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Prior research suggests that firms manipulate earnings through accruals to achieve certain reporting objectives. Recently, especially following the Sarbanes‐Oxley (SarbOx) Act, researchers have turned their attention to real account manipulation as an alternative. However, there is no evidence on whether the likelihood of being detected by outsiders is different for firms using these alternative manipulation methods. The purpose of this paper is to examine this research question in the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).

First, the authors compare SEOs to a matched sample of non‐SEOs to document income‐increasing manipulation. Next, they identify SEOs that prompt lawsuits and compare sued and non‐sued firms to determine whether using a particular method of manipulation is more likely to be detected and associated with litigation.

The authors find evidence of income‐increasing accrual and real manipulation for SEOs in the year prior to the offering in the pre‐SarbOx period, and find some evidence of a shift to real account manipulation post‐SarbOx. The authors examine the subsequent litigation pattern of these SEOs, and find that firms that are subsequently sued have a higher prevalence of income‐increasing discretionary accruals when the lawsuit allegations involve accounting issues. Following SarbOx, investors are paying less attention to accrual manipulation through accounts receivable and there is more scrutiny of real account manipulation.

The implication in this paper is that firms that engage in income‐increasing earnings management are more likely to be sued when they engage in accrual manipulation while other forms of manipulation may be less understood. This finding is important to investors and regulators.

The use of models for detecting earnings management in the academic literature, using accrual and real manipulation, is commonplace. The purpose of the current study is to compare the power of these models in a United Kingdom (UK) sample of 19,424 firm-year observations during the period 1991–2018. The authors include artificially-induced manipulation of revenues and expenses between zero and ten percent of total assets to random samples of 500 firm-year observations within the full sample. The authors use two alternative samples, one with no reversal of manipulation (sample 1) and one with reversal in the following year (sample 2).

The authors include artificially induced manipulation of revenues and expenses between zero and ten percent of total assets to random samples of 500 firm-year observations within the full sample.

The authors find that real earnings manipulation models have lower power than accrual earnings manipulation models, when manipulating discretionary expenses and revenues. Furthermore, the real earnings manipulation model to detect overproduction has high misspecification, resulting in artificially inflating the power of the model. The authors examine an alternative model to detect discretionary expense manipulation that generates higher power than the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Modified real manipulation models (Srivastava, 2019) are used as robustness and the authors find these to be more misspecified in some cases but less in others. The authors extend the analysis to a setting in which earnings management is known to occur, i.e. around benchmark-beating and find consistent evidence of accrual and some forms of real manipulation in this sample using all models examined.

This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of misspecification of currently used models to detect real accounts manipulation.

Based on the findings, the authors recommend caution in interpreting any findings when using these models in future research.

The findings address the earnings management literature, guided by the agency theory.

This study aims to investigate the occurrence of pre-merger earnings management for a sample of 197 stock- and cash-financed UK acquirers between 1990 and 2009. It also examines the earnings management behaviour around the change in the Corporate Governance Code in 2003 based on the Higgs recommendations.

Mean and median accrual- and real-based manipulation are examined in the period before the announcement of a merger and acquisition. These are compared across stock and cash acquirers as well as before and after the implementation of the Higgs recommendations. Logistic regressions are also run to examine accrual- and real-based manipulation across stock and cash acquirers after controlling for variables that may affect the acquisition type.

The study found some evidence of upward pre-merger accrual-based earnings management by stock-financed acquirers, which is in line with the findings of Botsari and Meeks (2008). Furthermore, no significant changes were found in the post-Higgs period, which indicates that the recommendations put forth by Higgs may not have been successful in mitigating earnings management. The evidence also shows that cash bidders engage in pre-merger real earnings manipulation through lower discretionary expenses, possibly to enhance cash availability for the bid.

The findings in this study confirm earnings management exists around mergers and acquisitions and provide some evidence that the recommendations set out in the Higgs Report do not appear to have mitigated earnings management activities. This is of interest to regulators as well as investors and academicians.

This provides the first analysis in the UK examining the use of real-based earnings management activities by UK acquirers. It also extends prior research around corporate governance changes that occurred in the UK.

This paper aims at studying earnings management phenomenon in its wider social and economic context to get better understanding for the following points: whether there is “one-size-fits-all” earning management approach which can be widespread applied among nations and whether the Egyptian context affects managers’ trade-off between three different earnings management approaches: accounting, operational and investment.

The paper adopts interpretive approach and analyses data from official documents and 34 interviews with company executives; financial analysts; external auditors; and Stock Exchange regulators to inform our understanding of the influence of the Egyptian context on the trade-off between earnings management approaches.

The results show that there is no application for “one-size-fits-all” earning management approach; unlike the developed cultures, where R&D expenses and overproduction are extensively used for boosting profits, in Egyptian context they are not valid tools. The findings indicate that the Egyptian political and economic context remarkably affect managers trade-off earnings management approaches, leading executives to prefer operational manipulation compared with others.

This paper extends but adds to the literature by shedding light on the different implications of earning management theories based on the variation in the political, economic and operational contexts of firms; identifying that operational cash flows matter more to managers than accounting profits; focusing on the fact that managers differentiate and compare between three various earning management approaches: accounting techniques, investment activities and operational activities; and showing that changes in political and economic Egyptian context makes operational manipulation favorable to be adopted compared with others. It also overcomes the criticism of New Institutional Sociology Theory.

The purpose of this study is to examine both accruals and real earnings management in a large sample of private companies in the UK using data from 2002 to 2009 following the implementation of the UK Act of 2006.

A panel data analysis using GMM has been adopted to examine the objectives of the study and answer the research questions.

The results of this study showed that the imposition of the Companies Act of 2006, on its own, did lead to changes in earnings management behaviour, in both accruals-based earnings and real earnings management. Moreover, this study also found that firms that chose to provide IFRS financial statements tended to show less discretionary earnings management, however, it tended to have no impact on real earnings management.

In accordance with the research findings, standard setters with some insight tend to determine how capital markets see the information provided under the legislation such as the UK Act of 2006 in developed countries and thereby ensure long-term sustainability in a modern and sophisticated financial world. This study provides an insight into the successful implementation of the UK act of 2006, and its influence on the aspect of financial reporting.

The novel conclusion reached in the study is that there exists a strong and direct link between the smooth implementation of UK Act of 2006 and the practices of both accruals and real earnings management in real-world business and financial scenarios, particularly, in private companies.

The authors propose an alternative robust technique to test for discontinuities in distributions and provide consistent evidence of discontinuities around zero for both scaled and unscaled earnings levels and changes. The advantage of the proposed test is that it does not rely on arbitrary choice of bin width choices.

To evaluate the power of the test, the authors examine the density function of non-discretionary earnings and detect no evidence of discontinuities around zero in levels and changes of these non-discretionary earnings. As robustness, the authors use pre-managed earnings excluding accrual and real manipulation and find similar evidence.

The finding using our technique support the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) interpretation on earnings management, even for smaller sample sizes and reject the theory that discontinuities arise from scaling and sampling methods.

The study provides an overview of those studies that support and those that oppose using “testing for discontinuities” as a way to examine earnings management. The authors advance the literature by providing an alternative methodology supporting the view that the kink in the distribution represents earnings management.

This paper addresses the link between earnings management (EM) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

Data were collected from 317 Spanish SMEs to perform: (1) bivariate analysis between EM, CSR and some firm-factors (i.e. size, sector, sector life cycle stage, corporate age, family ownership, profitability and financial risk); and (2) multiple regression analysis for a better understanding of EM behavior and test the influence of sector life cycle stage variable.

Results emphasize the relevance of the sector life cycle stage as an explanatory factor. Firms operating in sectors that are growing or declining in terms of sales are more proactive to EM than those with consolidated sales levels. Stratified regression analysis also confirms that the stage of the industry life cycle influences the EM-CSR relationship. Only for SMEs with stable sales in maturity sectors, lower interest in EM can be significantly explained by higher CSR performance. Firms with regular sales levels show a more outstanding socially responsible commitment and are less pressured to legitimize their operational decisions and therefore show lower levels of EM involvement.

This paper makes a twofold contribution. On the one hand, it examines the relationship between EM and CSR, focusing on SMEs' context, in which EM study could be considered incipient. On the other hand, the controversial empirical evidence on the significance and sign of EM and social responsibility link could be explained by the stage of the life cycle of the sector in which each company operates.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the effects of accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and institutional and financial development on corporate risk of Latin-American firms.

The GMM estimator was used according to Arellano and Bond (1991) for panel data on a sample of 914 non-financial companies between 2005 and 2017.

AEM practices significantly increase corporate risk. This result indicates that the risk increase is associated to weakening of the corporate governance of companies. Positive discretionary accruals also have the same impact on corporate risk. In addition, accrual-based earnings management has a non-linear impact on corporate risk. Higher institutional and financial development systemically reduces the risk of Latin American firms. Institutional development can mitigate the effects of earnings management on corporate risk.

These results support that AEM represents a practice that managers use to weaken firms' corporate governance and expropriate wealth from shareholders. These practices promote higher firm's risk. However, the institutional and financial development reduces the corporate risk and contributes to mitigate the impact of AEM on it. These results have relevant implications for firms' corporate governance because they warn the relevance to control AEM practices and its impact over corporate risk perception by investors. These results also are relevant to policymakers because they orient the financial policies design to strengthen the institutional and financial development as a systematic way to reduce the firm's risk.

El propósito de este artículo es analizar los efectos de la gestión de ganancias basada en devengos (AEM) y el desarrollo institucional y financiero sobre el riesgo corporativo de las empresas latinoamericanas.

Se utilizó el estimador GMM de Arellano y Bond (1991) sobre una muestra de 914 empresas no financieras entre 2005 y 2017.

Las prácticas de AEM aumentan significativamente el riesgo corporativo. Este resultado indica que el aumento del riesgo está asociado al debilitamiento del gobierno corporativo de las empresas. Los devengos discrecionales positivos también tienen el mismo impacto en el riesgo corporativo. Además, la gestión de ganancias basada en el devengo tiene un impacto no lineal sobre el riesgo. Un mayor desarrollo institucional y financiero reduce sistémicamente el riesgo de las empresas. El desarrollo institucional puede mitigar los efectos de la gestión de ganancias sobre el riesgo corporativo.

Estos resultados revelan que AEM es una práctica que debilita los gobiernos corporativos y permite expropiar riqueza de los accionistas. Estas prácticas promueven un mayor riesgo corporativo, aunque el desarrollo institucional y financiero lo reduce. Estos resultados tienen implicancias relevantes para el gobierno corporativo de las empresas porque indican la relevancia de controlar estas prácticas en la percepción de riesgo de los inversionistas. Estos resultados también son relevantes para los reguladores porque orientan el diseño de políticas financieras hacia el fortalecimiento del desarrollo institucional y financiero como una vía sistemática que reduce el riesgo de las empresas.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of financial market rules in protecting minorities.

The study compares two alternative disclosure rules on insider trading, namely, the market abuse directive (Directive 2004/72/EC), inspired from the United State (US) insider trading regulation enacted by the Sarbanes–Oxley act and the transparency directive enacted by the European (Directive 2004/109/EC) dealing with the crossing of the shareholding threshold. To investigate which one is more effective in signaling reserved information, and thus in reducing information asymmetry, the authors run an event study on the French context, where both regulations are adopted. The data were hand collected from the French stock exchange securities commissions during the two years following the implementation of the two regulations in 2004. The final sample consists of 363 insiders trading and 35 crossing shareholding thresholds for 10 top French firms during the period 2006-2007.

The results show that the French market reacts significantly to insider trading, but poorly to the crossing shareholding thresholds. Abnormal returns are greater after insider purchases than after crossing up thresholds. These findings support the superiority of the insider disclosure regulation, as it has better information content and provides better protection to minorities.

The study contributes to the corporate governance literature by comparing two disclosure-trading policies. The authors conclude that regulation of disclosure of insider trading along the lines of US disclosure rules is more informative to the market and thus more relevant and important than disclosure of cross-threshold trades.

The study contributes to the corporate governance literature by comparing two disclosure-trading policies. The authors conclude that regulation of disclosure of insider trading along the lines of US disclosure rules is more informative to the market and thus more relevant and important than disclosure of cross-threshold trades. This finding can be helpful for the securities lawmakers and regulators in the process of insider trading law enforcement.

Previous researchers approached the question of insider trading focusing on the identity of insiders. In the research, the authors address the question from another perspective, namely, the crossing of thresholds. Another methodological contribution of the study is the use of a market model that incorporates GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic) effect and time-varying systematic risk parameter (β), which is recommended to tackle the classical event study problem of detecting the exact timing of the event.

This paper attempts to investigate the effect of corruption on the real and accrual earnings management of target firms in the process of mergers and acquisitions.

The sample includes target firms from the European area that participate in mergers or acquisitions announced during 2010–2020. The preliminary empirical part estimates the level of earnings management during the period two years before the deal's announcement to identify whether the sample follows the manipulation behavior that the literature suggests for target firms. The primary empirical analysis focuses on the impact of corruption on real and accrual-based earnings management proxies, employing regression models and two alternative proxies for corruption. The existing literature points out that the combination of low levels of corruption and an integrated legal system reduces earnings manipulation.

The findings provide strong evidence for systematic downwards accounting manipulation practices, whereas the findings for real earnings management are not significant. The findings of the main empirical part show that corruption is positively associated with accrual-based manipulation and negatively related to real earnings management. In essence, in economies with a high level of transparency, managers adopt the manipulation of operating activities as a less detectable practice of earnings management instead of engaging in accounting procedures.

This study contributes to the literature highlighting the diversification of these firms' manipulation strategies according to the national level's corruption status.