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This paper aims to provide an overview of different issues related to jurisdictional arbitrage found in general regulatory arbitrage literature and their projection to the specific area of cryptoasset regulation.

By distinguishing any parallel, analogous and neighbouring concepts, this paper attempts to clarify the notion of jurisdictional arbitrage. By discussing certain aspects and effects of three regulatory regimes, BitLicense, 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5) and the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCa), it makes clear that national/State/regional policymakers have already failed to create arbitrage-proof regulatory frameworks by acting exclusively within their jurisdictional limits. Against this background, this paper discusses briefly regulatory competition and international harmonisation as alternative solutions to inappropriate and ineffective national/regional legislative approaches.

Based on a structured theoretical analysis, this paper reaches three important findings. First, academics, international bodies and other commentators use inaccurately the general concept of “regulatory arbitrage” to refer to the specific problem of jurisdictional arbitrage creating in this way an interpretative confusion; second, commentators confuse jurisdictional conflicts with jurisdictional arbitrage; third, the solutions to this regulatory problem can actually be found in its underlying causes.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first specific-issue paper on jurisdictional arbitrage in the context of cryptoasset regulation and aims to trigger further academic discussion on this evolving phenomenon and inform the development of future cryptoasset regulation combatting this problem.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory policy adopted by the Basel Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. The pathology of the new “securitisation framework” is carefully highlighted to facilitate a general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although a simplified sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset securitisation transactions is incorporated, the author does not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework.

This paper aims to offer a comprehensive comparison of the characteristics between banks that securitize and banks that do not and to provide evidence of the capital arbitrage theory of securitization.

First, the fundamental financial similarities and differences between banks that securitize assets and banks that do not participate in the securitization market are tested. Second, variables that help predict whether a bank securitizes assets are analyzed. Third, the determinants of securitization extent in banks that securitize assets are investigated – for general securitization extent and for specific type of asset securitized. Using a sample of 112 banks that securitize different assets, a matched sample of banks that do not securitize based on entity type and size is created. A quarterly panel data set of these banks dating back to 2001 is used.

The results indicate that bank size is a significant determinant of whether a bank securitizes. Further, overall securitization extent is negatively related to the bank's capital ratio (in support of capital arbitrage theory), but this result is primarily driven by credit card securitization.

Utilizing a unique data set of quarterly data from bank Call Reports; the panel data set is large relative to past studies. A matched sample approach was used to test fundamental financial similarities and differences between securitizing and non‐securitizing banks. In addition to aggregated securitization, an examination was made of how different classes of assets affect the banks' risk‐based capital ratios and test the capital arbitrage theory of securitization.

This paper aims to examine the relevance of cross-border activity in the European banking sector, evaluating the role of differences in regulation to explain the level of interest in entering foreign markets.

The sample considers all banks in the European Union (EU 28) existing at year-end 2017, and information about the ultimate owners’ nationality to classify local and foreign banks is collected. The analysis provides a mapping of regulatory restrictions for foreign banks and evaluates how they impact the role of foreign players in the deposit and lending markets.

Results show that the lower are the capital adequacy requirements, the higher are the amounts of loans and deposits offered by non-European Economic Area banks and, additionally, the higher the probability of having a foreign bank operating in the country.

This paper provides new evidence on regulatory arbitrage opportunities in the EU and outlines differences among EU countries not previously studied.

The purpose of this paper is to review the continued development of the “shadow banking” market in the USA, namely, lending to the private middle market, defined as financings of $5-100m to non-public, unrated operating entities or pools of assets with not more than $50m in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

The analysis includes a continued review of an innovative segment of the financial markets and primary evidence from direct participation in four actual cases of private, non-bank lending between 2013 and 2015 and theoretical observations around that data.

Although there have been considerable challenges, historically, in providing credit for small and mid-sized businesses in the USA, the authors show further evidence that private middle market capital is growing (post credit crisis) at a dramatic pace, in part because of excessive constraints placed on the regulated depositary institutions. The authors also explain the nature of the shadow banking innovation and how it is intrinsically linked to “arbitraging” often excessively restrictive banking regulation. The growing US shadow banking market, while providing an important service to middle market companies, may pose a new systemic risk post 2007-2008 credit crisis in the USA.

Any generalization is limited because of the difficulty in extrapolating from a small number of specific case studies and the absence of adequate survey data for the US capital markets and the limited examples examined.

This research calls for additional case studies, including participant observation research that offers a unique close-up view of financial behavior that is often beyond the view of regulators and the public. Data obtained may be useful in providing a deeper, more timely understanding of credit market behavior and contribute to efforts at formal financial modeling as well as the development of practical regulatory regimes.

The shadow credit market is a key source of funding for the global financial system, thus contributing to job creation and economic growth. The authors demonstrate the value of financial innovations and show that shadow credit fills a void left by depository financial institutions, shifting much of the risk from the public to investors. This research increases transparency in the operation of this market, which is extremely important for the industry, the government and the public. The authors offer a modest attempt at understanding credit behavior to avoid a repeat of the 2007/2008 financial crisis.

Direct participation is unique to the firms studied. Value is in developing a general framework to analyze an emerging credit market in advanced economies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the reasons that urge US banks to securitize.

The authors apply a logistic regression model to a sample of 5,394 observations. The dependent variable takes 1 if the bank securitizes and 0 if not. The authors use also, a Heckman selection model to account for the potential dependence between the decision to securitize and the decision of which assets to securitize.

The results indicate that liquidity, credit risk transfer, regulatory capital arbitrage and profitability are the most important factors that drive securitization in the USA. Moreover, the nature of the asset securitized appears to be dependent on the objective that the bank pursues. For funding and capital arbitrage objectives, the bank needs to securitize its mortgage loans. However, for credit risk transfer purposes, it has to opt for a non mortgage securitization. The nature of the asset securitized can thus, be used as a signal for bank’s intentions to securitize.

This study contributes to a better understanding of the reasons that urge banks to securitize. It also presents, using a Heckman selection procedure, a detailed analysis that discriminates between different types of securitization.

Capital is key to any financial institution. Companies in other industries need capital to buy property and production equipment. For financial institutions, the primary function of capital is to cover unexpected credit and market risks losses, because risk of such losses inevitably accompanies a bank’s core business of lending money and making markets. David Rowe, Dean Jovic and Richard Reeves explain why it is crucial for financial institutions to build an advanced economic capital framework and how that plays into current initiatives to implement the Basel II Capital Accord.

Capital matters to most corporations in free markets, but there are differences. Companies in non‐financial industries need equity capital mainly to support funding to buy property and to build or acquire production facilities and equipment to pursue new areas of business. While this is also true for financial institutions, their main focus is somewhat different. Banks actively evaluate and take risks on a daily basis as part of their core business processes. For example, the commercial lending business inherently involves weighing the credit risk of new loans and their associated mitigates. This involves analysis of the credit quality of the underlying obligor, the effectiveness of guarantees, collateral, cross‐default and other forms of credit protection. Today, however, best practice does not stop there. It also is necessary to evaluate the impact of portfolio diversification (e.g. in terms of geographical or industry concentration of exposures) and the degree of correlation among exposures on the bank's balance sheet. Another example is trading activity whereby a bank benefits from high trading volumes (by earning the bid/ask spread) and hopes to gain from proprietary net positions, but must bear some degree of market risk in the process.

This paper aims to highlight the new regulatory framework established by Basel III.

This paper provides a critical review of the existing literature concerning bank supervision while providing an overview of the transition from Basel I to Basel III rules and critical appraisal of the current regulatory framework. Review of the existing literature.

Basel III introduces new measures in favor of bank stability and in order to mitigate the propagation of financial shocks. But on the other hand the new regulatory framework adds an extra burden to banks’ business plans affecting credit policies and thus the real economy. Another issue that is not properly addressed is the rising of financial innovations that are able to pass by the new regulations. Overall Basel III rules are moving to the right direction but need to stay always up-to-date in order to catch up with the modern ever-evolving financial system. Pros and cons. Need for improvement.

The paper presents an up-to-date review of Basel rules with future prospects.

The purpose of this paper is to aid understanding of the changes in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) regulatory strategies after the global financial crisis.

The author uses the credit valuation adjustment (CVA) charge reform as a test case for inquiring whether BCBS has departed from its pre-crisis facilitative regulatory strategy path. The regulatory strategy of the CVA charge is discussed.

The charge exhibits a new regulatory strategy that BCBS has adopted. It seeks to manipulate market structures by imposing risk-insensitive capital charge methodologies.

The paper offers a new heuristic to analyse regulatory initiatives and their significance. The CVA charge has not been subject to a regulatory theory-based analysis in prior literature.