship between the TMT regulatory focus and MI.

Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from the result of steady regulation reform, absurd bureaucratic interventions have been sharply reduced. Corruption in the process of rent seeking has decreased too. It is impossible to exercise regulatory authority that infringes on the essence of the freedom of the people because people who live in a democratic society would not accept these absurd practices.

This chapter introduces some key features of the regulatory management system in South Korea as well as the challenges that need to be overcome. In particular, the bureaucracy has worked hard to chip away at past regulations that produce rents for various private interest groups but provide little to society at large. Regulatory quality is tied closely to democracy as maintaining a fair and even playing field for entrepreneurs is a key freedom. Introducing checks and balances into the regulatory system can be an important way to facilitate this goal. The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) facilitated to strengthen the logic of regulatory necessity and the logic of improving regulation which increased the level of its institutionalization.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the impact of regulatory-driven changes to the collateral management landscape, indicating operational and technological challenges faced by global investment banks while complying with the new regulatory framework. As it transpires, collateral management strategies need to be revised to find optimal solutions for the regulatory-shaped landscape. Furthermore, set against the regulatory background, this paper attempts to provide some insights into the future risks and shocks to collateral management.

This paper recognizes the dearth of up-to-date studies on current issues with collateral management and overnight indexed swap (OIS) discounting. Therefore, to introduce new theoretical avenues, this paper is based on an exploratory, qualitative approach to analyse the regulatory-driven collateral management.

The increased use of collateral, with a sharp focus on its quality, liquidity and eligibility for central clearing, requires a new approach to collateral management and discounting methods. At this point, banks (especially those with agency businesses) should develop an enterprise-wide view of collateral by having a central data repository, which allows access to information about the transactions conducted with all counterparties.

Analysing the regulatory-driven (Basel III; Dodd-Frank; EMIR) changes to collateral management, this paper adopts banks’ perspectives on the new regulations in collateral management. The paper contributes to the widespread, albeit complex, discussion on how banks adapt to the rapidly changing environment in collateral management and risk operations.

UK companies face an increasingly aggressive regulatory environment. A recent study by the LSE shows that UK directors are ill‐equipped to deal with increasing regulatory risk. While they are aware of these growing risks, almost a third of boards do not know about the activities in their companies that could lead to a regulatory intervention. Less than one in five are “very confident” in their risk management processes. UK companies also fail to effectively monitor and influence new regulations. Businesses need to adopt a proactive approach to handling these risks, acting at all stages of the regulatory cycle. By doing so, they can afford themselves a competitive advantage, and reduce the chances of facing severe corporate and personal penalties.

Internationally public utilities, sometimes referred to as network industries, are being privatised and dedicated regulatory structures to protect the public interest are being introduced. This study looks at the related issues of post‐privatisation performance, regulatory risk and management strategies in privatised public utilities, drawing on evidence from the UK. The main findings are, first, that in assessing the impact of privatisation on economic performance it is difficult to separate out the effects of ownership, competition, regulation and technological change. Second, that in terms of the distribution of the efficiency gains, initially investors were the main beneficiaries in the UK, but consumers gained as competition developed and regulation tightened. Third, regulated enterprises are subject to regulatory risk as well as commercial risk with implications for types of management strategies adopted. Following privatisation the dynamics of regulation involve both the regulator and management learning about regulation and the optimal strategies to adopt. The UK's experiences are educational for those countries now contemplating or in the process of introducing privatisation programmes.

This study explores the interrelationship between regulatory risks and strategic controls within the financial supervision architecture of an emergent global financial centre of China that embraces innovation as part of its strategic objectives.

This paper employs a longitudinal case study approach to examine the institutional dynamics of the key financial regulators in connection with the regulated financial institutions in Hong Kong before and after the financial tsunami of 2008.

First, this study reveals an organic development of a specialised financial regulatory architecture that resists transforming itself structurally despite the significant impact of externalities. Second, in this post-financial crisis analysis, regulated financial institutions swiftly respond by strengthening their risk controls through compliance with the guidelines imposed by the regulator. Institutional dynamics in influencing the implementation of risk controls through a top-down interactive mechanism are observed. Such dynamic and pertinent rapid responses induce the pursuit of optimal risk management within a regulatory framework.

This paper provides a longitudinal case study to reveal regulatory risks and strategic controls of the global financial centre of China. It unveils mitigating risk control measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The study demonstrates how regulatory institutions strive to take precautionary, coercive measures such that the regulated institutions mimic and implement prudent mechanisms.

This paper aims to explore and explain how administrative controls have been changed as a response to a significant crisis, using the transition of the three largest Icelandic banks from bankrupt to operational entities after the 2008 financial crisis. The Icelandic banks are compared with three Danish banks to separate crisis-driven responses from simple market-driven reactions.

Empirical data were collected using semi-structured interviews. The participating Icelandic and Danish banks were considered as two units, which formed the basis for a comparative case study between the two countries.

Driven by an understanding of what is expected by the market rather than the need to inform and guide the employees the Icelandic banks implemented a number of revolutionary and formally documented changes. These changes included significant bigger risk management functions and policies and procedures documenting “everything”. However, in both countries, it seems that new values supported by the “tone at the top”, areas with limited formal documentation, are the most important management tools.

The study relies on interviews with employees, and the actual changes of administrative controls have not been reviewed. The most important implication is that the situated logics in Iceland driven by external institutional pressure initiated a revolutionary implementation of values bypassing existing routines and formalised rules.

Although the use of management controls has been studied intensively, detailed studies of the banking sector have been lacking. Furthermore, there is limited knowledge of how administrative controls changed in response to the financial crisis.

The aim of this paper is to assess the nature and characteristics of regulatory risk management reporting by private and public sector banks in India.

Using a sample of 38 banks, a content analysis of their Basel II disclosure reports for the year 2012-2013 is examined.

The assessment shows that while the majority of the disclosure across banks focuses on credit risk and capital adequacy ratios, the total quantity of disclosure varies significantly across banks. Of the three broad risk categories (market, credit and operational), operational risk disclosure is the least, with minimal to no disclosure on several key aspects of operational risk, suggesting that operational risk issues are likely to emerge as an area of concern among Indian banks. Further, for the sector as a whole, the authors observe that asset size and net income are positively correlated with the quantity of regulatory disclosure and negatively correlated with the variation of this disclosure, suggesting a possible precautionary behavior on the part of larger and more profitable banks toward excessive scrutiny by the regulators and a regulatory regime in which no institution is too big to fail.

As an exploratory research article to address the characteristics of regulatory disclosure of private and public sector banks in India, it is informative, particularly for those working in the area of banking regulation and compliance. Areas for further research are suggested.