Search results

The purpose of this study is to examine whether regulations can prevent financial crises based on the case of Sweden in the 20th century. The evolution of banking regulation relies heavily on learning across borders as well as responding to recent and remembered crises. Sweden went from being an open economy with a highly protected national banking system with several banking crises under the Classical regime, through the Statist regime with no crises followed by abrupt liberalisation in the 1980s as the country changed to a more market-based regime. This study examines the regulatory responses to crises in each of these periods to assess how, and whether, an often backward-looking regulatory framework can address forward-looking risks.

This study is a qualitative study using a historical method. The authors use archival material, official publications and statistical data as well as secondary literature to succinctly analyse crises and regulatory responses in different regulatory regimes in the 20th century. The theoretical framework builds on three macro- and microeconomic policy regimes, the Classical, the Statist and the Market regime.

The authors find that regulations can play a decisive role in alleviating a banking crisis, but the relationship between regulations and economic development is complex, and regulations alone cannot prevent a crisis.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first longitudinal study of banking regulations in Sweden and how these change in response to crises with the aim of improving the role of banks in financial intermediation and financial stability. This study contributes to a body of literature on financial crises with a long-term perspective and an assessment of regulations as a policy response.

This study aims to test the validity of the Rajan theory in South Africa and other selected emerging markets (Chile, Peru and Brazil) during the period 1975–2019.

In this study, the researchers used time-series data to estimate a Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) model with hierarchical priors. The BVAR technique has the advantage of being able to accommodate a wide cross-section of variables without running out of degrees of freedom. It is also able to deal with dense parameterization by imposing structure on model coefficients via prior information and optimal choice of the degree of formativeness.

The results for all countries except Peru confirmed the Rajan hypotheses, indicating that inequality contributes to high indebtedness, resulting in financial fragility. However, for Peru, this study finds it contradicts the theory. This study controlled for monetary policy shock and found the results differing country-specific.

The findings suggest that an escalating level of inequality leads to financial fragility, which implies that policymakers ought to be cautious of excessive inequality when endeavouring to contain the risk of financial fragility, by implementing sound structural reform policies that aim to attract investments consistent with job creation, development and growth in these countries. Policymakers should also be cautious when implementing policy tools (redistributive policies, a sound monetary policy), as they seem to increase the risk of excessive credit growth and financial fragility, and they need to treat income inequality as an important factor relevant to macroeconomic aggregates and financial fragility.

The authors examined the impact of the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) and Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) payments to United States agricultural producers on non-real estate agricultural loans.

The authors used quarterly, state-level commercial bank data from 2016–2020 to estimate dynamic panel models.

The authors found MFP and CFAP payments not associated with the percentage of non-real estate agricultural loans with payments over 90 days late. However, these payments associated with the percentage of non-real estate agricultural loans with payments between 30 and 89 days late. The available data utilized cannot consider when producers received the actual payment and what they specifically did with those funds.

The contribution of this study is for US policymakers and agricultural lenders. The findings could be helpful in designing and implementing future ad hoc payment programs and provide an understanding of potential shortcomings of the current safety net for agricultural producers in the Farm Bill. Additionally, findings can assist agricultural lenders in predicting the impact of ad hoc payments on their distressed loan portfolios.

Following the recent global financial crisis, US regulatory agencies issued laws to implement the Basel III accords to ensure the resiliency of the US banking sector. Theories predict that enhanced regulations may alter credit issuance of the regulated banks due to increased capital requirements, but the direction of changes might not be straightforward especially with respect to the agricultural loans. A decrease in credit availability from banks might pose a serious problem for farmers who rely on bank credit especially during economic recessions. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

In this study, the impact of Basel III regulatory framework implementation on agricultural lending in the USA is examined. Using panel data of FDIC-insured banks from 2008 to 2017, the agricultural loan volume and growth rates are examined for agricultural banks and all US banks.

The results show that agricultural loan growth rates have slowed down, but the amount of agricultural loan volume issuance still remained positive. More detailed examination finds that regulated agricultural banks have decreased both the agricultural loan volume and their loan exposure to the agricultural sector, showing a possible sign of credit crunch.

This study examines whether the implementation of the Basel III regulation has resulted in changes in agricultural loan issuance by US banks as predicted by the lending channel theory.

In this two-part case, Richard Davis and Stephen Hodgetts, co-owners of D&H Management LLC, are trying to come to terms with changes in the real estate market‐changes that have made their rental homes worth less than their mortgages and at best yielding at most a break-even cash flow. In Part A Davis and Hodgetts are weighing the following options: (1) sell all of the properties, assume a loss (walk away with nothing), and avoid the negative cash flow; (2) walk away from all of the properties, assume a loss (walk away with nothing), and avoid the negative cash flow; (3) delay paying the mortgage on some of the homes, allow these properties, if necessary, to go into foreclosure, and in the interim use the positive cash flow to shore up some of the more positive cash flow homes; (4) contact all of the lenders and try to renegotiate the mortgages so as to have lower monthly rates.

In Part B Davis proposes that he and Hodgetts go their separate ways. Davis walks away with the two properties that have mortgages in his name, while Hodgetts obtains the four properties that have mortgages in his. From Hodgettsʼ perspective this is a losing proposition since (1) he would have to take over the management of four “loser” properties rather than Davisʼs two, an ʼunfairʼ split of the liabilities; (2) he had no interest in managing properties; and (3) he and Davis would be splitting up a long-standing team.