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1 – 10 of over 18000Thi Thu Ha Nguyen, Salma Ibrahim and George Giannopoulos
The use of models for detecting earnings management in the academic literature, using accrual and real manipulation, is commonplace. The purpose of the current study is to compare…
Abstract
Purpose
The use of models for detecting earnings management in the academic literature, using accrual and real manipulation, is commonplace. The purpose of the current study is to compare the power of these models in a United Kingdom (UK) sample of 19,424 firm-year observations during the period 1991–2018. The authors include artificially-induced manipulation of revenues and expenses between zero and ten percent of total assets to random samples of 500 firm-year observations within the full sample. The authors use two alternative samples, one with no reversal of manipulation (sample 1) and one with reversal in the following year (sample 2).
Design/methodology/approach
The authors include artificially induced manipulation of revenues and expenses between zero and ten percent of total assets to random samples of 500 firm-year observations within the full sample.
Findings
The authors find that real earnings manipulation models have lower power than accrual earnings manipulation models, when manipulating discretionary expenses and revenues. Furthermore, the real earnings manipulation model to detect overproduction has high misspecification, resulting in artificially inflating the power of the model. The authors examine an alternative model to detect discretionary expense manipulation that generates higher power than the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Modified real manipulation models (Srivastava, 2019) are used as robustness and the authors find these to be more misspecified in some cases but less in others. The authors extend the analysis to a setting in which earnings management is known to occur, i.e. around benchmark-beating and find consistent evidence of accrual and some forms of real manipulation in this sample using all models examined.
Research limitations/implications
This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of misspecification of currently used models to detect real accounts manipulation.
Practical implications
Based on the findings, the authors recommend caution in interpreting any findings when using these models in future research.
Originality/value
The findings address the earnings management literature, guided by the agency theory.
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Salma Ibrahim, Li Xu and Genese Rogers
Prior research suggests that firms manipulate earnings through accruals to achieve certain reporting objectives. Recently, especially following the Sarbanes‐Oxley (SarbOx) Act…
Abstract
Purpose
Prior research suggests that firms manipulate earnings through accruals to achieve certain reporting objectives. Recently, especially following the Sarbanes‐Oxley (SarbOx) Act, researchers have turned their attention to real account manipulation as an alternative. However, there is no evidence on whether the likelihood of being detected by outsiders is different for firms using these alternative manipulation methods. The purpose of this paper is to examine this research question in the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).
Design/methodology/approach
First, the authors compare SEOs to a matched sample of non‐SEOs to document income‐increasing manipulation. Next, they identify SEOs that prompt lawsuits and compare sued and non‐sued firms to determine whether using a particular method of manipulation is more likely to be detected and associated with litigation.
Findings
The authors find evidence of income‐increasing accrual and real manipulation for SEOs in the year prior to the offering in the pre‐SarbOx period, and find some evidence of a shift to real account manipulation post‐SarbOx. The authors examine the subsequent litigation pattern of these SEOs, and find that firms that are subsequently sued have a higher prevalence of income‐increasing discretionary accruals when the lawsuit allegations involve accounting issues. Following SarbOx, investors are paying less attention to accrual manipulation through accounts receivable and there is more scrutiny of real account manipulation.
Originality/value
The implication in this paper is that firms that engage in income‐increasing earnings management are more likely to be sued when they engage in accrual manipulation while other forms of manipulation may be less understood. This finding is important to investors and regulators.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between managers’ short-term, quarterly earnings forecast characteristics and earnings management through real…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between managers’ short-term, quarterly earnings forecast characteristics and earnings management through real activities manipulation.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a propensity-score matched sample from 2000 to 2015, the author examines whether, compared to non-issuers, firms issuing short-term earnings forecasts exhibit abnormal levels of earnings management through the manipulation of real activities such as acceleration of sales, changes in shipment schedules and delaying R&D and maintenance expenditures.
Findings
The finding of this study suggests that firms actually engage in less real activities manipulation when they provide short-term management earnings forecasts. This result does not support the practitioners’ criticism that providing short-term management earnings forecasts increases earnings management. Instead, it suggests that providing management earnings forecasts can reduce information asymmetry between managers and external shareholders, thereby constraining managers’ opportunistic behaviors.
Originality/value
Practitioners have expressed concerns that issuing earnings forecasts may foster managerial myopia, therefore, increasing earnings management. However, recent empirical study found evidence that management earnings forecast mitigates accrual-based earnings management, which is inconsistent with practitioners’ view. This study hence aims to provide timely evidence to this debate by examining the relation between management earnings forecasts and real activities manipulation.
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Ratna Candra Sari, Mahfud Sholihin, Zuhrohtun Zuhrohtun, Ida Ayu Purnama, Patriani Wahyu Dewanti and Umi Syafaatul Udhma
The purpose of this study is to examine the trade-off between accrual and real activity earnings manipulation by considering gender and punishment as one aspect of clawbacks.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the trade-off between accrual and real activity earnings manipulation by considering gender and punishment as one aspect of clawbacks.
Design/methodology/approach
To achieve the research objectives, experimental design research was used, involving 183 professional accountants in Indonesia. This was followed by interviews with board members of public companies in Indonesia.
Findings
After the adoption of clawbacks, the intention to manipulate accruals decreased more among women than among men. However, the possible unintended consequences of clawbacks, particularly an increase in real activity manipulation, did not differ between women and men.
Originality/value
There are still few studies that use experimental designs to examine the consequences of clawback. Our study is expected to provide a novel contribution to the literature on the consequences of clawbacks as we use an experimental method. Besides, previous research that tested the consequences of clawback, using both archival and experimental data, had not considered the gender aspect, thus prompting this study to fill the research gap related to the consequences of clawback adoption by including the gender variable.
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Talie Kassamany, Salma Ibrahim and Stuart Archbold
This study aims to investigate the occurrence of pre-merger earnings management for a sample of 197 stock- and cash-financed UK acquirers between 1990 and 2009. It also examines…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to investigate the occurrence of pre-merger earnings management for a sample of 197 stock- and cash-financed UK acquirers between 1990 and 2009. It also examines the earnings management behaviour around the change in the Corporate Governance Code in 2003 based on the Higgs recommendations.
Design/methodology/approach
Mean and median accrual- and real-based manipulation are examined in the period before the announcement of a merger and acquisition. These are compared across stock and cash acquirers as well as before and after the implementation of the Higgs recommendations. Logistic regressions are also run to examine accrual- and real-based manipulation across stock and cash acquirers after controlling for variables that may affect the acquisition type.
Findings
The study found some evidence of upward pre-merger accrual-based earnings management by stock-financed acquirers, which is in line with the findings of Botsari and Meeks (2008). Furthermore, no significant changes were found in the post-Higgs period, which indicates that the recommendations put forth by Higgs may not have been successful in mitigating earnings management. The evidence also shows that cash bidders engage in pre-merger real earnings manipulation through lower discretionary expenses, possibly to enhance cash availability for the bid.
Practical implications
The findings in this study confirm earnings management exists around mergers and acquisitions and provide some evidence that the recommendations set out in the Higgs Report do not appear to have mitigated earnings management activities. This is of interest to regulators as well as investors and academicians.
Originality/value
This provides the first analysis in the UK examining the use of real-based earnings management activities by UK acquirers. It also extends prior research around corporate governance changes that occurred in the UK.
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Neerav Nagar and Mehul Raithatha
The authors examine whether internal corporate governance mechanisms are effective in curbing cash flow manipulation through real activities, misclassification, and timing.
Abstract
Purpose
The authors examine whether internal corporate governance mechanisms are effective in curbing cash flow manipulation through real activities, misclassification, and timing.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample comprises of firms from an emerging market, India with data for years 2004 through 2015. The authors use the methodology given in Roychowdhury (2006).
Findings
The authors find that corporate boards in India play an active role in curbing cash flow manipulation through real activities but fail to control cash flow manipulation through misclassification and timing.
Practical implications
The study suggests that corporate boards should pay more attention to the reported cash flow numbers. Regulators can reduce the opportunities available for cash flow misclassification by fixing relevant accounting and governance norms. Auditors can also help by critically focusing on the cash flow classifications presented by management.
Originality/value
This study, to the authors’ knowledge, is the first study that talks about the role of internal governance in a trade-off between different cash flow manipulation techniques.
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Lara M. Alhaddad, Mark Whittington and Ali Meftah Gerged
This paper aims to examine the extent to which real earnings management (REM) is used in Jordan to meet zero or previous year's earnings, and how this impacts the subsequent…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the extent to which real earnings management (REM) is used in Jordan to meet zero or previous year's earnings, and how this impacts the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms.
Design/methodology/approach
The study used a sample of 98 Jordanian listed firms over the 2010–2018 period. To test the research hypotheses, which are formulated in accordance with both, agency theory and signalling theory, multivariate regression is performed using a pooled OLS estimation. Additionally, a two-step dynamic generalised method of moment (GMM) model has been estimated to address any concerns regarding the potential occurrence of endogeneity issues.
Findings
The results show that Jordanian firms that meet zero or last year's earnings tend to exhibit evidence of real activities manipulations. More specifically, suspect firms show unusually low abnormal discretionary expenses and unusually high abnormal production costs. Further, consistent with the signalling earnings management argument, the authors find that abnormal real-based activities intended to meet zero earnings or previous year's earnings potentially improve the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms. This implies that REM is not totally opportunistic, but it can be used to enhance the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms. Our findings are robust to alternative proxies and endogeneity concerns.
Practical implications
The findings have several implications for policymakers, regulators, audit professionals and investors in their attempts to constrain REM practices to enhance financial reporting quality in Jordan. Managing earnings by reducing discretionary expenses appeared to be the most convenient way to manipulate earnings in Jordan. It provides flexibility in terms of time and the amount of spending. The empirical evidence, therefore, reiterates the crucial necessity to refocus the efforts of internal and external auditors on limiting this type of manipulation to reduce the occurrence of REM activities and enhance the subsequent operating performance of listed firms in Jordan. Drawing on Al-Haddad and Whittington (2019), the evidence also urges regulators and standards setters to develop a more effective enforcement mechanism for corporate governance provisions in Jordan to minimise the likelihood of REM incidence.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the body of the accounting literature by providing the first empirical evidence in the Middle East region overall on the use of REM to meet zero or previous year earnings by Jordanian firms. Moreover, the study is the first to empirically examine the relationship between REM and Jordanian firms' future operating performance.
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Nana Y. Amoah, Anthony Anderson, Isaac Bonaparte and Susan Muzorewa
This study aims to examine the use of real activities manipulation by firms implicated in the stock option backdating scandal.
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the use of real activities manipulation by firms implicated in the stock option backdating scandal.
Design/methodology/approach
The real activity manipulation measures are as follows: abnormal R&D expense, abnormal SG&A expense, abnormal production cost and abnormal cash flow from operations. Using a sample of firms alleged to have backdated options during the period 1998-2006 and non-backdating one-on-one matched firms, a separate regression is run for each of the real activity manipulation measures (dependent variables) on backdating and other variables.
Findings
The authors report unusually low R&D and unusually low SG&A expenses among the backdating firms. They also find evidence of unusually high production costs among backdating firms compared to the matched firms.
Research limitations/implications
The findings imply that backdating firms are more aggressive in the use of real activities to manipulate earnings and the use of real activities appears to be opportunistic.
Originality/value
The study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the use of real activities manipulation by firms under investigation for fraud. The authors also add to the debate on whether the use of stock options as part of compensation aligns the interest of management with the interest of shareholders.
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Apostolos Christopoulos, Ioannis Dokas, Christos Leontidis and Eleftherios Spyromitros
This paper attempts to investigate the effect of corruption on the real and accrual earnings management of target firms in the process of mergers and acquisitions.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper attempts to investigate the effect of corruption on the real and accrual earnings management of target firms in the process of mergers and acquisitions.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample includes target firms from the European area that participate in mergers or acquisitions announced during 2010–2020. The preliminary empirical part estimates the level of earnings management during the period two years before the deal's announcement to identify whether the sample follows the manipulation behavior that the literature suggests for target firms. The primary empirical analysis focuses on the impact of corruption on real and accrual-based earnings management proxies, employing regression models and two alternative proxies for corruption. The existing literature points out that the combination of low levels of corruption and an integrated legal system reduces earnings manipulation.
Findings
The findings provide strong evidence for systematic downwards accounting manipulation practices, whereas the findings for real earnings management are not significant. The findings of the main empirical part show that corruption is positively associated with accrual-based manipulation and negatively related to real earnings management. In essence, in economies with a high level of transparency, managers adopt the manipulation of operating activities as a less detectable practice of earnings management instead of engaging in accounting procedures.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the literature highlighting the diversification of these firms' manipulation strategies according to the national level's corruption status.
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Mahdi Moradi, Mahdi Salehi and Mohammad Zamanirad
– The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of managers’ incentive bonuses on both accrual and real earnings management.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of managers’ incentive bonuses on both accrual and real earnings management.
Design/methodology/approach
First, the authors investigate the relationship between managers’ bonuses and both accrual earnings management (measured by a modified Jones model) and real earnings management (measured by Roychowdhury proxies). Next, the authors examine whether management has any preferences for earnings management methods to enhance its bonuses. Finally, the authors investigate the possible effects of earnings management on future operating performance. The sample consists of compositional data in the period from 2006 to 2012.
Findings
The authors find a negative relationship between real earnings management and managers’ bonuses and detect that managers prefer to use accrual earnings management to earn more bonuses. The results also show that real earnings management will reduce a firm’s performance in future periods, and on the other hand that increasing managers’ bonuses links to improvement of the firm’s future performance. The results suggest that managers are typically aware of the negative effects of real earnings management on the firm’s future performance and thus prefer to improve the firm’s performance in securing their bonuses when their ability to manage accruals is constrained.
Originality/value
The implications of this paper provide further evidence on how managers’ bonuses affect their discretion in using accrual and real earnings management. This finding is important to investors and regulators.
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