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Perhaps the most difficult objection raised by skeptics of the real options approach concerns the apparent lack of market transactions that would verify that real options have actual value. Although there are no organized exchanges with publicly disclosed prices, there are nevertheless several mechanisms for buying and selling real options. Observing these could offer important advantages in the quest for enhancing the role of real options in financial decision making:•demonstrate that real options can indeed add value•in some cases even gain a sense of the amount of value added by real options•offer expert appraisers methods for improved estimation of the value of a business when real options are part of the organizational capital

The most frequently used method for buying or selling real options occurs when a product that includes real options is sold to customers (often at a premium above the price of a comparable product that does not include real options). Real options that are part of the organizational capital of a business are part of the package in an acquisition (or minority equity position). In this chapter we examine several cases of such transactions.

I am interested in clarifying the discussion of how researchers might try to isolate real option effects to identify whether managerial decisions are guided by a real option heuristic. If we are to claim that the theory of real options illuminates managerial behavior, then as a field, we must converge on an understanding as to what constitutes a real option effect, and what does not. The discussion centers on hypothesis development, measurement issues, and research methodology.

Real options theory begins by drawing an analogy between real options and financial options. A financial option is a derivative security whose value is derived from the worth and characteristics of another financial security, or the so-called underlying asset. By definition, a financial option gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying asset at a specified price (i.e., the exercise price) on or before a given date (i.e., the expiration date). Financial economists Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) pioneered a formula for the valuation of a financial option, and their methodology has opened up the subsequent research on the pricing of financial assets and paved the way for the development of real options theory.

This paper categorizes and critiques the empirical research strategies that have been employed to test real options theory. Existing research has sought to detect valuable options in firms’ strategic investments as well as to investigate the payoffs from these investments. Our review highlights some of the evidence that has accumulated in recent years for real options theory. We flag some of the most important challenges and tradeoffs associated with the use of different empirical research approaches for testing real options theory in strategic management. The paper concludes by offering a number of research priorities to advance the theory by probing its descriptive validity as well as by addressing its normative aspirations to bridge corporate finance and strategy.

The application of real options theory to international strategy has surged in recent years. However, it is still a relatively new and loosely defined field, and there are several constraints on practical applications of this powerful theory. To move forward this field, the paper first provides a systematic analysis of theoretical and empirical contributions of real options theory to three critical issues in international strategy: (1) valuing multinational networks, (2) assessing market entry modes, and (3) evaluating market entry timing. The paper further suggests that future studies can focus on a refined treatment of uncertainty and the development of a dynamic theory in international strategy. Five testable propositions are developed in these directions.

We discuss recent developments in real options theory and its applications to strategic management research, examine the potential difficulties in implementing real options in theory and practice, and propose several areas for future research. Our review shows that real options theory has provided substantial insights into investment and exit decisions as well as into the choice of investment modes. In addition, extant research studies have contributed significantly to our understanding of whether and how organizations can benefit from real options. Future research that addresses difficulties in applications will further advance both real options theory and practice in strategic management. We call for future generations of research to enhance the impact of real options as an emerging dominant conceptual lens in strategic management.

Scholars have begun to recognize the importance of integrating organizational issues into real options theory. In doing so, some argue that options are inappropriate for evaluating critical strategic investments. In a more in-depth analysis, we argue that the organizational form that an option takes has a profound effect on exercise decisions. When options are initially integrated, organizational elements such as routines and culture become increasingly intertwined over time, raising the cost of abandoning the option – in effect, pushing firms to exercise options. In contrast, initially isolated options become idiosyncratic and more costly to integrate over time – pushing firms to kill them. There are also reputational and social capital effects that may bias exercise decisions beyond the mere consideration of costs, leading to escalation or missed opportunities.

Accordingly, firms must first be able to manage the associated organizational costs and minimize systematic bias in exercise decisions. Real options theory is moving away from the limitations of the financial options analogy and is increasingly integrated with strategy and organization theory. This shift requires that researchers consider issues such as intermediate organizational forms, external monitoring of exercise decisions, portfolios of competing options, and group process interventions.

We examine a central tenet of real option theory – whether real options influence managerial thresholds for investment. In contrast to prior studies that have focused on whether real options influence discrete investment decisions, our focus is on empirically isolating real options’ effects on thresholds. In particular, we examine the real options inherent in acquisition decisions. Our model posits that there are good reasons why we might expect there to be information asymmetry around the value of real options. Accordingly, if managers have unique information about growth options we might expect to observe them lowering their thresholds, perhaps to the point where they are willing to accept negative market returns. We further expect that the degree of information asymmetry for firm-specific growth options should be higher than for industry-specific growth options. Finally, we believe that managerial thresholds will be more prone to influence from growth options than deferment options. While thresholds are unobservable, we are able to isolate the effects of real options on acquisition thresholds by borrowing a method used originally in labor economics to isolate the determinants of reservation wages. Using a sample of over 28,000 acquisitions in the U.S., we find strong support for the model. These findings suggest that firms with low thresholds may choose to acquire despite comparatively low expected performance.

It is fundamental to good governance that corporate decision makers be well informed, have the knowledge-base necessary to use the information effectively, and share the same motivations as the owners. Further, managers must provide owners with accurate, timely, and complete disclosure of the company's positions. Regarding the first part of the problem, value-based incentive systems have been under development in order to aid in resolving conflicts of interest between owners who lack the specific information (or the background knowledge to utilize it) and the managers who act as their agents. Such systems often focus exclusively upon cash flows relative to resource investment; yet, share values are often substantially greater than the amount that could be explained by expected cash flows from existing operations. Indeed, in some firms the majority of share value may derive from growth opportunities or other real options that add flexibility or reduce risk. So, value-based incentive systems could be improved by explicitly rewarding actions that create or enhance the firm's real options. Further, satisfactory disclosure requires that accounting reports include adequate information about the firm's real options, with market-based mechanisms for defining the necessary information and calling it into the appropriate arena.

This study analyses the determinants of the value of a portfolio of real options and explores implications for strategic management. It focuses the analysis on four elements: the number of real options in the portfolio, constraints on the number of options that can be exercised, the volatility of underlying assets, and the correlation between underlying assets. These elements are articulated around a trade-off between growth options and switching options and are applied to different strategic situations of technological, market, and macroeconomic uncertainty.