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Regulation in its broader sense, means the imposition of restrictions on the various sectors of an economy. For example, prior to 1986, regulatory controls were the main approach to macroeconomic management in Nigeria. On the contrary, deregulation aims at the removal of controls, thereby enhancing competition and efficiency in the allocation of resources in the economy. Since 1987, deregulation has been the central framework for macroeconomic management in Nigeria. It is often argued that deregulation is associated with high levels of unemployment. Thus, analyses developments in the Nigerian labour market during the period, 1980‐93. Available data show that Nigeria’s unemployment rate declined marginally under deregulation as opposed to regulation. Despite this development, unemployment still remains a critical issue in Nigeria today. Also shows that even industrial relations deteriorated under regulatory controls. Consequently, concludes that the labour market in Nigeria did stabilize in the period 1987‐93, as opposed to the period 1980‐86.

The purpose of this paper is to advance a conceptual analytical framework to help explain employment regulation as a dynamic process shaped by institutions and actors. The paper builds on and advances regulatory space theory.

The paper analyses the literature on regulatory theory and engages with its theoretical development.

The paper advances the case for a broader and more inclusive regulatory approach to better capture the complex reality of employment regulation. Further, the paper engages in debates about the complexity of employment regulation by adopting a multi-level perspective.

The research proposes an analytical framework and invites future empirical investigation.

The paper contends that existing literature affords too much attention to a (false) regulation vs deregulation dichotomy, with insufficient analysis of other “spaces” in which labour policy and regulation are formed and re-formed. In particular, the proposed framework analyses four different regulatory dimensions, combining the legal aspects of regulation with self-regulatory dimensions of employment regulation.

Mises (1949[1963], p. 692) explains that market-failure justifications for state actions, such as economic regulation “ascribe to the state not only the best intentions but also omniscience.” He then points out that neither assumption is valid: government is not benevolent since both, those who are employed by the state and those who demand state actions, have subjective self-interests, and it is not all knowing since knowledge is widely dispersed and the cost of coordination is infinitely high, particularly without market profits and prices as coordinating mechanisms. Furthermore, Mises suggests that dropping either assumption undermines the conclusions that state intervention is necessarily desirable even if some sort of market failure is actually identified. Austrian economists in the Mises tradition have tended to focus on the knowledge problem in their challenges to regulation, however. Many Austrians obviously recognize the interest problem, of course, but they often assume it away in order to illustrate that government interference with markets is not desirable even if it is well intended. In contrast, public-choice analysis tends to focus on the interest problem as source of government failure, although some public-choice analysts also obviously recognize the knowledge problem. Indeed, this difference in perspective is so pronounced that Ikeda (1997, p. 240) explicitly distinguishes between Public Choice and Austrian political economy by suggesting that the Austrian approach assumes benevolence on the part of government officials, while the public-choice approach assume narrow interests.¹ Ikeda (1997, p. 150) also suggests that the separation of these two approaches is justified because “Austrian political economy and public choice are each capable of standing on their own [so] public-theorists…find it optimal simply to continue to pursue their research along the line of either the former or the latter approaches.” The following presentation questions this assertion. Instead, both assumptions should be dropped, and the resulting integrated Austrian-public-choice model should be expanded to include assumptions about the relationships between regulations, property rights security, and both market and political behavior.²

The purpose of this paper is to focus on top management demographic characteristics, business strategy, and firm performance in the major US airlines.

The relationships between management characteristics and business strategy are examined as well as the business strategy – firm performance relationships before and after airline deregulation. This is a longitudinal study (1972‐1995) that includes data from publicly available sources. Pooled cross‐sectional time series regression analyses were used with fixed‐effects to test specific hypotheses. The management demographics include age, tenure, education, and functional background. Business strategy was measured as low cost, differentiation, and scope. The study includes three measures of firm performance.

There were significant management demographics‐business strategy relationships in the deregulatory period. There were also significant business strategy‐firm performance relationships with deregulation.

This is a longitudinal study of management, strategy, and performance of the airlines from regulation to deregulation. It has performance implications for the major air carriers that are of interest to academics and managers.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show that the effects of industry regulation on worker earnings are reconsidered using a wider array of industries and differentiating between industry‐opposed and industry‐supported legislation. Design/methodology/approach – Primary data from the Current Population Surveys are used in this paper with data on regulatory legislation from Cahan and Kaempfer. A difference‐in‐difference approach is used to compare wage changes pre‐ and post‐legislation, in industries with opposed or supported legislation, with those unaffected by legislation. The relative contribution of union and non‐union wage changes to the overall wage changes are also examined. Findings – The paper finds that regulatory legislation opposed by the industry did not affect earnings growth relative to industries not subject to regulatory legislation. Legislation supported by the industry led to slower relative earnings growth. Union wage differentials increased in industries with legislation regardless of industry opposition or support. Relative earnings declined among non‐union workers in industries that received legislation. The effects vary across industries with the results suggesting that some legislation led to increased product competition, while some legislation affected labor market competition. Research limitations/implications – The paper shows that data on regulatory legislation are limited by the lack of detailed information. For example, it is only known whether legislation was passed that was opposed or supported by the industry. Future research should replicate this analysis with more complete data. Practical implications – Also the paper sees that regulatory legislation does not need to completely regulate or deregulate an industry to affect workers. As such, policy makers should consider the effects of proposed legislation on workers in the affected industries. Originality/value – This paper directly tests whether the wage effects from regulation differ depending on industry opposition or support for the legislation. As such, this paper is innovative because it differentiates between different types of legislation in examining the effect of legislation on wages and the union differentials.

Although policy makers strengthen the necessity of “deregulation”, discussions about deregulation vs regulation in Europe still seem to be characterized by a lack of sophistication and require a more differentiated picture of specific forms of deregulation. As a consequence, the analysis of new educational governance approaches should consider the local actor's interpretation of new roles and new responsibilities. Relating actions and reactions of school leaders to their formal environment should lead to more contextual patterns of responsiveness. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors investigate, based on a survey among Cypriot school leaders, whether school autonomy needs deregulation, or regulation towards autonomy, respectively. At the time of research the school system of Cyprus could be characterized as a “centralized” system and hence represented a suitable field of study. Using a factor model followed by a cluster analysis the paper explores the school leaders’ profiles of operative and perceived autonomy in different fields of governance issues and identify different types of leadership.

The authors find that the autonomy school leaders experience is not necessarily related to a “defined” degree of autonomy which is prescribed by educational law and driven by concepts of new public management. Their “perceived” autonomy is also due to factors which can be located at a rather individual level.

The findings provide insight into principals’ motives to adopt certain styles of leading schools, quite independently from new measures of educational governance. The authors conclude that greater emphasis on systematic support programmes may prepare school principals for gains of autonomy as well as for potential sources of conflict.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Looks at the 2000 Employment Research Unit Annual Conference held at the University of Cardiff in Wales on 6/7 September 2000. Spotlights the 76 or so presentations within and shows that these are in many, differing, areas across management research from: retail finance; precarious jobs and decisions; methodological lessons from feminism; call centre experience and disability discrimination. These and all points east and west are covered and laid out in a simple, abstract style, including, where applicable, references, endnotes and bibliography in an easy‐to‐follow manner. Summarizes each paper and also gives conclusions where needed, in a comfortable modern format.

The purpose of this viewpoint, case study analysis paper is to assist in understanding how history repeats itself in the case of insider trading, even with regulatory intervention.

Qualitative methodology approach, using interviews of some of the watchdogs of Wall Street (SEC, US Attorney's Office) during the insider trading scandals of the 1980s. Key themes including ambiguity of money, regulation, and the networks of financial institution professionals are discussed.

Findings suggest that regulation is difficult if nearly impossible, in the face of limited resources and regulatory ambiguity.

This paper suggests a network approach to regulators, corporate decision makers, and academics in order to understand the structure of insider trading conspiracies.

Continues the tradition of qualitative research in a niche of white-collar crime that is more often approached with strict statistic analysis. Value is that the data are allowed to “speak for themselves” and patterns of structure are allowed to emerge without prior biases of hypotheses.