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This paper examines the relationship between poison pills, real earnings management and initial public offering (IPO) failure.

The authors sampled 2,997 IPO firms that went public during 1993-2015.

The authors find that IPO firms manipulate earnings upward using real earnings management. The authors also find that IPO firms exhibiting a higher level of real earnings management have a higher probability of IPO failure. In addition, the authors find that weak shareholders' governance is positively associated with IPO failure.

These results suggest that poor governance structures in failed firms open the door to manipulating real activities and increasing operational risk.

The study findings are of most significant interest to potential investors and other stakeholders affiliated with a firm going public, an auditor, an underwriter, the lawyers who consult with the firm and employees or executives who might consider joining that firm.

The purpose of this study is to examine both accruals and real earnings management in a large sample of private companies in the UK using data from 2002 to 2009 following the implementation of the UK Act of 2006.

A panel data analysis using GMM has been adopted to examine the objectives of the study and answer the research questions.

The results of this study showed that the imposition of the Companies Act of 2006, on its own, did lead to changes in earnings management behaviour, in both accruals-based earnings and real earnings management. Moreover, this study also found that firms that chose to provide IFRS financial statements tended to show less discretionary earnings management, however, it tended to have no impact on real earnings management.

In accordance with the research findings, standard setters with some insight tend to determine how capital markets see the information provided under the legislation such as the UK Act of 2006 in developed countries and thereby ensure long-term sustainability in a modern and sophisticated financial world. This study provides an insight into the successful implementation of the UK act of 2006, and its influence on the aspect of financial reporting.

The novel conclusion reached in the study is that there exists a strong and direct link between the smooth implementation of UK Act of 2006 and the practices of both accruals and real earnings management in real-world business and financial scenarios, particularly, in private companies.

The aim of this paper is to provide additional insights on the association between real earnings management (REM) and crash risk, particularly from the perspective of an emerging market economy. It also examines the moderation role that internal and external corporate governance may play in this area.

Relying on archival data from the RESSET and CSMAR databases over a timeframe from 2010 to 2018 of China listed company, the authors test the hypotheses by regressing common measures of crash risk on the treatment variable (REM) and crash risk control variables identified in the prior crash risk literature. The authors also introduce monitoring proxies (internal controls as an internal governance and institutional ownership as an external governance) and assess how effective internal and external governance moderate the relation between REM and stock price crash risk.

The results suggest firms with higher REM have a significantly greater stock price crash risk, and that this association is mitigated by external monitoring. That is, greater institutional ownership, particularly pressure insensitive owners, mitigates the impact of REM on stock price crash risk. However, internal control does not mitigate the association between REM and stock price crash risk.

Following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act, prior research has documented an increase in the use of REM and a positive association between REM and cash risk. The authors demonstrate that they persist in one of the largest emerging markets where institutional regulations, market conditions and corporate behaviors are different from those in developed markets. Also, the assessment of the moderation effect of internal and external governance mechanisms could have meaningful implications for investors and regulators in Chinese and other emerging markets.

This paper aims to understand real earnings management behavior in the context of a parent–subsidiary relationship. It explores the differences between business groups and firms that do not have controlled subsidiaries and provides potential explanations for any measured difference.

The study uses the random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimation to find the difference between the real earnings management behavior of business groups, represented by the ultimate parent firms and the nonparent firms from 73 countries.

The results show that ultimate parent firms have lower abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses than nonparent firms. In contrast, parent firms have higher abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) than nonparent firms. The results are unexpected because abnormal production costs usually have a dominant direct relationship with abnormal CFO. The results indicate that business groups use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses.

The results reveal that parent firms use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results can be used to extend the discussion to specific business group cases, such as tracing the route or allocation of real earnings management (REM) pressure from a parent firm to its listed and private subsidiaries, and if the consolidation of minority voting rights and the transitivity of control affect the behavior in its subsidiaries.

Instead of the degree of diversification or affiliation, this paper investigates REM behavior based on the parent firm's control of its subsidiaries. With this approach, the study argues that business groups prefer a route other than manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results may redirect the attention of regulators to the activities of parent firms that need more policing.

The study investigated the relationship between residual audit fee and real income smoothening, proxied as real operating cash flow and production expenditure smoothing of non-financial firms in Nigeria.

The study relied on secondary data from annual financial statements of 75 firms in the non-financial sector from 2010 to 2019. The study estimated the residual audit fee using a modified model from several contexts to suit the Nigerian environment. The hypotheses were tested using the dynamic panel GMM estimation procedure.

The results showed a significant negative effect of residual audit fee on (real) operating cash flow smoothing and production expenditure smoothing of non-financial firms. The control variables showed mixed effects for the industry-related (firm size and profitability), auditor attribute (audit quality and audit report lag) and the board related (board size and board independence).

The firms included in the analysis were selected based on data availability from MachameRatios® and the occurrence of missing values for some of the variables used in the various estimation models may bias results.

The study identifies the nexus between RAF and real earnings management practices of non-financial firms; and shows the implication of fee payment to the overall conduct of the audit. More so, the mixed findings from the CVs suggest that in the context of developing economies, shareholders and capital markets regulators should be watchful of residual audit fees and utilise it as a gauge for audit quality and also an indicator of opportunism and weak internal control in the firm in the future assessments.

The implication of the study stems from its relevance to the capital market stability and the potential negative disastrous effect of corporate failure from earnings management practices.

The study develops a newly residual audit fee model to explore the effect of RAF on real income smoothing rather than the widely used models from prior literature; secondly, the focus on real activities manipulation may present additional evidence that applies to developing countries rather the widely used accrual measurement technique from an economic bonding perspective.

This paper examines how board structure influences real earnings management and the interaction effect of CEO narcissism on board structure-real earnings management relationship.

The authors used panel data derived from secondary sources from publicly listed firms in Kenya during 2002–2017. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that board independence, board tenure and size have significant negative effect on real earnings management, while CEO duality positively affects real earnings management. Further, the interaction results show that CEO narcissism moderates the relationship between CEO duality and real earnings management.

The results suggest that real earnings management reduces when boards are independent, large and comprising of long-tenured members. However, when the CEO plays dual role of a chairman, real earnings management increases. The authors also find that when CEOs are narcissists, the monitoring role of the board is compromised.

The study adds value to the understanding of how board structure and CEO narcissism influence the monitoring role of the board among firms listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of family control on the association between related party transactions (RPTs) and different forms of accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM), analyzing the effect of board characteristics on the possible association.

This paper studies a sample of Italian non-financial listed firms over the 2014–2019 period, by GLS regression models, controlling for the fixed effects of the company's sector of operation and the year.

Results indicate a different association between RPTs and earnings management (EM) in family and non-family firms. They point out that family firms use RPTs in association with downward AEM and REM perpetrated by abnormal discretionary expenses as well as a substitute of REM via abnormal production costs. For non-family firms, findings indicate only a substitution effect between RPTs and AEM. Furthermore, CEO duality, board gender diversity and the presence of the family on the board positively moderate the association between RPTs and, respectively, REM implemented through sales manipulations, downward AEM and upward AEM.

This study suggests that the socioemotional wealth (SEW) differently affects the relationship between RPTs and EM, according to the form of the latter. It also points out family firms' heterogeneity in earnings manipulations, by providing evidence of the moderating role of board characteristics on the association between RPTs and the various forms of EM.

This paper explores the relationship between earnings management and firms' value through the moderating effect of the missing elements – corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and state ownership in Russian companies. The main argument of the paper is that CSR disclosure can be used as a mitigating mechanism to weaken the negative relationship between earnings manipulation and market value. Additionally test whether state ownership is an important moderating factor in this relationship are conducted as state has always played an important role in the emerging Russian market.

The hypotheses are tested on panel data for 223 publicly listed Russian firms for the period 2012–2018. A number of robustness tests are used to check the obtained results for consistency. Following previous research GMM method is employed to address endogeneity concerns.

Supported by stakeholder theory, it is observed that firms that disclosed more CSR information experience a weaker negative relationship between earnings management and market value because investors and other stakeholders positively evaluate a positive CSR image. This negative effect of earnings management on market value is even weaker for state-owned companies as market participants appreciate involvement of state-owned companies in CSR activities and place greater expectations on these firms to be responsible without clear understanding whether these actions are “window dressing” for this type of companies or not.

The study results provide new insights into the relation between earnings management, firm's value, CSR disclosure and state ownership in emerging-market firms. The paper highlight the importance of considering country-specific factors, such as state ownership, while analysing the market reaction on CSR disclosure and earnings management since the institutional peculiarities may help to explain differences in the obtained results.

This study aims to see the moderating effect of board diversity on the relationship between ownership structure and real earnings management.

This study uses unbalanced panel data of 75 listed energy firms (346 firm-year observations) from three South Asian emerging economies (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) from 2015 to 2019. The two-step system GMM estimation is used for data analysis. This study also uses fixed effect regression to obtain robust findings.

The findings show that firms with a greater ownership concentration and managerial ownership significantly reduce real earnings management. In contrast, the data refute the idea that institutional and foreign ownership affect real earnings management. We also find that board diversity interacts significantly with ownership concentration and managerial ownership, meaning that board diversity moderates the negative link of the primary relationship that reduces real earnings management. On the other hand, board diversity has no interaction with institutional and foreign ownership, implying no moderating effect exists on the primary relationship.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is unique research investigating how different ownership structures affect real earnings management in the emerging nations’ energy sector, which the earlier studies overlook. More specifically, this research focuses on how board diversity moderates the relationships between ownership structure and real earnings management, which could be helpful for future investors.

The study aims at investigating the impact of real earnings management (REM) on the cross-sectional stock return after considering the moderating role of market effect, size effect, value effect and momentum effect.

The study uses weekly and monthly data of 3,085 Bombay Stock Exchange listed stocks spanning over twenty years, from January 2000 to December 2019. REM is measured through metrics developed by Roychowdhury (2006), namely, abnormal levels of operating cash flows, production costs and discretionary expenditure. The study employs univariate and bivariate portfolio-level analysis.

The findings deduced from the empirical results demonstrate that investors perceive downward REM as an element of risk; hence, they discount the stock prices at a higher rate. On the contrary, results show that investors positively perceive upward REM; hence, they hold the stocks even at a lower rate of return. This anomaly is found to be robust for all kinds of considered moderations.

The findings have important managerial implications as investors are found to assign different weights to different forms of REM, depending upon the perception regarding the magnitude of risk involved in different forms. Managers can accommodate this information during their short- and long-term corporate planning.

First, the study is among the earlier attempts to examine the association between REM and stock returns by considering the moderating role of cross-sectional effects. Second, the study considers the direction and endogenous nature of REM while investigating the issue.