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Many megacities in the Global South have developed without any systematically regularized modernization processes. Therefore, urbanization is accompanied by the inappropriate level of economic and social opportunities. This macro-structural constraint of urbanization contributes to frame the patterns and features of many location-based poverty and inequality.

Dhaka followed the similar trajectory of development without creating substantial opportunities for its underclass, poor, and marginalized citizens. This unequal pattern of development influences the disproportionate environmental burdens of the marginalized people, who have little or no voice in the urban decision-making process. People experience unequal environmental inequality through their differential exposures to poor housing and/or living conditions, along with a lack of access to safe drinking water, sewage, adequate waste disposal systems, and so on.

In this context of urban injustice, this environmental justice movement (EJM) is an evidence of demanding basic rights among the unprivileged citizens. To some extent, this is a response to the state’s structural failure to provide urban environmental services (and social justice) to majority of its poor citizens.

Evidence suggests that in context of fragile democracy, an EJM can generate opportunities for progressive urban politics as well as contribute to redistributive development opportunities for its poor and marginalized citizens. Most megacities in the Global South inherit urban governance from their colonial heritages, which were often criticized for its citizen-detached and top-down nature.

Dhaka is not an exception in this context. In the present socio-political condition, even though the environmental movement is not very welcomed by the government – more particularly from the ruling political party – it can have tremendous implications on redistributive urban politics. This chapter focuses on Dhaka, which is currently one of the world’s largest megacities in the Global South.

This chapter highlights the local patterns and process of the unequal environmental burdens and the subsequent mobilization, demanding environmental justice in that process, as well as how that movement contributes to redistributive urban politics. The discussions of this chapter also have the implications on public policy discourse focusing on environmental rights, movements, and citizens-centered politics in the megacities of the Global South, with renewed relationships between the state and its citizens.

Purpose – The goal of this chapter is to explore whether variation in the distribution of union members across the income distribution affects the role of unions in redistributive politics.

Design/methodology/approach – The conceptual part of the study provides a theoretical motivation for disaggregating organized labor by income. The empirical part uses European Social Survey data for 15 West European countries 2006–2008 to describe the composition of union membership by income across countries and to explore, in a preliminary fashion, the implications of where union members are located in the income distribution for social protection and redistribution.

Findings – In most countries, workers with incomes above the median are better organized than workers below the median and the income of the median union member exceeds the income of the median voter. The political implications of the overrepresentation of relatively well-off workers depend on the mechanism of preference aggregation within unions and the influence of unions in the policymaking process. While leaving a thorough examination of these issues for future research, we present descriptive regression results suggesting that the membership composition of unions by income is related to income inequality and redistribution but not social insurance.

Originality/value of paper – This is the first comparative study to map the distribution of union members across the income distribution and to examine the implications of compositional variation by income for redistributive politics.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of political influences on fiscal transfers from the central government to district assemblies in Ghana.

It adopted a redistributive politics model and estimated the two-step system generalized method of moment using electoral outcomes, and transfers data for 167 districts which were classified into swing and aligned, from 1994 to 2014.

The findings reveal that Gh₵6.28m on average was transferred to each district annually, which tend to increase by 8.4 percent in election years. Further, the swing districts received 5.2 percent more than the aligned districts.

The sharing mechanism is significantly influenced by political considerations as there exists a political budget cycle and a general dominance of swing effects.

The fiscal transfer system disregards the social principles of fairness and efficiency. Therefore, a wider consultative process in reviewing the formula is proposed; and this should be done in intervals of five years to minimize the indiscriminate adjustments of the sharing formula.

The paper empirically examines the political economy dynamics of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in a decentralized unitary system.

This paper looks at the role of redistributive politics and corruption in the utilization of foreign aid. We find that the governments in relatively poor countries have incentive to adopt ‘bad policies’ which do not improve the growth rate of the economy. On the other hand, the governments in relatively rich countries have more incentive to misappropriate the money increasing the corruption level of the economy, although they may pursue growth-enhancing policies. Therefore, it hints towards the existence of a positive correlation between the ‘good policies’ adopted in utilization of the aid money and the level of corruption in the recipient countries. The paper also finds that more aid-flow to the poorer (richer) countries increase (decrease) their levels of corruption.

This paper updates and expands Norton's 1979 study of the political economy of city life cycles in thirty jurisdictions. Using 1970 and 1976 fiscal data, Norton had found that older cities of the Northeast and North Central states provide a more extensive range of services and have a stronger commitment to social welfare functions than younger cities of the South and Southwest. A thirty-five city survey using 1991 data generally confirms his findings. We found significant differences in the service mix, spending patterns and revenue sources of older and younger cities. Older cities offer a broader mix of services with the most dramatic differences among redistributive and safety functions, and notable differences in the public works and administrative services categories. Older cities expend more per capita on local services and exhibit different spending priorities. They spend propor-tionately more on redistributive services, eg. health, hospitals, welfare and housing. They also spend more per capita on police, fire and education. On the revenue side, older cities depend more on commercial property taxes, while newer cities rely more on residential property taxes. The most significant difference on the revenue side, however, concerns the greater reliance of younger cities on locally generated non-tax sources (eg. user fees), whereas older cities remain more dependent on intergovernmental aid.

We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the USA and Spain – each of which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find that when individuals are informed about the determinants of income, there are no cross-cultural differences in giving. When uninformed, however, Americans give less than the Spanish. This difference persists even after controlling for beliefs, personal characteristics, and values.

Demands for atonement for past wrongs to ethno-cultural groups have become popular in Canada. On November 12, 2005, the Government of Canada announced to the Italian–Canadian community a package to atone for wrongs to individuals of Italian origin unjustly interned as enemy aliens during World War II. This package was part of the government's Acknowledgment, Commemoration, and Education Program.¹ The prime minster acknowledged, but did not apologize for, the injustice of the internment. $Can 12 million were set aside for commemorative projects, but not to compensate any individual survivors of the internment, or their heirs.² This money is part of a package of $Can 50million – double the $25million originally set aside in the 2005 federal budget – to compensate a number of ethno-cultural groups for injustices their real or fictive ancestors experienced.³ The editorial writers of Toronto's Globe and Mail objected to the government's encouragement of a “currency of grievance,” calling it “the antithesis of a forward-looking public policy.”⁴ This objection encapsulates the debate about public policies and monetary payments designed to compensate for past wrongs to groups, as opposed to policies and payments designed to redistribute wealth to groups and individuals suffering in the present.

Introduces a special issue on globalization and the welfare state. Asserts that economic globalization constrains national economic and social policy far more now than ever before, although the level of international trade has not increased that much compared to levels at the beginning of this century. Talks about the political consequences of economic globalization, particularly welfare state retrenchment in the advanced capitalist world. Outlines the papers included in this issue – comparing welfare system changes in Sweden, the UK and the USA; urban bias in state policy‐making in Mexico; and the developing of the Israeli welfare state. Concludes that economic globalization has a limited effect in shaping social welfare policy in advanced capitalist countries; nevertheless, recommends further research into which aspects of economic globalization shape social welfare policy.

The purpose of this paper is to inspect disaster risk reduction (DRR) challenges from a political economy (PE) perspective and to explore how PE determinants facilitate or hinder effective DRR in Bangladesh.

A qualitative case study, using semi-structured in-depth interviews, official documents and literature review has been conducted to explore the current process and practices of DRR in Bangladesh. The specific focus is on the distribution of public spending on flood shelters implemented by the Department of Disaster Management.

The study revealed a number of findings, including that the interest and incentives of influencing decision makers matter; formal and informal institutions have influence; and the values and ideas of dominating stakeholders’ impact on decisions regarding public spending of DRR in Bangladesh. These PE factors often hinder efficiency by leading to overlapping efforts and inefficient use of scarce resources. DRR planners and practitioners need to take steps to mitigate potential risks from PE processes in the allocations of DRR funding by implementing improved distribution arrangements.

Despite many successes in dealing with disasters, Bangladesh faces several challenges, including better governance of funds. DRR challenges can be considered as a problem of PE, which concerns the distribution of resources, and includes how powerful decision makers affect economic choices. Prior research examining the challenges in DRR-related funding distribution from a PE perspective is limited. Therefore, this study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on the situation in Bangladesh from this perspective. The authors elaborate how PE determinants can function as both barrier and opportunities on the ground in DRR-related fund distribution and in the selection of project locations and beneficiaries.