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The first well-known liner shipping conference was created for the UK/Calcutta trade in 1875. However, the European Union (EU) decided to abolish repeal the liner conferences system with effect from October 18 2008. This paper aims to study the governing regulations on shipping conferences in Taiwan along with investigating the impact on the EU to repeal conferences. The regulation on liner conferences in the USA is also briefly referred.

Literature review and questionnaire survey are used to conduct the study. This paper reviews important literature relating to the EU to repeal the conferences system and its impact on liner market competition to/from European trade routes, with discussions on the US and Taiwan regulations on shipping conferences. Questionnaire survey data, collected from published report and this research present shippers’ and carriers’ responses on the changes of regulations on liner conferences.

Shippers are strongly supporting the repeal of the conferences system. Academic research results basically reveal that the liner market will be more competitive in the trades to/from the USA and the EU after the repeal of the conferences. For Taiwan, its regulations are rather simple and loosely control over the liner conferences; therefore, if the shipping administration intends to enhance the inspection of the agreements of conferences and strategic alliances, more detailed regulations should be prepared, and the provisions of the EU or USA would be a good reference.

Through the discussions on the legal treatments of shipping conferences from the USA, the EU and Taiwan perspectives, this paper provides shipping researchers with not only a clear evolution of the liner conferences but also a deep understanding of the impact to repeal the conferences on liner market competition.

This paper reviews important literature and related legislations on liner conferences including the USA, the EU and Taiwan. The different responses on the EU to repeal the conferences system from shippers and carriers are discussed. The impact on liner market competition is presented.

Antitrust exemptions to shipping alliances in the liner shipping sector have prevailed for many years. This study aims to examine anti-competition of ocean shipping alliances from a legal perspective of the USA, the European Union (EU) and People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Adopting the standard “doctrinal approach to legal research and analysis” in legal literatures, this paper reviews landmark court cases and legislations in the USA relating to shipping conference system from its beginning to its erosion, followed by its latest transition to non-ratemaking agreements, with discussions on the EU and some PRC treatments on shipping conferences.

Although antitrust exemptions to shipping conferences in the liner shipping sector were eliminated in the trades to/from the USA and the EU, there is a lack of evidence of the deterioration found in the viability of liner shipping carriers in both parts of the world trades. For the USA, shipping alliances will shift the focus to sharing resources for improvement of collective operational efficiencies, whereas the shipper groups in the EU have worried that a protected system of sharing information may lead to price fixing conducts among the carriers.

Through the discussions on the legal treatments of shipping conferences from the USA, the EU and PRC perspectives, this paper provides legal researchers with not only a new research direction on raising collective operational efficiencies through resource sharing but also an insight into shifting their research focus from purely price determination to the area of merger.

This paper reviews landmark court cases and related legislations about the treatments of different regulatory regimes, including the USA, the EU and PRC, to explore the illegitimacy of anti-competition conducts in ocean shipping alliances.

Slow steaming has been implemented by the main liner shipping companies since 2008. The reduction in vessel speed affects fuel consumption and should be reflected within the fuel surcharges paid by shippers. The purpose of this paper is to assess if this was the case for the main outbound European container trades from the port of Antwerp.

Through an extensive analysis of liner service characteristics, fuel costs and fuel surcharges this paper provides an answer to three research questions: how significant are slow steaming practices in container liner shipping?; what is the impact of slow steaming on fuel consumption and liner service characteristics?; and to what extent has slow steaming changed the relation between fuel costs and fuel surcharges imposed on shippers by shipping lines?

It is found that slow steaming practices are not implemented on all trade routes, but depend on operational aspects such as distances covered and the characteristics of the ships deployed. While it could be expected that the reduction in vessel speed should be reflected within the fuel surcharges paid by shippers, the empirical results show that on most trade routes slow steaming did not fundamentally change the relation between fuel costs and fuel surcharges imposed on shippers by shipping lines.

The paper has practical relevance to actors active in global ocean freight logistics, particularly since its results can be used as input for ongoing debates between shipping lines and shippers on pricing and surcharges in container shipping.

This paper is the first extensive study that makes an explicit link between slow steaming practices and fuel surcharge policies of shipping lines. A method was developed to estimate fuel consumption levels of ships at various speeds and to link the associated fuel costs to real‐life bunker surcharges imposed on shippers by shipping lines.

Since the 2010s, market conditions for container shipping companies have been deteriorating owing to decreasing container cargo trade and increasing supply capacity. This study aims to contribute to the empirical literature on the container shipping industry market structure. Specifically, this study aims to investigate the extent of market competition.

This study analyzes the market structure and evaluates the market power of shipping companies through a non-structural test.

The H-statistic for the entire period of 2004–2018 was 0.37, which is significantly different from zero. This indicates the absence of monopoly pricing throughout the entire period. For the time-phased estimates, the H-statistic between 2004 and 2008 is 0.15, which is not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the H-statistic from 2009 to 2018 was 0.40, which differs significantly from zero.

As the Far East Freight Conference had released tariffs and charge rates by item for container shipping routes, monopolistic pricing is said to have appeared until the European Union abolished the European Economic Community (No. 4056/86) in 2008, before the economic crisis. However, this study indicates that pricing in the container shipping industry has been distinctly non-monopolistic; further, competition seems to have intensified since 2008. Industry competitiveness is of interest not only to academics but also to practitioners, including policymakers, especially when considering competition policies.

The EU Commission's radical proposals to change the rule set controlling the implementation of Article 81 and 82 in antitrust matters are critically explored in this paper. This includes the Commission's reasoning behind the proposed changes, particularly the assertion that it will lead to a more effective application of community antitrust instruments, thus helping to safeguard the Single Market. The aim of the proposals is to establish a network of cooperating enforcers applying Articles 81 and 82 in an effective and uniform way, with the Commission guaranteeing this. The proposed decentralisation of antitrust applications stands in marked contrast to merger control at the EU level, with the Commission retaining exclusive jurisdiction over mergers having a community dimension. However, the Commission, in the longer term, particularly in the light of enlargement, is much more likely to rethink the architecture of EU merger control.

The European Commission’s competence to vet mergers at the Community level is primarily derived from the Merger Control Regulation (MCR) 1989, amended 1997, which established a concentration architecture based on separate, non‐overlapping jurisdictional spheres for member states and the Commission, with the Commission alone having jurisdiction over concentrations with a competition concern which potentially have a Community impact. Under the MCR, Community impact is determined by the two Community Dimension (CD) tests employing a numerical form‐based approach. The paper examines the Commission’s 2000 report on aspects of the MCR, particularly the appropriateness of the key CD tests in guaranteeing that all concentrations with a Community impact are centralised to the Commission, while those which are national in impact are dealt with at the member state level. It reveals that the tests are ineffective and undermine the goal of the concentration architecture. A streamlined single CD test is advanced and a radical alternative is put forward – based not on separate jurisdictional spheres but where the Commission and member states competition authorities form a network of co‐operation to regulate concentrations.

“Re‐shaping” policy provides the opportunity for an inclusive approach to decision‐making in dialogue with existing member‐states and anticipated new members. The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which the governance process that underpinned the modernisation of EC competition policy (Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, effective 1 May 2004) can be considered inclusive.

A multi‐level genre is used to describe EC governance with respect to the implementation of revised competition policy. The process is evaluated through the levels of involvement of the key stakeholders, i.e. firms (national, European and non‐European), consumers, national competition authorities (NCAs), the European Commission, and member states. The main explanatory vehicles relied on are institutionalism governance, policy network analysis and inter‐governmentalist models of governance.

Multi‐level governance was apparent as member states established national working parties and committees that paralleled similar consultation in Brussels. Good governance was evident through the democratic process that involved interest groups in policy network analysis. Ultimate authority, however, remains vested in the Commission, vouchsafed through legislation and institutionalism.

This paper contributes to the small but growing literature that illustrates the complex interaction between governance and implementation of public policy.