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The purpose of this paper is to examine whether a negative outcome (i.e. a sanction) of an inspection by Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service for an industry-leading company affects the accounting quality of other companies in the same industry. The premise is that when peer companies observe the negative results of such an inspection on a leader in their industry, they will be more concerned about their own risk during a future inspection and more likely to increase their accounting quality.

The authors conduct a mutivariate Oridnary Least Squares (OLS) regression using 11,476 South Korean samples from 2002 to 2016. The study uses ordinary least square regressions to test the hypotheses using discretionary accruals as a proxy for accounting quality.

The authors find that peer companies reduced their discretionary accruals in the next period and that this reduction is amplified according to the severity of the disciplinary action on the industry leader and the materiality of errors in that leader’s financial statements.

This finding contributes to the literature by providing the first evidence of a spillover effect of regulatory inspection on accounting quality that financial reporting sanctions not only affect the overall accounting quality of the sanctioned company but also that of its peers in the same industry. The authors expect this study to lead to future research on the effect of other regulations on industry-wide accounting quality.

This study explores the impact mechanism of corporate digital transformation (CDT) on the quality of accounting information.

Samples of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2020 are used as a research sample. The empirical analysis is based on the ordinary least squares regression model, and mediation and moderation effect models were used in further analysis.

This study finds that CDT enhances accounting information quality by alleviating the agency problem. This positive effect is more significant among firms that exhibit less media coverage, have low industry competition and are not subject to cyber-attack.

This study extends the economic consequences of CDT and enriches the literature on the factors that affect accounting information quality. Further, this study's findings guide the government to actively promote CDT, facilitate the digital upgrading of industries and improve accounting information quality and efficiency in capital markets.

The purpose of this study is to explore the economic impact of financial restatements by major customers on the audit opinion of their suppliers, showing that non-financial information disclosure potentially helps auditors make better assessments.

Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2007 to 2021, the authors aim to find the relationship between customers’ financial restatements and their suppliers’ audit opinions. Heckman selection model, placebo tests and other robustness checks are used as well.

The findings reveal that customers’ financial restatements have a significant effect on the likelihood of suppliers receiving modified audit opinions. This relationship is pronounced when suppliers face a higher level of financial constraints, exhibit poorer accounting conservatism or receive more negative media coverage. Additionally, this effect occurs through increased business risk and information risk, which heightens auditors’ perceived audit risk. Moreover, the study highlights the influence of switching costs, auditor expertise and restatement severity on this relationship.

Risks originating from customers can spread along the supply chain, emphasizing the necessity for auditors to give heightened attention to both the audited firms and their customer information. Moreover, regulators should carefully consider the important impact of customer information disclosures to maximize the protection of the interests of external information users.

This study not only confirms the crucial role of customer information disclosures in annual reports for stakeholders and auditors but also contributes to the existing literature on customer–supplier relationships.

This study reviews the existing literature on the U.S. peer review system and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection system to assess our knowledge of audit regulation. The traditional self-regulatory system of the accounting profession came to an end, in 2002, when the PCAOB was established to oversee the audit firms of publicly traded companies. This paper contributes to the controversial debate about self-regulation versus independent regulation by analyzing, categorizing, and comparing the research findings on the peer review system and the PCAOB system along three dimensions: the validity of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections, the recognition of reviews and inspections by decision-makers (e.g., investors, bankers, committees), and the effect of reviews and inspections on audit quality. Synthesizing the research on the regulatory regimes suggests that the notion of external quality control, both through peer reviews and government inspections, is positively linked with an improvement of audit quality. At the same time, the analysis indicates that external users do not seem to recognise peer review and PCAOB reports as very useful instruments for decision-making, which is in line with an identified rather skeptical perception of the audit profession on reviews and inspections. Overall, this study reveals that although the academic literature on peer review and PCAOB inspection is extensive it has not produced definitive conclusions concerning various aspects of audit regulation. This paper shows how this blurred picture is due to conflicting research findings, the dominance of the quantitative research paradigm, and unchallenged assumptions within the literature, and concludes by proposing research opportunities for the future.

The purpose of this paper is to extend research on contemporary forms of oversight surrounding professional work in an era characterized by increased skepticism regarding professional claims and the rise of independent regulatory authorities. The authors investigate the interplay between key actors as well as the shifting role boundaries in a distinct regulatory space, following the introduction of a new public oversight framework.

The analysis draws on the notions of regulatory space and boundary work to better understand the development of independent audit oversight in France. The authors adopted an interpretive approach to conduct a longitudinal case study based on 33 interviews and documentary data produced from 2003 to 2012.

The study provides a narrative of the boundary work carried out by the French audit profession as it tried to reinvent its role in the new regulatory order. In the case, boundary work engendered a hybrid regulatory pattern, named “co-regulation,” reflecting both the logic of independent regulation and the logic of self-regulation. The main consequence of this is that zones of mutual involvement were constructed – thereby suggesting that to become a reality, independent oversight of professional work needs to accept some operational dependence from professionals.

The study illustrates the elusiveness of boundaries surrounding actors’ role within contemporary forms of professional regulation. More generally, hybrid development suggests that professions are proactive and, to some extent, successful when it comes to developing alliances and manipulating changes within their regulatory space.

Mandatory auditor firm rotation (mandatory rotation) has been a controversial issue in the United States for many decades. Mandatory rotation has been considered at various times as a means of improving auditor independence. For example, in the United States, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has considered mandatory rotation as a solution to the independence problem (PCAOB, 2011) and the European Parliament approved legislation that will require mandatory rotation in the near future (Council of European Union, 2014). The concept of implementing a mandatory rotation policy has been encouraged by some constituents of audited financial statements and rejected by other constituents of audited financial statements. Although there are apparent pros and cons of such a policy, the developmental process of such a policy in this country has not necessarily been an open-democratic, objective process. Universal mandatory rotation may or may not be the ideal solution; however, an open-democratic, objective process is needed to facilitate the development of a solution that considers the needs of all major stakeholders of audited financial statements – not simply accounting firms and public companies, but also investors. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine key issues relating to mandatory rotation and to encourage and stimulate future research and ongoing dialogue regarding this issue, in spite of efforts by certain constituents to silence the issue. This paper provides an overview of the various reasons, including practical, theoretical, political, and self-motivated reasons, why a mandatory rotation policy has not been implemented in the United States in order to address the potential conflict of interest between the auditor and client. This paper will also discuss how some deliberations of mandatory rotation have been flawed. The paper concludes with a summary of key issues along with two approaches for regulators, policy makers, and academics to consider as ways to improve the process and address auditor independence. The authors are not advocating for any specific solution; however, we are advocating for a more objective, unified approach and for the dialogue regarding auditor rotation to continue.

We investigate the effect of the PCAOB’s Part II report on annually inspected firms’ audit fees and audit quality. The PCAOB replaced the peer review auditor program with an independent inspection of audit firms. Upon completion of each inspection, the PCAOB issued inspection reports that include a public portion (Part I) of identified audit deficiencies, and (in most cases) a nonpublic portion (Part II) of identified quality control weaknesses. The Part II report is only made public when the PCAOB deems that remediation was insuffcient after at least 12 months have passed. Starting around the time of the 2007 Deloitte censure (Boone et al., 2015), the PCAOB shifted from a soft synergistic approach to an antagonistic approach, such that Part II reports were imminent, despite delays that ultimately led to their release one to four years later than expected. Our study spans the period from 2007 to 2015, and examines the effect on audit fees and audit quality at the earliest date that the Part II report could have been released – 12 months after the Part I report was issued. We find that following the 12 month period, that annually inspected audit firms eventually lost reputation by lower audit fees, while they concurrently made remedial efforts to increase the quality of their client’s financial reporting quality (abnormal accruals magnitude and restatements). However, three years after the Part II report was actually released, audit fees increased.

For the past 10 years, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has operated as an independent overseer of public company audits. Over 70 percent of PCAOB studies have been published since 2010, evidencing the increasing relevance of PCAOB-related research in recent years. Our paper reviews the existing literature on the PCAOB’s four primary functions – registration, standard-setting, inspections, and enforcement. In particular, we examine PCAOB registration trends and evaluate the effects of PCAOB registration requirements on the issuer audit market, as well as discuss the relative costs and benefits (e.g., auditor behavior changes, improvements in audit quality, auditor perceptions) of the 16 auditing standards the PCAOB passed in its first 10 years of operation. Further, we summarize the literature’s findings on the effects of the PCAOB inspection process on various facets of audit quality. Finally, we analyze the research concerning the PCAOB’s enforcement actions to determine how markets have responded to sanctions against auditors and audit firms. We contend that understanding and reviewing the effects of the PCAOB’s activities are important to future audit research because of the PCAOB’s authority over and oversight of the issuer audit profession. We also identify PCAOB-related research areas that have not been fully explored and propose several research questions intended to address these research areas.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the transition from self-regulation to heteronomy has changed the gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors.

This study analyzes publicly held companies in the USA between 1999 and 2012 using univariate analysis, multivariate analysis and quantile regression analysis. Audit quality is measured with discretionary accruals.

This study shows an insignificant difference in audit quality between the clients of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors after Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter, PCAOB) began its operations. In the analysis of the effects of PCAOB inspections on the audit quality of audit firms that are inspected annually and triennially, the findings show that the inspections have more positive effects when carried out annually. This suggests that the frequency of inspection is positively associated with audit quality. Overall, these results provide evidence that recent improvements in audit quality have been caused by changes in regulatory standards.

The paper provides three major original contributions. First, the authors add to the literature on audit quality by further demonstrating a reduced gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms due to heteronomy. Secondly, this study contributes to the debate as to whether independent inspections on audit firms are beneficial or not and suggests that the PCAOB inspections help increase audit quality. Finally, the results of this work contribute to the growing literature examining discretionary accruals.