Search results

This paper aims to examine the effect of managerial ability (MA) on real earnings management and the effect of real earnings management by higher ability managers on future profitability, at a different level of the crime rate.

The research sample includes 864 manufacturing firms-years listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. MA uses an efficiency score by data envelopment analysis. Real earnings management is measured by abnormal activities. The crime rate is measured by logarithm natural of the number of crimes per 100.000 citizens in the region where the firm is headquartered. Data analysis uses fixed-effect regression.

MA increases real earnings management in the region where the firm is headquartered with a higher crime rate while MA will reduce real earnings management in the region where the firm is headquartered with a lower crime rate. Also, real earnings management by higher-ability managers gives a signal of better future profitability in the region where the firm is headquartered with a lower crime rate.

This research contributes to filling the previous gap of managerial characteristics ability-related on real earnings management by providing regional crime rate as a determinant factor of managers’ ethical behavior. This research is the first one to considers the regional crime rate treatment to the relationship between MA and real earnings management especially in Indonesia. This research also provides new evidence of efficient real earnings management for a lower crime rate group of samples to give a signal of better future profitability.

The purpose of this study is to examine both accruals and real earnings management in a large sample of private companies in the UK using data from 2002 to 2009 following the implementation of the UK Act of 2006.

A panel data analysis using GMM has been adopted to examine the objectives of the study and answer the research questions.

The results of this study showed that the imposition of the Companies Act of 2006, on its own, did lead to changes in earnings management behaviour, in both accruals-based earnings and real earnings management. Moreover, this study also found that firms that chose to provide IFRS financial statements tended to show less discretionary earnings management, however, it tended to have no impact on real earnings management.

In accordance with the research findings, standard setters with some insight tend to determine how capital markets see the information provided under the legislation such as the UK Act of 2006 in developed countries and thereby ensure long-term sustainability in a modern and sophisticated financial world. This study provides an insight into the successful implementation of the UK act of 2006, and its influence on the aspect of financial reporting.

The novel conclusion reached in the study is that there exists a strong and direct link between the smooth implementation of UK Act of 2006 and the practices of both accruals and real earnings management in real-world business and financial scenarios, particularly, in private companies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships among corporate social responsibility (CSR), analyst forecast accuracy and firms’ earnings management behavior using US-based firms.

The authors use the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) database to construct CSR performance scores and divide all firms into ten groups from high to low as a proxy for CSR performance. The authors obtained an initial sample of 33,364 firm-year observations from 1991 to 2012. Filtering for records which exist in the KLD, Compustat, and Center for Research in Security Prices databases lefts a total of 16,807 firm-year observations and CSR evaluation reports for 5,896 firms.

The authors find that high CSR-score firms have lower rates of analyst forecast error than their low CSR-score counterparts, suggesting that CSR performance is a useful means of forecasting earnings. Furthermore, firms with better CSR performance have significantly lower accrual-based earnings management behavior. However, the level of the manipulation behavior of real earnings management (REM) activities increased significantly in better CSR firms, suggesting that high CSR-score firms substituted REM methods for accrual-based methods. REM methods are consistent with the stipulations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and allow high CSR-score firms to better manipulate earnings behavior. These results hold after the authors control for various factors related to firm financial characteristics.

Overall, the findings have important implications for investors and regulators to more easily assess firms’ earnings manipulation behavior and earnings stability under CSR performance and financial information in financial markets.

This paper aims to understand real earnings management behavior in the context of a parent–subsidiary relationship. It explores the differences between business groups and firms that do not have controlled subsidiaries and provides potential explanations for any measured difference.

The study uses the random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimation to find the difference between the real earnings management behavior of business groups, represented by the ultimate parent firms and the nonparent firms from 73 countries.

The results show that ultimate parent firms have lower abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses than nonparent firms. In contrast, parent firms have higher abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) than nonparent firms. The results are unexpected because abnormal production costs usually have a dominant direct relationship with abnormal CFO. The results indicate that business groups use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses.

The results reveal that parent firms use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results can be used to extend the discussion to specific business group cases, such as tracing the route or allocation of real earnings management (REM) pressure from a parent firm to its listed and private subsidiaries, and if the consolidation of minority voting rights and the transitivity of control affect the behavior in its subsidiaries.

Instead of the degree of diversification or affiliation, this paper investigates REM behavior based on the parent firm's control of its subsidiaries. With this approach, the study argues that business groups prefer a route other than manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results may redirect the attention of regulators to the activities of parent firms that need more policing.

In this study, the author examines the effect of managers’ perception of product market competition on accruals and real earnings management.

The author develops a new text-based measure of the emphasis managers place on product market competition by conducting a textual analysis of firms’ 10-K filings. Using this measure, the author conducts a battery of econometric analyses and robustness checks to investigate the impact of this measure of product market competition on measures of accruals and real earnings management.

This study finds robust evidence that when management perceives more competitive threats, they are more likely to engage in accruals-based earnings manipulation but are less likely to engage in real earnings management activity. The author argues that these findings are due to managers’ career concerns enticing them to manage earnings via accrual when competition is high, but that greater product market competition discourages real earning management activity as it can diminish firms’ competitiveness.

The findings of this paper have important policy and practical implications since it signals that managers’ perceptions of product market competition is able to affect accounting choices, information environments and economic outcomes in firms.

This study develops a new text-based measure of managers’ perception of product market competition with the aid of GPT-4. The author then using this measure provides firm-level evidence on how this relates to earnings management.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between voluntary disclosure of a statement of management's responsibility for the financial reports (MRF) and earnings management, both accrual and real earnings management, in firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).

The samples in this study are selected from listed companies on the SET in the year 2009. The multiple regression are used to test hypotheses.

The results show that the inclusion of a MRF has no association with both discretionary accrual and real earnings management activities (i.e. sales manipulation, a decrease in discretionary expenditures, and overproduction). The findings from the study reveal that firms with or without the MRF manipulate their earnings in a similar manner.

The sample for the study includes Thai listed firms in the year 2009 only. The small sample size may limit the validity of generalizations from these conclusions.

Based on the results, the regulators will know that the voluntary disclosure of management responsibilities on the financial reports is an ineffective tool to control earnings management.

Like Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, a disclosure of management responsibilities on the financial reports should be required by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand.

Investors will know that firms with or without the MRF manipulate their earnings in a similar manner. The voluntary disclosure of an MRF in Thailand does not guarantee earnings quality.

This paper examines the relationship between poison pills, real earnings management and initial public offering (IPO) failure.

The authors sampled 2,997 IPO firms that went public during 1993-2015.

The authors find that IPO firms manipulate earnings upward using real earnings management. The authors also find that IPO firms exhibiting a higher level of real earnings management have a higher probability of IPO failure. In addition, the authors find that weak shareholders' governance is positively associated with IPO failure.

These results suggest that poor governance structures in failed firms open the door to manipulating real activities and increasing operational risk.

The study findings are of most significant interest to potential investors and other stakeholders affiliated with a firm going public, an auditor, an underwriter, the lawyers who consult with the firm and employees or executives who might consider joining that firm.

The existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement.

In the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management.

The authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team.

As the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the qualitative effect of corporate governance components, in the form of managerial entrenchment index, on earnings management and innovation.

In this study, the variable of managerial entrenchment, which includes the variables of management independence, dual role of management, management tenure, the board compensation and the board ownership percentage, was initially estimated through the exploratory factor analysis and its effect was evaluated on the dependent variables of the study using the test of multivariable regressions. Hence, a total of 103 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange were selected and analyzed during 2011–2016. In this paper, the Jones model is used as the variable of accrued earnings management and for calculating the real earnings management, the models of abnormal operational cash flows, abnormal production costs and abnormal optional costs are employed. Moreover, the research and development cost to total costs ratio is used for calculating the innovation.

The results indicate a negative and significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and accrual-based earnings management; moreover, the entrenched managers are less likely to engage in manipulating the real activities accruals in Iran context. Furthermore, the findings show that there is a positive and significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and firm innovation.

What really sets this paper apart from other studies is that this research will make aware investors and stakeholders of this fact that managerial entrenchment will be a good way to diminish the manipulation of financial reporting and improve the corporate situation in emerging markets, particularly those bazaars facing with economic sanctions such as Iran. Undeniably, the study results will complete the knowledge gap between the developed economies and the emerging markets.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of the reclassification of International accounting standard (IAS) 39 on income smoothing using loan loss provisions among European banks.

Regression methodology is used to determine the extent of income smoothing using loan loss provisions before and after IAS 39 reclassification. The authors predict that the strict recognition and re-classification requirements of IAS 139 reduced banks’ ability to smooth income using bank securities and derivatives, motivating them to rely more on loan loss provisions to smooth income. The authors test this hypothesis over a sample of 114 European banking institutions over the period 2005 to 2013.

The findings do not support the prediction for income smoothing through loan loss provisions. Also, there is no evidence for income smoothing in the pre- and post-IAS 39 reclassification period.

The implication of the findings is that the European banks did not use loan loss provisions to smooth income during the period examined, and rather rely on other accounting numbers to smooth income. This implies that the International Accounting Standards Board’s strict disclosure regulation improved the reliability and informativeness of loan loss provision estimates among European banks during the period of analysis.

This study is the first attempt to analyze the effect of IAS 39 re-classification on bank’s ability to smooth income in Europe.