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Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from the result of steady regulation reform, absurd bureaucratic interventions have been sharply reduced. Corruption in the process of rent seeking has decreased too. It is impossible to exercise regulatory authority that infringes on the essence of the freedom of the people because people who live in a democratic society would not accept these absurd practices.

This chapter introduces some key features of the regulatory management system in South Korea as well as the challenges that need to be overcome. In particular, the bureaucracy has worked hard to chip away at past regulations that produce rents for various private interest groups but provide little to society at large. Regulatory quality is tied closely to democracy as maintaining a fair and even playing field for entrepreneurs is a key freedom. Introducing checks and balances into the regulatory system can be an important way to facilitate this goal. The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) facilitated to strengthen the logic of regulatory necessity and the logic of improving regulation which increased the level of its institutionalization.

There has been a significant increase in the number of financial crime regulatory offences (as distinct from traditional fraud offences). The purpose of this paper is to address the question of how should those in positions of control and influence in management take steps to ensure the integrity of those under them and also the relevant conduct of their customers and clients in light of this proliferation.

The work, which is grounded in the field of criminology, uses a combination doctrinal (legal) and qualitative methods. Its emphasis is on mala prohibita (“wrong because they are prohibited”) offences rather than mala in se (“wrong or evil in itself”). The work situates regulatory offences within the broader criminological debate regarding financial crime. It then analyses and reviews the significance of the requirement for certainty in relation to mala prohibita offences. By reference to some Australian offences, the analysis moves to some offences where uncertainty manifests. Finally, the work proposes some practical ways in which those in positions of control and influence may provide certainty to those under them to ensure integrity.

The paper argues that a paramount step for those in positions of control and influence, in taking steps to ensure the integrity of those under them and also the relevant conduct of their customers and clients is to provide certainty with regard to the illicit activities relevant to their organisation to those persons under them. The work proposes some practical ways in which those in positions of control and influence may provide certainty to those under them to ensure integrity.

The work is novel because of its focus on regulatory mala prohibita offences rather than the traditional criminal law or mala in se offences (in relation to which there has been much more discussion).

This paper aims to determine the most possible telecommunications regulatory system for the Palestinian Authority by investigating its institutional foundations. The paper highlights the problem of setting sophisticated institutions in fragile states that do not fully control their resources and investigates possible solution in terms of foreign investments.

The paper follows a qualitative research approach in two parts. The first part examines the institutional endowment framework set by Levy and Spiller and Levy and Spiller but considers critique of the framework. It also investigates institutional problems in fragile states in order to identify similar patters identified in Levy and Spiller framework. The second part focuses on the Palestinian Authority institutional foundations. Data are collected through interviews with key stakeholders of the Palestinian telecommunications sector.

The case of the Palestinian Authority shows a mix of political investment cycles and a genuine attempt of regulatory reforms. Endogenous fragility of the government magnified the effect of corruption and the maintenance of business‐politicians ties. Also, the Palestinian telecommunications sector suffers from exogenous fragility in terms of Israeli control of radio spectrum, international gateway, and importing of equipment. Inability of the Palestinian Authority to invoke GATS BTA conflict resolution mechanism and the crucial role foreign investors played to secure release of spectrum for the second mobile operator indicates the need for the Palestinian Authority to attempt attracting foreign investment. However, foreign investments require regulatory effectiveness that the Palestinian Authority lacks; thus eliminating endogenous fragility becomes a prerequisite to exogenous fragility.

This paper sheds light on problems regarding setting up an institution‐based regulatory system in unstable states. It contributes to the argument that “one size fit all” might not be the answer for some countries, especially fragile ones.

Strong versions of the Precautionary Principle (PP) require regulators to prohibit or impose technology controls on activities that pose uncertain risks of possibly significant environmental harm. This decision rule is conceptually unsound and would diminish social welfare. Uncertainty as such does not justify regulatory precaution. While they should reject PP, regulators should take appropriate account of societal aversion to risks of large harm and the value of obtaining additional information before allowing environmentally risky activities to proceed.

Refers to previous research to suggest that US commercial bank managers use discretion to “manage” regulatory capital and that accounting discretion can influence a bank’s investment opportunity set (IOS) and therefore its share price. Challenges the assumption that using accounting discretion to manipulate contracting variables will only result in a redistribution of wealth. Develops a mathematical model based on Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and uses it to explore the bank manager’s optimal investment in risky assets, the constraint on investment choice produced by minimum regulatory capital requirements and how accounting discretion can reduce this. Shows that regulatory requirements do constrain a bank’s IOS but that discretion (e.g. over loan loss provisions) can only mitigate this if dividend and financing policies depend on the discretionary components.

A large literature studies why firms self-regulate and “signal green.” However, it has ignored that regulators have enforcement discretion, and may act strategically. We fill this gap. We build a game theoretic model of whether a firm should signal its type through substantial self-regulation. We find self-regulation is a double-edged sword: it can potentially preempt legislation, but it can also lead regulators to demand higher levels of compliance from greener firms if preemption fails. We show how self-regulatory decisions depend upon industry characteristics and political responsiveness to corporate environmental leadership. We have made a number of simplifying assumptions. We assume activist groups cannot challenge regulatory flexibility in court, and that regulatory penalties are fixed and are not collected by the regulator. Firms with low compliance costs confront a tradeoff regarding self-regulation. They can blend in with the rest of the industry, and take few self-regulatory steps. This reduces the risk of regulation somewhat, and preserves their ability to obtain regulatory flexibility should regulation be imposed. Alternatively, they can step up with substantial self-regulation. This better mitigates the risk of regulation, but at the risk of signaling low costs and becoming a target for stringent enforcement should regulation pass. Recent work has found negative market reactions to corporate claims of voluntary emissions reductions, despite the conventional wisdom that it “pays to be green.” We offer a new explanation to scholars and managers: regulatory discretion may undermine the ability of industry self-regulation to profitably preempt mandatory regulatory requirements.

Federal regulatory agencies are created by Congress to mitigate particular social problems, such as pollution (the Environmental Protection Agency), discrimination (the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), and anticompetitive conduct (the Federal Trade Commission). These agencies have the delegated authority to issue Rules and Regulations that have the force of law within their respective domains, constrained by the oversight of the President and Congress, and by litigation through the Courts. Many view the extent of such oversight as inefficiently lax, with the result that “missionary” bureaucracies successfully overregulate and inefficiently extend the span of their authority. After describing these concerns, I develop a model of agency bias that extends my earlier work with Canice Prendergast and Topel (1993, 1996) to a regulatory framework. In the model, activist bureaucrats who seek greater regulation are attracted to an agency's mission. Their biases are constrained by the courts, where agency rules and regulations can be challenged, and by oversight from other branches of government. In equilibrium, agencies gain from the exercise of bias even though all parties know it occurs and seek to mitigate its costs. The public sector is overregulated on average. Overregulation is largest when the social problem is least harmful, and when oversight of agency actions is weak. Stronger oversight would reduce the distortionary effect of agency biases. More precise legislative language would provide clearer guidance to the court system, which would reduce deference to biased agency opinions in the formation of regulations.

Neither capture theory, nor neo‐conservative theory and technical failure arguments adequately account for the behaviour of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA) during the 1970s. A framework drawn from organisation theory suggests that regulatory failure is due to a crisis of compliance resources caused by a flawed legislative mandate. Lacking effective compliance mechanisms, regulatory agencies are forced into a bargaining posture rather than an enforcement stance towards industry. This leads to creation of de facto policy which diverges substantially from the original legislative mandate, and this is read as evidence for regulation failure.

The theory of managerial discretion and the direct insights it provides in the understanding of the varying impact strategic and operational actions have on organizational change and business fortunes is an area of research potential underexplored in the UK. This study aims to establish whether the measurement of managerial discretion is constant between the two similar societal corporate frameworks of the UK and the USA listed markets.

The extant managerial discretion ranking model, established in the USA, is empirically assessed for its validity and effectiveness across a sample of high- and low-discretion companies from the FTSE 350.

Using accounting measures, a clear and significant difference is established between UK high and low managerial discretion entities. The results prove to be significant in enabling the differential comparative analysis of the institutional characteristics of corporates.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no study of this nature has been conducted previously in the UK context. While the original model developed in the USA is now several decades old, the UK results reflect similar industry rankings as found originally in the USA, subject to some differences considered to be a result of the changing nature of global business since the 1990s. This study opens a new seam of novel research, which has the potential to uncover, at a granular level, the differential mores and character of management ethics, styles and practices in such issues as organizational change, corporate culture, governance and social responsibility.

The aim of the paper is to examine what type of relationship existed between the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and Riggs Bank in respect of anti-money laundering (AML) compliance. Different commentators have established certain trends in the interaction between a regulator and a regulated entity, and this paper seeks to apply these findings to the relationship between the OCC and Riggs Bank and ascertain where this example lies in the wider domain of regulatory relationships. The paper then examines whether the relationship between the OCC and HSBC United States was similar to the one between the OCC and Riggs Bank or did the regulator adopt a more aggressive supervisory stance. Throughout this work, there is also a focus on the underlying incentives which may adversely affect how a financial institution interacts with a financial regulator and possible solutions to this problem proposed.

Research undertaken by commentators was assessed and their findings as the different regulatory relationships that may develop between a regulator and a regulated entity were applied to the interactions between the OCC and two different financial institutions, namely, Riggs Bank and HSBC United States. Examples from the Senate Subcommittee Reports into the AML failings into these financial institutions were examined through the prism of pre-existing regulatory relationship categories.

The paper ultimately concludes that the OCC was far too passive in its interactions with both Riggs Bank and HSBC United States and that the primary underlying motivations for both institutions were profit- rather than compliance-led.

One of the main limitations to this research was the absence of direct input from either personnel from the banking sector in the USA or of regulators from the same jurisdiction.

This paper proposes a number of practical solutions to recast the relationship between financial regulators and regulated institutions away from the former deferring to the latter to one where the former dictates to the latter.

This paper seeks to examine an actual regulatory relationship between a financial regulator and two different institutions that is reported in the public domain by applying pre-existing academic research on question of regulatory relationships and see how the practice differs or corresponds with the theory.