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In July 2008 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published three proposals relating to the use of credit ratings in its rules and forms. The proposals were designed to address concerns that the misuse of credit ratings may have contributed to the current crisis. The SEC sought market feedback regarding the effect the removal of credit rating references may produce on the markets.

This article examines the use of ratings by various market constituents, analyzes the details of the SEC proposals, and reviews the provided feedback. The main finding is that the majority of the market participants opposed the SEC proposals. Fiduciaries and regulated entities are looking to regulators to offer a common measure of risk, stable, accurate and free of conflict of interests.

This chapter assesses the impact of socially responsible investing (SRI) in terms of its role in governance. Governance refers to the rules, incentives, institutions and philosophies for coordinating, controlling and supervising behaviour. The SRI sector purports to be a mechanism of market governance, such as through its codes of conduct and targeting of individual companies by engagement or divestment.

This subject-matter of the chapter is evaluated primarily through a conceptual and theoretical argument rather than empirical research.

Social investors’ capacity to ‘govern’ the market is constrained by gaps and deficiencies in the legal frameworks for the financial economy. Fiduciary law controlling institutional investors is the most important element of this governance framework. The SRI movement is starting to broaden its agenda and strategies to include advocacy for regulatory reform. But the SRI industry has devoted attention to its own voluntary codes of conduct, such as the UNPRI, which do not yet provide a sufficiently comprehensive or robust substitute for official regulation.

Paradoxically, whereas SRI once stood for taking action through the financial economy when governments had failed to act, the sector is also somewhat dependent on the state to provide an empowering governance framework. But state regulation itself may be strengthened by partnership with the SRI industry, such as by utilising its codes of conduct to supplement official legal standards.

The chapter deepens insights into the relationship between the SRI sector as a largely voluntary movement and its legal governance through the state or the market.

Making law in America is not a simple task. It can be legislated by Congress, enforced by the executive, interpreted by the courts, and augmented by a massive body of rules created by administrative agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) (Dodd-Frank was passed) with an eye to preventing future financial crises. Four years later, many details of Dodd-Frank have yet to be finalized as the SEC is still in the process of developing the regulations that the legislation required them to create. Even once the regulations are finalized by the SEC, the regulations will be challenged by various parties in the courts. The regulations will be either upheld or rejected. Those that are upheld will then face numerous challenges when applied in specific cases, while those rejected will have to be redone all over again. The process of developing these regulations is cumbersome and attracts many of the special interests that were present in the legislative phase of Dodd-Frank and who will also be present in the litigation phases of testing Dodd-Frank in the courts. This paper focuses on the requirement that investment advisors and broker-dealers be deemed as owing fiduciary duties to their clients as a case study for the entangled political economy theory. The paper shows how the development of a simple rule such as whether these fiduciary duties should be owed or not requires years of back and forth between the legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial branches.

Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are one of the most innovative financial products listed on exchanges. As reflected by the size of the market, they have become popular among both retail and institutional investors. The original ETFs were simple and easy to understand; however, recent products, such as leveraged, inverse, and synthetic ETFs, are more complex and have additional dimensions of risk. The additional risks, complexity, and reduced transparency have resulted in heightened attention by regulators. This chapter aims to increase understanding of how ETFs function in the market and can potentially impact financial stability and market volatility.

We discuss the evolution of ETFs, growing regulatory concerns, and the various responses to these concerns.

We find that concerns related to systemic risk and excess volatility, suitability for retail investors, lack of transparency and liquidity, securities lending and counterparty exposure are being addressed by both market participants and policy makers. There has been a shift toward multiple counterparties, overcollateralization, disclosure of collateral holdings and index holdings.

The analysis contained in this chapter provides an understanding of the role of ETFs in the financial markets and the global economy that should be valuable to market participants, investors, and policy makers.

We examine the relationship between how mutual fund sponsors configure their board(s) of directors and the performance of the funds under a particular board's purview. Fund sponsors utilize either one board to oversee all the funds within a fund family or multiple boards that oversee one fund or a subset of the family's funds. Our results suggest that fund families – that is, sponsors – that use multiple boards have significantly higher objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess returns. But, there are no significant differences in the objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess expenses. These results are consistent with the argument that multiple boards provide superior monitoring.

Russia's size – both in terms of population and geography, spanning 11 time zones, 89 oblasts (states or regions) and autonomous republics and its privatization program, encompassing some 100,000 small-scale enterprises, 25,000 medium to large firms, and 300 or so of its largest firms, made its privatization program the largest sale/transfer of assets conducted among the transition economies, with the possible exception of China. Comparisons by many of the program's critics, and there are many, to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech republic are invidious, especially the latter two countries whose populations are similar to just that of greater Moscow.

This chapter aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the turnover tax system in South Africa. The objective of the study was to identify companies from the SARS-NT Panel that may qualify for turnover tax in order to calculate and compare turnover tax liabilities to alternative forms of taxation within the South African context. The results showed that turnover tax is not necessarily beneficial for most small businesses and the possible reasons are also highlighted.