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Why did the United States experience a housing and mortgage market boom and bust in the 2000s, while analogous Canadian markets were relatively stable? Both US and Canadian markets are replete with government interventions. In this paper, I account for the US and Canada’s different experiences by arguing that government interventions are not created equal. Some government interventions prevent market participants from pursuing actions that ex ante are reckoned beneficial. Alternatively, other interventions lead to the pursuit of actions that turn out to be costly ex post. It is the latter type that we expect to manifest in crises. The US case is one where government interventions in the mortgage markets led to actions that appeared ex ante beneficial but were revealed to be costly ex post. Alternatively, Canada’s mortgage market was and remains essentially a regulated oligopoly. Regulatory capture makes for a sclerotic market that likely imposes costs on Canadian borrowers in the forms of limited financing options and higher interest rates. However, this sclerosis also lends itself to stability. This market structure made the Canadian mortgage market relatively insusceptible to a bubble.

Examines the pioneering work of the European Commission, with the support of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of First Instance (ECFI), to apply the merger control of regulation (MCR) to situations of collective as well as to single dominance. Reveals that the Commission first applied the notion of collective dominance in the Nestlé Perrier merger in 1992 but that the legality of this practice was questionable, given that the express wording of the MCR does not mention the notion. The legal challenge arose from the takeover of Mitteldeutsche Kali AG by Kali und Salz with the landmark judgment favouring the stance of the Commission – the MCR does encompass situations of collective dominance. Examines why the court reached this decision, particularly given that the Advocate General’s opinion was exactly the opposite.

Tourism & Hospitality

Post graduate

The South African-based Sun International Group (SI) develops, operates and manages hotels, resorts and casinos. In its mission statement, SI describes itself as a “leisure group offering superior gaming, hotel and entertainment experiences”. In 1984, SI was listed in the travel and leisure sector on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. SI is looking for growth opportunities.

Strategic options analysis to create new market spaces. Practical application of blue ocean thinking frameworks.

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Discusses telecommunication regulatory agencies, which have multiplied worldwide. Proclaims the new regulators can win effective independence and position themselves as exemplars of good governance. Sums up that good regulatory design is never fully completed, in the same way that a computer system’s firewall is never completed.

Global trading of oil and gas means international markets are more open than at any previous time. As a result, the oil industry oligopoly is being deconstructed and vertically integrated MNCs are being reconstituted to address this fact. In parallel, emergent MNCs in the form of National Oil Companies are now entering the competitive arena. Traditionally dominant MNCs are adopting new operating models focused on technological and financial strength. We examine changes in the once-dominant industry paradigm of vertical integration using several theoretical lenses. These include transaction-cost economics, the resource-based view and institution theory. The giant MNCs operated globally for decades and are an important variant of the MNCs studied in strategic management literature. We suggest the current theoretical models do not explain sufficiently how these MNCs respond to current changes and by using industry observation we contribute to modernization of this literature.

The market for enterprise telecommunications has benefitted greatly from liberalisation over the last quarter century. This paper seeks to review the evolving engagement of enterprises with markets and with policy processes.

The paper presents a review of the literature and of the experiences of telecommunications user groups, both national and international, focusing on leased lines, roaming and trans‐national service provision.

The paper reveals that telecommunications user groups have declined as enterprises have been satisfied by the level of competition on markets for integrated information communication technology (ICT) services. There is less engagement in policy and regulatory processes.

The secondary nature of many sources points to the need for the collection and analysis of market developments and the experiences of individual enterprises.

This paper brings together material on enterprise telecommunications, a subject often lost to consumer applications.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the range of benchmarking applications that can be used in a principal‐agent relationship setting often found in the public sector.

Collection and critical analysis of secondary data from relevant publications addressing applications of benchmarking in the public sector. Extraction of knowledge from several research projects where the authors have been involved in studying and developing benchmarking approaches for different public sector organizations. Induction of new theory about the use of benchmarking in principal‐agent relationships in the public sector, grounded through empirical evidence from case studies.

A number of new approaches to benchmarking in the public sector have been identified and described, some of which are already used in real life cases, others which need further development before being implemented. All of these can introduce benefits to both principals and agents involved in such benchmarking efforts.

The paper explores benchmarking applications that are almost exclusively relevant in a public sector setting, although some of them might be adapted to certain private sector conditions.

Whereas most work on benchmarking in the public sector tend to view only improvement‐oriented, voluntary benchmarking as relevant and useful, this paper demonstrates how many different imposed benchmarking schemes with other purposes can be useful.

Several high-profile prescription drugs have been withdrawn from the U.S. market in the last decade, yet there is no direct evidence of how a prescription drug withdrawal affects consumers’ use of remaining drugs within the same therapeutic class. In theory, remaining drugs in the therapeutic class could enjoy competitive benefits or suffer negative spillovers from the withdrawal of a competing drug. Using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we test for spillovers following prescription drug withdrawals in six therapeutic classes between 1997 and 2001. Results vary, but we find stronger evidence of negative spillovers than competitive benefits. We conclude with a discussion of the characteristics of drugs and classes that may influence how remaining drugs are affected by a withdrawal in the class.

INTRODUCTION During the past dozen years a relatively large theoretical literature has grown out of the models proposed by Averch‐Johnson (2) and, to a lesser extent, Wellisz (90). Averch‐Johnson (here‐after A‐J) pointed out the now famous overcapitalization effect‐that a monopoly subject to rate of return regulation has an incentive to use more than the cost minimizing value of capital. The A‐J model was at first regarded as simply a theoretical explanation of what was long thought to be a significant cost of regulation. After languishing in this state for several years, the model achieved some popularity as a vehicle for theoretical explorations of various aspects of rate regulation. To date, the A‐J model has given rise to nearly forty papers on what has come to be called “the theory of regulatory constraint.”

The debate over whether or not to allow the sale of human organs is compelling enough to warrant discussion. A literature review revealed much ethical discussion, but little discussion was found on economic outcomes related to donors and selling human organs. It was demonstrated in the literature how an increased organ supply will benefit recipients. If allowing the sale of organs is the way to increase the organ supply for the benefit of recipients, then, in order to demonstrate that donors will not be exploited, it must be demonstrated how, and if, such sales would benefit those donors. This study explores whether or not one should sell human organs. Using basic models, this study develops economic scenarios and outcomes related to the selling of human organs with particular focus on pricing and profitability in relation to donor benefit. Theoretical outcomes show that the donor will not benefit in the long run.