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A major theme in the literature on bank regulation is that greater reliance on market forces can mitigate the moral hazard problem inherent in government sponsored deposit insurance. Specific proposals to impose greater market discipline on banks include minimum requirements on (1) uninsured subordinated debt financing (either fixed-term or with option-type features), and (2) private coinsurance on deposits. Both proposals amount to delegating the responsibility for bank regulation to various private sector claimholders. The results suggest that such delegation (with or without claims that include option-type features) may be ineffective in lowering bank risk, at least within the present regulatory and institutional framework. Alternative mechanisms exist that can mitigate the moral hazard problem; however, it may be necessary for the regulator/deposit insurer to be an integral part of the solution.

Most spatial econometrics work focuses on spatial dependence in the regressand or disturbances. However, Lesage and Pace (2009) as well as Pace and LeSage2009 showed that the bias in β from applying OLS to a regressand generated from a spatial autoregressive process was exacerbated by spatial dependence in the regressor. Also, the marginal likelihood function or restricted maximum likelihood (REML) function includes a determinant term involving the regressors. Therefore, high dependence in the regressor may affect the likelihood through this term. In addition, Bowden and Turkington (1984) showed that regressor temporal autocorrelation had a non-monotonic effect on instrumental variable estimators.

We provide empirical evidence that many common economic variables used as regressors (e.g., income, race, and employment) exhibit high levels of spatial dependence. Based on this observation, we conduct a Monte Carlo study of maximum likelihood (ML), REML and two instrumental variable specifications for spatial autoregressive (SAR) and spatial Durbin models (SDM) in the presence of spatially correlated regressors.

Findings indicate that as spatial dependence in the regressor rises, REML outperforms ML and that performance of the instrumental variable methods suffer. The combination of correlated regressors and the SDM specification provides a challenging environment for instrumental variable techniques.

We also examine estimates of marginal effects and show that these behave better than estimates of the underlying model parameters used to construct marginal effects estimates. Suggestions for improving design of Monte Carlo experiments are provided.

Although extant post-acquisition literature has mainly focused on the integration of stand-alone firms, many acquisitions involve select units that were divested from former parents. Scholars have therefore recently called for moving beyond the dominant dyadic acquirer–target view of the acquisition process to a triadic view that considers the roles of, and interactions between, divestors, targets, and acquirers in the acquisition process. The authors set out to build an extended process view of such triadic relations based on a five-year longitudinal case study of one entrepreneurial company, acquiring two divested units from large multinational companies. The case sheds light on how divestors and acquirers together shape synergy realization efforts and identity-building by targets, causing dramatic shifts in perceptions of success throughout the acquisition process. The authors hope the case offers greater understanding, and triggers more research, into mingled integration and disintegration processes. The authors also highlight three impediments that can shape post-acquisition choices and discontinuous processes when acquiring divested units.

We consider two economic aspects of required reserves on bank deposits, their impact on bank-intermediated investment versus direct investment and their opportunity cost. We show that Bank reserves serve as a buffer to mitigate inefficient liquidation of a bank's assets in order to meet the demand for liquidity by investors. Due to some transaction costs or information costs, investors may prefer bank-intermediated investment to direct investment. Banks offer investors competitive deposit returns compared to the liquidation value of investment to attract funds from investors. If the Federal Reserve allows banks to set their individual optimal level of reserves, this might mitigate costs associated with required reserves. If banks implement the social optimum, this may introduce additional fragility into the banking system. We argue that required reserves might lead to deadweight loss if they are set above a bank's optimally determined reserves.