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Socially responsible investment (SRI) engagement currently performs a variety of supportive regulatory functions such as reframing norms, establishing dialogue and providing resources to improve performance, however corporate responses are voluntary. This chapter will examine the potential gains in effectiveness for SRI engagement in a responsive regulatory regime.

Global warming is a pressing environmental, social and governance (ESG) issue. By using the example of climate change the effectiveness of SRI engagement actors and the regulatory context can be considered. This chapter builds the conceptual framework for responsive regulation of climate change.

SRI engagement may face resistance from corporations due to its voluntary nature and conflict with other goals. Legitimacy and accountability limit the effectiveness of SRI engagement functioning as a voluntary regulatory mechanism. This chapter argues that the effectiveness of SRI engagement on climate change could be enhanced if it served as part of a responsive regulation regime.

Engagement is used by SRIs for ESG issues. A comprehensive regulatory regime could enhance corporate adaptation to climate change through increasing compliance with SRI engagement. The implication for SRI practitioners is that lobbying for a supportive regulatory regime has a large potential benefit.

Responsive regulatory policy involves both support and sanctions to improve compliance, enhancing policy efficiency and effectiveness. There are potentially large net social benefits from utilising SRI engagement in a regulatory regime.

In seeking to re-articulate voluntary and legal approaches this research addresses a gap in the literature on climate change regulation.

An emerging stream of research has identified critical events as spikes in societal interest that increase public attention to firm behavior and can function as exogenous triggers for change. With respect to misconduct, firms vary considerably in how they respond to critical events, and for a visible change in their undesirable behavior to transpire, there needs to be ongoing accumulation of work by social-control agents. While social-control agents are often boundedly rational in their decision-making, most studies have overlooked the ability of critical events to restrict or redirect collective attention among such agents. Drawing on the case of a regulatory agency’s enforcement actions against violations of anti-money laundering regulations by three European banks, we investigate the influence of critical events on social-control agents’ enforcement behavior. This study achieves two goals: first, we identify three types of fieldwide critical events that influence social-control agents’ behavior, and second, we demonstrate that these events may shape the regulatory environment in which firms operate, thus allowing for different organizational responses to enforcement actions. Our findings contribute to the literature on critical events and organizational misconduct.

Networks are by now popular inter-organizational coordination modes. However, there is still much to know regarding how networks are governed and how their governance develops and changes through time.

This paper addresses the research question how does the governance form of networks develops over time by empirically studying the European telecommunications regulatory network using a case study approach.

We find that the network’s governance system is determined by the dialectical tension between network members (National Regulatory Agencies) and an external very influential body (the European Commission).

This tension unifies the group in the classic external conflict–internal cohesion fashion. We also identify a second dialectical tension internal to the network among its members. The tensions are triggered by evaluations carried out by an external actor (the European Commission). In general, the process observed confirms the propositions that predict a formalizing of the governance as the network grows older.

This research is based on a single case, a broader analysis of other regulatory networks among network industries at the European Union level will help researchers to establish a more comprehensive picture on the development of the governance form of this specific subset of goal-directed networks.

Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from the result of steady regulation reform, absurd bureaucratic interventions have been sharply reduced. Corruption in the process of rent seeking has decreased too. It is impossible to exercise regulatory authority that infringes on the essence of the freedom of the people because people who live in a democratic society would not accept these absurd practices.

This chapter introduces some key features of the regulatory management system in South Korea as well as the challenges that need to be overcome. In particular, the bureaucracy has worked hard to chip away at past regulations that produce rents for various private interest groups but provide little to society at large. Regulatory quality is tied closely to democracy as maintaining a fair and even playing field for entrepreneurs is a key freedom. Introducing checks and balances into the regulatory system can be an important way to facilitate this goal. The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) facilitated to strengthen the logic of regulatory necessity and the logic of improving regulation which increased the level of its institutionalization.

Governments throughout the world have sought, and are seeking, to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and, for that purposed, have liberalized their national regulatory frameworks for FDI and established a strong international investment law regime. However, there are signs that, as a result of a number of important developments (which are being discussed in some detail in this chapter), governments are re-evaluating their stance toward FDI, or at least certain types of it. This re-evaluation has found its expression in a number of regulatory changes that may eventually lead to a regime that balances the rights of investors and host countries in a manner that places more emphasis on maintaining policy space for host-country governments while still protecting foreign investors.

In this article, we consider the evolution of the US stock market from the 1770s through the early 20th century. Adopting an institutional lens, we conceive of the stock market as an institutional field constituted by socially constructed cultural logics and myths. We focus on the role of the US government as an actor embedded in the stock market field and sharing in the prevailing field logics. Tracking the dominant logics of the stock market field at different historical periods, we examine how these logics impacted government regulatory action upon the stock market, and how those government regulations affected the subsequent logics of the stock market field. Our research included both quantitative content analysis of articles in historical newspapers and qualitative historical analysis of multiple primary and secondary accounts of stock market problems and solutions across more than 150 years. We document how government regulatory action both reflects and shapes the logics of the stock market field.

This paper presents an institutional theory framework integrating normative, regulatory and cognitive-cultural pillars (Scott, 2008) to depict an interinstitutional system within which professions operate and develop. The pillars highlight the trade-offs between institutions leading to conflicts of interest that also impact the stability of the system and the ability of the profession to self-regulate. To illustrate the framework, the paper uses selected accounting-based professions and their alignment with the institutional pillars. Drawing from examples emerging from the Enron experience, the paper delves more deeply into the regulatory profession and professionals as agents to explore implications of their role in interpreting and in some instances developing institutions. Further, the paper highlights the potential fissures that emerge in a competitive environment between the public interest and market-based cognitive-cultural pillars that tends to erode public trust and weaken the institutional system, leading to the need for increased regulation to maintain the stability of the pillars. Overall, the framework presents a unique perspective on the role of public interest as a component of the normative pillar in aligning and thereby, stabilizing the functioning of the interinstitutional system. This perspective provides a basis to contextualize and articulate a public interest perspective for the accounting profession in an interinstitutional system.

This chapter seeks to explain the effects of actions in investment treaty tribunals against states in the European Periphery. The chapter examines the case of Spain and the multiple actions brought against it due to changes in support structures for the production of solar electricity. The aim of this analysis is to test whether investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) can further the cause of environmental sustainability.

In its opening part the chapter employs a ‘socio-legal’ methodology, showing the links between legal frameworks and the evolution of social and political norms. The chapter then adopts a ‘law and economics’ approach in presenting recent developments seeking to tease out the dynamic between legal changes, economic effects, policy reactions and dispute resolution.

While there is significant uncertainty over the strength of the legal arguments of claimants, it seems possible that they will be successful in claiming compensation from the Spanish government. Nonetheless, a win for the investors is unlikely to reverse the Spanish policy of ending support for renewables due to fiscal constraints. The conclusion is that such actions have a negative impact in terms of promoting the spread of renewables and they inhibit recovery in crisis hit nations.

The chapter offers context on the use of ISDS against the background of the European crisis. This analysis has wider connotations for policy design as it feeds directly into concerns about multilateral agreements under negotiation, such as TTIP.

This is the first comprehensive academic study of the changes in Spanish regulatory frameworks regarding clean energy incentives. It is also the first comprehensive presentation of the actions brought against Spain as a result of these changes.

Explicit barriers to international trade, investment, technology, and financial flows have been reduced considerably. As a result, “macro-liberalization” of international economic transactions has largely run its course. Now, attention needs to shift from international rules for governments to international rules dealing with the various aspects of the international operations of firms – what are called “micro-issues” in this chapter; these include, by way of example, cross-border mergers and acquisitions and international bankruptcies. Such international rules for the principal actors in international production and markets would complement (or replace) the unilateral rules that exist at the national level. International rules would set the direct parameters for certain aspects of the international activities of firms and hence provide the global governance for operating in the global production and trading spaces. This chapter exemplifies for a number of areas the state of rule-making for some micro-issues, analyzes the nature of this rule-making, and suggests a way forward. Developing international micro-regulatory frameworks of rules of the road for the various aspects of the international operations of firms in the globalizing world economy should be the new frontier of international commercial diplomacy.